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I. INTRODUCCIÓN 
 
A continuación se expone lo que comenzó siendo un trabajo sobre los 
intercambios de información y ha terminado siendo un estudio sobre las bases 
dogmáticas y teóricas del artículo 101 TFEU.  
En principio, podría parecer que estas dos cuestiones no guardan ninguna 
conexión entre sí. No obstante, como el lector comprenderá, existe un nexo lógico 
entre ambas.  
Tradicionalmente, los intercambios de información se configuraron como 
prácticas facilitadoras de los cárteles y, como tales, permitían extraer conclusiones 
y mayores indicios sobre la existencia de los mismos.  
No obstante, con el paso del tiempo, la Comisión Europea ha ido ampliando 
su relevancia, llegando a concluir que los intercambios de información pueden 
constituir, por sí mismos, una infracción del Derecho de la competencia. Esta 
nueva figura se conoce como los intercambios autónomos de información.  
A grandes rasgos, el reconocimiento de esta infracción supone, de hecho, 
una anticipación considerable de la frontera de protección del bien jurídico 
protegido “competencia”. Ya no es necesario demostrar la existencia de un cártel, 
sino que es suficiente demostrar que el intercambio podría llevar, con toda lógica, 
a la formación de dicho cartel.  
Ello plantea a nuestro modo ver tres grandes cuestiones (con sus múltiples 
derivadas) que se tratan en la presente tesis: si existe una base económica para 
ello, si es razonable jurídicamente ampliar la frontera de protección y, por último, 
si ello tiene cabida dentro del artículo 101 TFEU.  
Este último precepto liga los tres elementos. Desde el momento en que se 
pasa a sancionar esta conducta, que anticipa la defensa del bien jurídico desde la 
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lesión hasta la puesta en peligro, es necesario cuestionarse el espacio vital del 
artículo 101 TFEU. En otras palabras, qué y hasta donde protege el artículo 101.  
La presente tesis trata de responder a las tres preguntas que se planteaban 
anteriormente a través del estudio de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia, los 
precedentes normativos del Artículo 101 TFEU, los trabajos económicos sobre 
colusión y, particularmente, la dogmática jurídica clásica continental.  
A. La necesidad de una exégesis dogmática del artículo 101 
TFUE  
La presente tesis se ocupa de estudiar, en primer lugar, el artículo 101 TFUE 
desde una perspectiva dogmática.  
Usamos aquí el término dogmático bajo su concepción continental 
tradicional.1  Esto es: un análisis conceptual, histórico y sistemático que trata de 
comprender el sistema jurídico que se esconde tras la jurisprudencia comunitaria 
sobre colusión.2 
                                            
1 Larenz, K. Metodología de la Ciencia del Derecho. Barcelona: Ariel, 2009, página 215 y 
siguientes (la versión original en alemán se titula “methodenlehre der rechtswissenschaft”). 
 
2 El significado mismo del concepto de Sistema en la dogmática jurídica es muy debatido, e 
incluso entre los que coinciden en la existencia de un Sistema existen discrepancias en cuanto a su 
significado exacto. Véase  García Amado, J.A. “Teorías del sistema jurídico y concepto de 
derecho” Anuario de filosofía del derecho 2, 1985. 297-316 (García Amado, 1985). En lo que 
prosigue,  analizaremos el Derecho de la competencia como un Sistema desde la perspectiva de 
Cannaris. Esto es como un sistema abierto y en evolución caracterizado por unos principios 
generales a modo de directrices que guían su funcionamiento y donde existe una unidad y 
coherencia teleológica. Canaris, C.W. El sistema en la jurisprudencia. Madrid: Fundación Cultural 
del Notariado, 1999 (la versión alemana se titula “systemdenken und system begriffe in der 
jurisprudenz”). 
 
En nuestra opinión, existen varios factores que explican la ausencia de dicho Sistema teórico en el 
Derecho de la Competencia. En primer lugar, la relativa juventud de este ámbito del Derecho en 
comparación con otras disciplinas. En segundo lugar, su difícil encaje entre el Derecho 
administrativo, mercantil y penal. En tercer lugar, la gran importancia que siempre se ha dado a la 
teoría económica por encima de otros factores y la necesidad de conceptos muy flexibles 
adaptados a las evoluciones cambiantes de los mercados y la política económica. En cuarto lugar, 
la influencia del derecho del “common law” y su enfoque casuístico de los problemas, junto con la 
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Evidentemente, todos sabemos que la ciencia jurídica no es ni perfecta ni 
exacta,3 y mucho menos el Derecho de la competencia. De hecho, no podemos 
obviar que el Derecho de la competencia debe adaptarse y funcionar en muchas 
culturas jurídicas diferentes.4 No obstante, ello no significa que no se susceptible 
de un análisis jurídico crítico y sistemático.5  
Aunque pueda parecer simplista es indubitado que toda la arquitectura 
jurídica del Derecho de la competencia en torno a la colusión descansa en un 
único artículo de los Tratados: el artículo 101 TFUE.6  
                                                                                                                       
utilización del mismo por magistrados poco acostumbrados al análisis crítico del precedente 
propio de los ordenamientos anglosajones.  
 
3 (Larenz, 2009) op. cit. y Viehweg, T. Tópica y Jurisprudencia. Pamplona: Thomson-Civitas, 
2007 introducción de García de Enterría: “Puede resultar paradójico que un libro como éste que 
reclama para la ciencia jurídica su humildad y sus limitaciones resulte a la postre liberador y 
ampliador de horizontes, pero estos efectos son siempre una virtud de la verdad, sea cual fuere, y 
no del poder y de la fuerza. No es poco librar al Derecho como ciencia de esa suerte de complejo 
de inferioridad que ha venido padeciendo desde que el mundo moderno perfeccionó las ciencias 
físicas o axiomáticas. Otro es nuestro camino y por tanto nuestra dignidad.”  
 
4 Tal y como el sistema positivista continental basado en la comprensión de la norma, la búsqueda 
de su significado y la aplicación al caso sobre la base de la comprensión teórica de los conceptos 
en ella contenidos, o el sistema del “common law” enfocado a una visión casuística de los 
problemas y el desarrollo cognitivo mediante la experiencia – i.e. a través del estudio de casos con 
casuísticas similar para identificar principios o tópicos de aplicación regular a los mismos que se 
mejoran con la repetición continuada de los casos.  
 
5 (Larenz, 2009) op. cit. pág. 221 “Lo que queremos expresar es una serie de “doctrinas” conexas 
entre sí acerca de lo que es Derecho vigente, que como tales pueden ser participadas, 
transmitidas y aceptadas como base de ulteriores reflexiones con vistas a la solución de 
cuestiones jurídicas concretas; es decir, que ejercen una “función de estabilización” en el sentido 
de Esser.” (Canaris, 1999) pág. 112 “En lo que se refiere al modo de operar del sistema en el 
aseguramiento de la unidad y coherencia en la obtención del derecho, su efecto puede ser tanto 
conservador como dinamizador y, por tanto, tanto puede obstaculizar como impulsar el desarrollo 
del derecho. En el primer caso una determinada solución se rechaza por “contraria al sistema”, 
en el segundo caso se desarrolla una solución nueva como exigida por el sistema; en el primer 
caso se trata en lo esencial de evitar contradicciones valorativas, en el segundo de establecer 
lagunas.” 
 
6 Disponible en http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E101:EN:HTML  
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Podría pensarse que ello facilita considerablemente la labor a los juristas y, 
sin embargo, la vasta literatura sobre la materia demuestra que, ya desde la 
promulgación del Tratado de Roma en 1957, las pocas oraciones recogidas en esta 
norma han atribulado por igual a abogados, funcionarios, magistrados y 
académicos.7  
Nuestro objetivo aquí no es sugerir que el artículo 101 TFUE ha sido 
interpretado erróneamente desde sus comienzos. Al contrario, creemos que el 
artículo 101 TFUE siempre fue una cláusula general (y ambigua) de prohibición.8 
Precisamente en ello reside su principal virtud, pues permitió que fuese 
promulgado por 6 países con tradiciones jurídicas muy diferentes y, 
posteriormente, ha facilitado su rápida adaptación a los cambios en la política 
del Derecho de la competencia.  
El problema es que el mandato impuesto por los redactores del Tratado - 
en el artículo 103 TFUE (83 TCE) - de desarrollo de los principios contenidos 
en el artículo 101 TFEU en un régimen administrativo sancionador autónomo 
(con sus correspondientes infracciones y sanciones administrativas) no ha sido 
llevado debidamente ejecutado, ni por el Reglamento 17/62 ni por el 
Reglamento 1/2003.9  
                                            
7 Odudu, O. "Interpreting Article 81(1): Object as Subjective Intent." European Law Review, 2001 
disponible en http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/faculty-resources/10008953.pdf y la literatura allí 
contenida.  
 
8 Esta cláusula protege el principio general de libre competencia. Utilizamos el término principio 
en el sentido dado por Alexy, Alexy, R. "On the Structure of Legal Principles." Ratio Juris. Vol. 
13 No. 3 September 2000, 2000: 294-304, otros autores preferirían una categorización distinta, por 
ejemplo, principios en sentido estricto, (Atienza Rodríguez, M., y J. Ruiz Manero. "Sobre 
principios y reglas." Doxa: Cuadernos de filosofía del derecho 10, 1991: 101-120), o principios 
regulatorios, Ferrajoli, L., y J. Ruiz Manero. "Un diálogo sobre principios constitucionales." Doxa 
34, 2012: 361-375 o cláusulas general Miquel Rodríguez, J.M. "Cláusulas generales y desarrollo 
judicial del Derecho." Anuario de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid 
1, 1997: 297-326. En cualquier caso, lo relevante es que no existe una regla (un tipo) en el sentido 
clásico del concepto, sobre el desarrollo desde los principios hasta las reglas (y viceversa) véase 
(Canaris, 1999) op. cit. page 66.  
 
9 Como se razonará el Reglamento1/2003 trata principalmente las cuestiones procedimentales pero 
por lo que se refiere a la aplicación del Artículo 101 TFEU por las Autoridades no realiza ningún 
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En ausencia de un régimen administrativo sancionador adecuado, lo 
oportuno habría sido que este se supliese mediante una revisión estricta, por 
parte del Tribunal de Justicia, de la práctica decisoria de la Administración para, 
de este modo, desarrollar un sistema de reglas ciertas y sanciones que se 
derivasen del artículo 101 TFUE.  
Debemos comenzar, por tanto, esta tesis con una disculpa, rogando al 
lector que perdone el descaro de nuestros argumentos, que esperamos no 
ofendan a ninguna de las mentes brillantes que durante los últimos 50 años han 
coadyuvado al desarrollo del Derecho de la competencia en Europa.10 Dos 
sólidos argumentos justifican, no obstante, estas licencias.   
En primer lugar, la incertidumbre constante que rodea al artículo 101 
TFEU en la literatura académica respecto de cuestiones nada menores:11 ¿Qué 
significa el Derecho de la competencia?;12 ¿Qué son infracciones por objeto y qué 
por efecto?;13 ¿Cuál es la relación jurídica existente entre el artículo 101.1 y el 
                                                                                                                       
aportación sustantiva. No proporciona un nivel mayor de detalle o de especificación, simplemente 
renvía al intérprete del artículo 23.1 a la norma originaria, el Tratado.  
 
10 Aun cuando el Tratado de Roma se promulgó en 1957, el Derecho Europeo de la competencia 
no dio sus primeros pasos hasta la aprobación del Reglamento 17/62.  
 
11Motta, M. Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004. Bishop, S., and Walker, M. The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application 
and Measurement. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2010 ayudan a comprender mejor la continua 
incertidumbre que acompaña a la mayoría de cuestiones de índole económica en Derecho de la 
competencia.  
 
12Lianos, I. " Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law." CLES 
Working Paper Series, 2013. 
 
13 Odudu, O. "Interpreting Article 81(1): Object as Subjective Intent." European Law Review, 
2001. El autor trató de desarrollar una interpretación coherente de la ambigua jurisprudencia sobre 
el significado de objeto proponiendo un polisemia (subjetiva y objetiva) o Lianos, I. "Collusion in 
Vertical Relations Under Article 81 EC." 45 Common Market Law Review, 2008 quien sostiene 
que el enfoque formalista seguido por los Tribunales se encuentra teórica y prácticamente viciado. 
Disponible en http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1089681 
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101.3TFUE?;14¿Cuál es el significado de acuerdo y cómo se diferencia del de 
prácticas concertadas?15   
En segundo lugar, las dudas similares que parecen existir en Luxemburgo, 
tal y como la reciente sentencia en Groupement français des Cartes Bancaires 
(“CB”) demuestra.16 En este asunto, el Tribunal de Justicia falló que el Tribunal 
General había cometido un error de derecho al concluir que una conducta 
concreta constituía una infracción por objeto.  
En nuestra opinión, estas cuestiones reflejan claramente la necesidad de 
una conceptualización jurídica del artículo 101 TFUE. Después de todo, si esta 
norma ha estado en vigor 50 años, cómo es posible que el Tribunal General se 
equivoque en algo tan básico y, más aún, cómo es posible que existan tantas 
preguntas sin repuesta.  
Esta tesis ofrece una contestación sencilla pero contundente: el motivo 
último de estos problemas se debe a que los fundamentos jurídicos del artículo 
101 TFUE (al contrario que los económicos) no han sido adecuadamente 
estudiados y desarrollados, todavía.17  
                                            
14 Faull, J., and A. Nikpay. The EU Law of Competition. Oxford: OUP, 2014.  
 
15 Wish, Richard. Competition Law. Oxford University Press, 2012. Bellamy & Child. European 
Community Law of Competition . Oxford: OUP, 2008. Ghezzi, F., and M. Maggiolino. "Bridging 
EU Concerted Practices with U.S. Concerted Actions." 10 Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics 3, 2014 quienes afirman: “On the theoretical level, EU antitrust institutions have 
always struggled to defined the three notions of agreements, decision by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices separately one form the other”.  
 
16 C-67/13 P, Groupement des cartes bancaires (CB) c. Comisión, sentencia de 11 de septiembre 
de 2014, en adelante “CB”.  
 
17 Una de las conclusiones que se desprende de nuestra investigación es que el Derecho de la 
competencia se ha visto fuertemente expuesto a la teoría económica, más que a otras ramas del 
Derecho (como el Derecho penal o administrativo). El resultado ha sido la utilización de dos 
lenguajes (el jurídico y el económico) que no comparten el mismo vocabulario y que no persiguen 
los mismos fines.  
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Ahora bien, no se trata, sin embargo, de un error achacable a los padres del 
Tratado, ellos eran perfectamente conscientes de que el artículo 101 TFUE era 
una norma imprecisa y sin una base teórica jurídica sólida, tenía que serlo para 
ser aprobada.  
Como demostraremos, la raíz del problema se sitúa en la promulgación del 
Reglamento 17/62 y la jurisprudencia consiguiente y se agrava con la 
aprobación del Reglamento 1/2003, particularmente, cuando la prohibición (y 
sanción) de los cárteles (secretos) se convirtió en una prioridad para la Comisión 
Europea. 
En aquel tiempo, los esfuerzos de las Autoridades (tanto en Bruselas como 
en Luxemburgo), se centraron en la mejor comprensión de la literatura 
económica sobre organización industrial y microeconomía,18 en lugar de tratar 
de proporcionar al artículo 101 TFUE, las bases teóricas que siempre había 
necesitado.19  
La presente tesis trata de revertir esta tendencia mediante una 
interpretación dogmática del artículo 101 TFEU, a través de las aportaciones 
realizadas por la doctrina administrativa, penal y constitucional continental. 
                                            
18 Nótese que el puesto del Economista Jefe se creó en septiembre de 2003. Para más información 
sobre el mismo, véase Roller, L. H., y P. A. Buigues. "The Office of the Chief Competition 
Economist." European Commission, 2005. Una explicación de cómo este puesto se creó tras las 
decisines del Tribunal de Justicia en Airtours, Tetra Laval y Schneider, véase Lianos, I., and D. 
Geradin. Handbook on European Competition Law: Enforcement and Procedure. Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2013, pág. 310.  
 
19 La siguiente cita de la Comisión Europea en el "White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules 
Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty" es muy reveladora: “The reform proposed in 
this White Paper, namely the introduction of such a directly applicable exception system, has three 
main elements: the ending of the system of notification and authorisation, decentralised 
application of the competition rules, and intensified ex post control. The approach taken to the 
application of Article 85 will continue to be rigorously economic.” 
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Con ello esperamos que el lector se convenza, al final de la tesis, de que 
éstas pueden resultar, al menos, de igual importancia, para el desarrollo del 
Derecho de la competencia, que la teoría microeconómica.20  
B.  Estructura  
La presente tesis se divide en tres bloques temáticos que persiguen resolver 
las tres preguntas formuladas al comienzo. Estos son: un estudio abstracto de la 
naturaleza jurídica y el funcionamiento sistemático del artículo 101 TFUE (parte 
I); un estudio de las bases económicas de los intercambios de información 
autónomos, junto con su encaje actual en el artículo 101 TFUE (parte II); y, por 
último, una propuesta que propugna una interpretación del artículo 101 TFEU que 
permitiría la prohibición sin sanción de los intercambios de información como 
practicas autónomas, de manera conforme con los principios rectores de un 
sistema administrativo sancionador (parte III).   
En la primera parte, exploramos los orígenes del artículo 101 TFUE y 
tratamos de comprender la naturaleza jurídica de la norma con la ayuda de las 
herramientas cláisicas de la dogmática jurídica continental.   
Aquí demostraremos como existe una distinción fundamental, que no ha 
sido adecuadamente identificada, entre la aplicación del artículo 101 TFEU como 
una cláusula general de prohibición, por un lado, y la imposición de sanciones, 
como consecuencia de la infracción del artículo 101 TFUE (a resultas la remisión 
del artículo 23.2.a) del Reglamento 1/2003), por otro.   
Esta distinción deviene crucial en tanto que existen conductas que pueden 
quedar englobadas dentro de la cláusula general y, por tanto, ser prohibidas, pero 
                                            
20 Si el Derecho de la competencia se ha utilizado como herramienta intellectual para analizar otros 
campos del derecho, véase Rock, E. "Corporate Law through an Antitrust Lens." 92 Colum. L. 
Rev., 1992, no vemos porque no debería intentarse el mismo proceso a la inversa. Véase Alfaro, J. 
"El Proceso de Configuración del Derecho de la competencia a la luz de la doctrina del Tribunal 
de Justicia de la Unión Europea." eXtoikos (eXtoikos), 2014.  
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que no pueden subsumirse (y por tanto ser sancionadas) dentro de los tipos 
administrativos infractores que desarrollan el artículo 101 TFUE.   
En la segunda parte, analizamos una de las infracciones del artículo 101 
TFUE más controvertidas: los intercambios autónomos de información. Esta parte 
se divide en dos bloques temáticos.  
Primero, realizamos un análisis descriptivo de la teoría económica sobre los 
intercambios de información. Demostraremos que existen razones para pensar que 
se pueden extraer inferencias solidas sobre el posible resultado anticompetitivo de 
determinados intercambios de información. No obstante, también expondremos 
las dificultades que existen en la mayoría de casos de calificar un intercambio de 
información como pro-competitivo o infra-competitivo ex ante.  
Posteriormente, exploramos la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justica para 
comprender su encaje en el Artículo 101 TFUE. En esta sección expondremos 
como el concepto amplio de intercambio de información se desarrolló y amplió 
(junto con el de prácticas concertadas) en un contexto muy concreto: el de la lucha 
contra los cárteles secretos, largos y complejos.  
Demostraremos, además, como esta jurisprudencia se trasladó 
posteriormente a los intercambios de información como infracciones autónomas, 
sin un análisis crítico, convirtiendo esta infracción en un cajón de sastre de todo 
comportamiento mínimamente colusorio, distorsionando de este modo el 
significado jurídico de concertación o coordinación.21  
                                            
21 En esta línea, véase (Ghezzi & Maggiolino, 2014) op. cit.  “the EU institutions have always 
wanted to frame the class of concerted practices as a catch-all device to grasp the species of 
collusion that do not amount to agreements” y la nota al pie 9 explicando la Decisión IV/31.149, 
1986 O.J. L 230, § 87, donde la Comisión argumentó que el concepto de práctica concertada es 
una herramienta “to forestall the possibility of undertakings evading the application of Article 
[101] by colluding in an anticompetitive manner falling short of a definite agreement”. 
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En la tercera parte, proporcionamos los que, en nuestra opinión, deberían 
ser los parámetros clave en el análisis de los intercambios de información como 
prácticas autónomas.  
En esta sección explicamos una serie de conceptos clásicos de todo sistema 
sancionador: a) los diferentes bienes jurídicos que tratan de proteger los sistemas 
penales o administrativos (individuales o colectivos); b) los mecanismos para 
protegerlos (delitos de peligro o de daño), y c) los principios que deberían guiar la 
aplicación los mismos (culpabilidad, lesividad y legalidad).  
Mediante la comprensión de estos conceptos razonamos porqué, en nuestra 
opinión, puede concluirse que el artículo 101 TFUE previene, en la mayor parte 
de casos, delitos de peligro, esto es, conductas que siendo peligrosas no son 
necesariamente dañinas.22   
Como corolario de lo anterior, justificamos, por un lado, porqué únicamente 
en aquellos casos en que exista un daño evidente, o la proximidad al daño sea más 
que obvia, resulta adecuado imponer una sanción administrativa y, por otro, 
porqué en la mayoría de casos, la reacción de las Autoridades deberá limitarse a la 
adopción de medidas de restablecimiento de la legalidad (por ejemplo, mediante 
medidas de cesación).    
Por último, exponemos como la traslación de este marco jurídico a los 
intercambios de información, como infracciones autónomas, proporciona un 
método alternativo de análisis jurídico de los mismos. Esto es, como conductas 
infractoras de la cláusula general del artículo 101 TFUE pero no necesariamente 
en la aplicación sancionatoria del artículo 23 Reglamento 1/2003. Por ello, 
concluimos que, en muchos casos, los intercambios autónomos de información 
deberán ser prohibidos pero no sancionados.  
                                            
22 Véase Immenga, U., y E.J. Mestmäcker. Wettbewerbsrecht, Band 1. EU, Teil 2. Munich: C.H. 
Beck, 2012, pág. 407 “Daher handelt es sich bei Art. 23 Abs. 2 Unterabs. 1 lit. a i. V.m. Art. 81 
Abs. 1 EG (jetzt: Art. 101 Abs. 1 AEUV) um ein Tätigkeitsdelikt in der Form eines abstrakten 
Gefährdungsdelikts.”  
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C. Nuestras conclusiones  
Primera, las consecuencias jurídicas que se derivan del Artículo 101 
TFUE (como cláusula general) y las que se derivan de la infracción del 
Artículo 101 TFUE como infracción administrativa (por la remisión del 
Artículo 23.2.a) del Reglamento 1/2003) no deben confundirse.   
En efecto, la primera es una cláusula prohibitiva que acarrea la sanción 
civil de nulidad, mientras que la segunda es un tipo de infracción administrativa 
con su correspondiente sanción.  
Existen, por lo tanto, dos consecuencias jurídicas distintas asociadas a la 
infracción del Artículo 101 TFUE, la nulidad establecida en el artículo 101.2 
TFUE y la sanción administrativa fijada en el Artículo 23 del Reglamento 
1/2003.  
La interacción entre estas dos consecuencias jurídicas es compleja. El 
artículo 101.1 TFUE es, en primer lugar, una cláusula general de prohibición, 
tanto desde la perspectiva sistemática como histórica. Sin embargo, los 
redactores del Tratado previeron que, conforme se fuese instaurando una cultura 
de la competencia en Europa, determinadas infracciones del artículo 101 TFUE 
resultarían tan flagrantes, tan dañinas para la competencia, que deberían ser 
sancionadas, dado el riesgo que generarían y la necesidad de disuasión de las 
mismas. Este es el mandato que se contiene en el artículo 103 TFUE.  
De lo anterior se desprende es que existen determinadas conductas 
infractoras - que necesariamente se engloban en el artículo 101 TFUE - que 
merecen una sanción mayor que la mera consecuencia civil de nulidad. El mayor 
problema que plantea, por tanto, el artículo 23.2.a) del Reglamento 1/2003 es 
que no define expresamente las conductas que deberían entenderse englobadas 
en esta interpretación más protectora del artículo 101 TFUE o, al menos, qué 
requisitos deberían guiar a las Autoridades a la hora de determinar el nivel de 
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reproche jurídico adecuado para cada infracción específica del artículo 101 
TFUE.  
En otras palabras, cualquier conducta que infringe el Artículo 23.2.a) y por 
lo tanto acarrea una sanción administrativa es necesariamente una infracción del 
artículo 101 TFUE en sentido amplio y exige la imposición de la sanción civil. 
Sin embargo, no toda infracción del artículo 101 TFUE debe acarrear 
necesariamente la sanción administrativa prevista en el artículo 23.2.a) del 
Reglamento 1/2003.  
Dicho de otra manera, no toda conducta que amenaza a la competencia 
necesita ser castigada, únicamente aquellas que claramente tiene ese efecto 
sobre la base de una experiencia previa pueden serlo. El resto de conductas que 
por su objeto o sus efectos (y utilizamos estos términos deliberadamente) 
puedan prevenir o distorsionar la competencia simplemente deben ser 
prohibidas.  
La ausencia de un marco normativo expreso, detallando los criterios para 
distinguir qué conductas deben entenderse englobadas en el artículo 23.2.a) del 
Reglamento 1/2003, obliga a los Tribunales Europeos a desarrollar una serie de 
reglas que permitan una aplicación del Derecho de la competencia acorde a los 
principios de legalidad, seguridad jurídica, lesividad y culpabilidad.  
Esta conclusión conlleva, a su vez, dos reflexiones jurídicas de gran 
interés. 
Por un lado, las sanciones monetarias23 - previstas en el artículo 23 del 
Reglamento 1/2003 – son la consecuencia jurídica (sanción administrativa) 
                                            
23  La Comisión ha señalado que el propósito de las multas es doble “the purpose of fines is 
twofold: to impose a pecuniary sanction on the undertaking for the violation and prevent a 
repetition of the offence, and to make the prohibition in the Treaty more effective”, véase el 
décimo tercer informe de política de Competencia 1983 para 62. Wils, W. The optimal 
enforcement of EC antitrust law: essays in law & economics. The Hague: Kluwer International, 
2002.pág. 13.  
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impuesta por el sistema como resultado de la infracción de un tipo 
administrativo y, por tanto, deben ser impuestas de conformidad con los 
principios desarrollados por el Derecho administrativo sancionador.24 Ello 
supone, al menos, que éstas deben ser graduadas en función del riesgo que 
presentan para la competencia (lesividad), así como la voluntad subjetiva o 
negligencia de las partes involucradas (culpabilidad). 25   
Por otro, el artículo 101 TFUE puede y debe ser aplicado como una cláusula 
general de prohibición sin necesidad de recurrir al artículo 23 del Reglamento 
1/2003. En otras palabras, su carácter imperativo conlleva que pueda, y deba, ser 
usado por las Autoridades de competencia para imponer medidas de 
prohibición/cesación.26  
                                            
24 Huergo Lora, A. Las Sanciones Administrativas. Madrid: Iustel, 2007. 
 
25 Wils, W. "Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice." 29 World Competition 2, 2006: 
 “With regard to the first task of clarifying the content of the antitrust prohibitions, fines do not 
appear to play a significant role” and footnote 35 “Indeed, in those cases where a competition 
authority would take a decision or bring a prosecution so as to clarify that a certain behaviour, 
the illegality of which was previously not clear, violates the antitrust prohibitions, the imposition 
of a fine would legally not be possible. In the case of fines imposed by the European Commission 
for violation of Articles 81 or 82 EC, the 'intent or negligence' required by Article 23(2) of 
Regulation No 1/2003, as note 6 above, would be lacking; see also Judgment of the EC Court of 
First Instance of 30 September 2003 in Joined Cases T-191/98 etc. Atlantic Container Line and 
Others v Commission [2003] ECR 11-3275, paragraphs 1611 to 1633.” 
 
26 En esencia, el razonamiento es que del artículo 101 TFUE se extrae una cláusula general y una 
infracción administrativa como resultado del incorrecto uso de los poderes conferidos por el 
artículo 103 TFUE. El principio general incorpora únicamente la prohibición y por tanto la 
facultad de cesación (artículos 101.1 and 101.2 TFUE) lo que, permite, una aplicación regulatoria 
(ex ante), mientras que la infracción administrativa (artículo 23 del Reglamento 1/2003) se aplica 
ex post. Este distinción es más evidente en el derecho antitrust norteamericano dado los diferentes 
(aunque confusos) roles de la FTC (como regulador) y el DoJ (como fiscalizador) respectivamente.  
 
Véase entre otros Kovacic, W. y M. Winerman. "Competition Policy and the Application of 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act." 20 Minn. J. Int'l L. 274 , 2010: 1001-1022. 
Cooper, J. "The Perils of Excessive Discretion: The Elusive Meaning of Unfairness in Section 5 of 
the FTC Act." George Mason University Law and Economics Research Papers, 2014 and 
Hovenkamp, H. "The Federal Trade Commission and The Sherman Act." Florida Law Review, 
Vol. 62, 2010.  
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En otras palabras, no todas las infracciones del artículo 101 TFEU deben 
acarrear una sanción administrativa, puesto que el Artículo 101 TFEU no 
comparte la misma naturaleza jurídica que el Artículo 23 del Reglamento 
1/2003.  
Si bien la norma primigenia del artículo 23.2.a) del Reglamento es 
indudablemente el artículo 101 TFUE, su ámbito de aplicación es distinto. El 
artículo 23.2.a)del Reglamento 1/2003 nos dice que existen determinadas 
conductas que infringen el artículo 101 TFUE de una manera tan patente que 
deben ser sancionadas económicamente.  
En conclusión, todo ello asevera que las Administraciones disponen de un 
amplio margen de maniobra en la toma de decisiones, siempre y cuando sean 
congruentes con las consecuencias jurídicas impuestas como resultado de las 
conductas bajo investigación.  
En segundo lugar, para poder coludir, las empresas deben llevar a 
cabo actos preparatorios que, dependiendo de las circunstancias, deberán 
ser sancionados con multas menores que la colusión o incluso no 
sancionados. 27 En otras palabras, todo crimen puede ser cometido, pero 
también preparado (diseñado) o intentado, ¿por qué debería ser distinto para las 
infracciones del Derecho de la competencia?  
Como demostraremos, la mayoría de infracciones del artículo 101 TFUE 
son delitos de peligro. El infractor no es sancionado por el daño concreto causado 
a unos individuos específicos. En su lugar, el malhechor es reprendido por el 
                                                                                                                       
De manera análoga en Suiza con el tratamiento dado al asunto ASCOPA, véase Alfaro, J. “Como 
se analiza un intercambio de información o qué bien legislan los suizos: Caso suizo de cosmética 
de lujo." Blog Derecho Mercantil, February 23, 2012.  
 
27 En cierta manera, se podría decir que seguimos el camino abierto por (Lianos, Some Reflections 
on the Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law, 2013) op. cit. donde afirma “defining the 
contours of what constitutes true unilateral conduct is essential in order to define the concept of 
antitrust agreement and not the opposite”.  
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peligro, más o menos cierto, que su conducta causa a la “competencia” como bien 
jurídico protegido.28  
Los intercambios de información van un paso más allá, ampliando el campo 
de protección del bien jurídico “competencia” a aquellas prácticas que pueden 
facilitar la creación de dicho riesgo. Como tales, creemos firmemente que deben 
ser sancionadas siguiendo unos criterios muy precisos. 
En tercer lugar, la traslación de estas observaciones al campo de los 
intercambios de información lleva a la conclusión de que existe una base 
teórica suficiente para incorporar una doctrina de la “invitación a coludir” 
que prevendría la divulgación unilateral de información que, aunque 
constituye un supuesto muy peligroso, no encaja bien en el significado 
tradicional de coordinación utilizado por la jurisprudencia.29  
                                            
28 Schaub, A. "Working Paper X." In European Competition Law Annual 2000: The 
Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy, by C. Ehlermann, & I. Atanasiu. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2001 pág. 247 “It is clear from the very content of the Treaty that effective competition constitutes 
a public good that must be protected”. Schaub era el Director General de Competencia en aquella 
época.  
 
29 Véase la interesante conversación entre el Abogado General Mayras en Dyestuffs y el Abogado 
General Vesterdorf en Rhône-Poulenc (infra note 449),  II-934 “In a later section, devoted to the 
adverse effect on competition, Mr Advocate General Mayras further stated (p. 682, right-hand 
column) : 'However, there are some academic writers who say, attaching particular importance to 
objective factors in defining the concept of a concerted practice, that to fall under Article 85 such 
a practice must actually and concretely have had the effect of altering the conditions of 
competition. In his opinion on the Chemiefarma case, Mr Advocate General Gand seemed to take 
the same view. He said ... . I have already given you to understand that my opinion is not very far 
removed from that expressed in those words. Would it be possible to go further and to take into 
consideration not the result, the actual effect of the practice, but also its potential effect} There 
can be no doubt that it would seem curious for a concerted practice which has not had any 
material effect on the competitive situation, despite the intention of the participants and because of 
circumstances beyond their control, to escape the application of Article 85.1 should be tempted to 
say that in such a case merely to attempt or to initiate execution would be enough to justify the 
application of Article 85(1).' What is interesting about that argument for the purposes of the 
present cases is that Mr. Advocate General Mayras tries to introduce a doctrine of attempt into 
the concept of concerted practice as used in Article 85(1). However, the theory ventured by him 
has not been supported or commented upon in later judgments of the Court of Justice or by its 
Advocates General.”  
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Esta doctrina de la “invitación a coludir” evitaría que las Autoridades y los 
Tribunales tuviesen que continuar ampliando el significado de coordinación más 
allá de los límites de lo razonable. Asimismo, resultaría plenamente coherente 
con una interpretación amplia del artículo 101 TFUE, como cláusula general, 
siempre y cuando la consecuencia jurídica derivada de la infracción se 
circunscribiese a la imposición de órdenes de cesación.30   
En conjunto, creemos que una mejor comprensión del artículo 101 TFUE 
puede ayudarnos a lidiar con aquellos casos que se encuentran en los límites de la 
norma, tales como los intercambios de información y que, precisamente por ello 
ayudan a cohonestar la norma con el sistema jurídico en el que se inserta.31  
Dicho de otra manera, existe un modo distinto de conceptualizar 
jurídicamente los intercambios de información, lo que a su vez mejorará nuestra 
comprensión de las prácticas concertadas y, en último, lugar del artículo 101 
TFUE.  
                                                                                                                       
De hecho, esta propuesta no es tan original. En 1953 cuando el Gobierno francés promulgó el 
Decreto, cuya redacción se considera uno de los precedentes del artículo 101 TFEU, incluyó 
expresamente la siguiente mención: “Est assimilé à la pratique des prix illicites le fait: (…) 3º Par 
toute personne responsable d’une action concertée de se livrer ou d’inciter à se livrer à une 
pratique prohibée para l’article 59 bis de la présente ordonnance” 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf/common/jo_pdf.jsp?numJO=0&dateJO=19530810&pageDeb
ut=07045&pageFin=&pageCourante=07046 
 
30 Esta no es una propuesta tan drástica si se considera que esto es precisamente lo que sucede en 
la mayoría de casos de terminación convencional (compromisos). De hecho, durante las 
conversaciones previas a la modernización, el Libro Blanco reconoció la posibilidad de que la 
Comisión fuese más allá de la imposición de sanciones en la toma de decisiones:  
 
“It is true that the Commission would no longer adopt exemption decisions under Article 85(3) as 
it does now, but it should nevertheless be able to adopt individual decisions that are not 
prohibition decisions. Where a transaction raises a question that is new, it may be necessary to 
provide the market with guidance regarding the Commission’s approach to certain restrictions in 
it. Positive decisions of this kind would therefore be taken in exceptional cases, on grounds of 
general interest.” 
 
31 (Canaris, 1999) op. cit. Después de todo, debemos plantearnos cómo es posible que la misma 
conducta – intercambiar información – admita prácticamente cualquier caracterización jurídica en 
derecho de la Competencia. O, cómo, hechos similares pueden dar lugar a conclusiones distintas 
dependiendo de la autoridad  a cargo de la investigación, o incluso, cómo es posible que una única 
divulgación unilateral de información de lugar a una infracción por objeto.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In what follows we record what began as an investigation of information 
exchanges under EU competition law and ended up becoming a dogmatic and 
theoretical study of Article 101 TFEU.  
At first sight, one could think that there is no link between these two issues. 
However, as the reader will understand while reading these pages, there is a 
logical nexus among them.  
Traditionally, information exchanges were configured as facilitating 
practices of a cartel or other collusive arrangements. As such, jointly with other 
evidence, they allowed making inferences and drawing conclusions about the 
existence of a collusive agreement or concerted practice.  
However, as time passed (and a culture of competition settled down in 
Europe), the European Commission has broadened their area of influence. Today, 
information exchanges can, on themselves, amount to a competition law 
infringement. These are called “self-standing information exchanges”. 
The upbringing of such an infringement implies, de facto, advancing the red 
lines that safeguard Article 101 TFEU. It is no longer necessary to show the 
existence of a cartel, it merely suffices showing that the exchange (or disclosure) 
could most logically end up in a cartel, for the practice to be prohibited and 
punished.  
To our mind, this raises three fundamental questions: is there an economic 
basis for such conclusion? Is it legally reasonable to do so? And more 
importantly, how does this infringement fit within the wording of Article 101 
TFEU? 
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This last question links the two key themes of the dissertation. From the 
moment that there is an infringement that sanctions the risk inflicted to 
competition rather than the harm actually caused, we must question ourselves, 
what and how is that Article 101 protects.    
This thesis answers the three questions posed above by reference to the case 
law of the ECJ, the historical precedents of Article 101 TFEU, the economic 
studies on collusion and, particularly, the use of the classic continental legal 
theory.   
A. The need for a dogmatic exegesis of Article 101 TFEU 
This dissertation devotes a considerable effort to study Article 101 of the 
Treaty Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) from a dogmatic 
perspective.  
We use dogmatic in the traditional “continental” legal sense of the word.32 
This means: a conceptual, historical and systematic analysis that seeks to define 
and understand the legal system behind the competition law jurisprudence on 
collusion.33 
                                            
32 Larenz, K. Metodología de la Ciencia del Derecho. Barcelona: Ariel, 2009, page 215 and seq. 
(the German version is titled “methodenlehre der rechtswissenschaft”). 
 
33 The concept of a system within the law is, in itself very debated, and even within those that 
agree that there is a system, there are discrepancies about the exact meaning of such a system. See  
García Amado, J.A. “Teorías del sistema jurídico y concepto de derecho” Anuario de filosofía del 
derecho 2, 1985. 297-316 (García Amado, 1985)  In what follows, we envision the competition 
law system as a whole and as part of the rule of law from Cannaris’ perpection. That is as an open 
and evolving system, characterized by guiding general principles and where there must be a 
teleological coherence and unity. Canaris, C.W. El sistema en la jurisprudencia. Madrid: 
Fundación Cultural del Notariado, 1999 (the German version is titled “systemdenken und system 
begriffe in der jurisprudenz”). 
 
 In our opinion, several factors which might explain the lack of such a theory in competition law 
yet. First and foremost, the relative youth of the subject as opposed to other fields of the law. 
Secondly, its unclear placing between administrative, corporate and criminal law. Thirdly, the role 
played by economic theory in competition law and the Public Authorities’ need to adapt to 
evolving market circumstances. Fourthly, the influence of the common law and the case law 
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Obviously, we all know that the legal science is not perfect or exact,34 and 
even less competition law. In fact, we cannot disregard that EU competition law 
has to adapt and work in many different legal cultures.35 However, it is still 
amenable and it should be subject to critical and systematic legal reasoning.36  
Even if it sounds simplistic, it is undisputed that the whole European 
Competition law architecture on collusion rests, ultimately, just on one Article of 
the Treaties: Article 101.37  
One would think that this facilitates the job for competition practitioners 
and, yet, the vast legal literature on collusion reveals that, ever since the 
                                                                                                                       
approach to competition law coupled with magistrates unaccustomed to this system, which has 
resulted in a tendency to follow precedents without the proper critical analysis. 
 
34 (Larenz, 2009) op. cit. and Viehweg, T. Tópica y Jurisprudencia. Pamplona: Thomson-Civitas, 
2007 foreword by García de Enterría: “Puede resultar paradójico que un libro como éste que 
reclama para la ciencia jurídica su humildad y sus limitaciones resulte a la postre liberador y 
ampliador de horizontes, pero estos efectos son siempre una virtud de la verdad, sea cual fuere, y 
no del poder y de la fuerza. No es poco librar al Derecho como ciencia de esa suerte de complejo 
de inferioridad que ha venido padeciendo desde que el mundo moderno perfeccionó las ciencias 
físicas o axiomáticas. Otro es nuestro camino y por tanto nuestra dignidad.”  
 
35 Such as the civil (positivist) one based on the understanding of the norm, the search for its 
meaning and its application to the facts based on the theoretical meaning of the concepts 
embedded in the norm, or the common law (casuistic) approach based on the process of learning 
by practice- i.e. through the study of cases sharing similar fact patters in search for principles or 
topics that can be applied regularly to them and tuned thanks to their recurring occurrence.  
 
36 (Larenz, 2009) op. cit. page 221 “Lo que queremos expresar es una serie de “doctrinas” 
conexas entre sí acerca de lo que es Derecho vigente, que como tales pueden ser participadas, 
transmitidas y aceptadas como base de ulteriores reflexiones con vistas a la solución de 
cuestiones jurídicas concretas; es decir, que ejercen una “función de estabilización” en el sentido 
de Esser.” (Canaris, 1999) page 112 “En lo que se refiere al modo de operar del sistema en el 
aseguramiento de la unidad y coherencia en la obtención del derecho, su efecto puede ser tanto 
conservador como dinamizador y, por tanto, tanto puede obstaculizar como impulsar el desarrollo 
del derecho. En el primer caso una determinada solución se rechaza por “contraria al sistema”, 
en el segundo caso se desarrolla una solución nueva como exigida por el sistema; en el primer 
caso se trata en lo esencial de evitar contradicciones valorativas, en el segundo de establecer 
lagunas.” 
 
37 Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E101:EN:HTML  
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enactment of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the few sentences contained in this 
norm have troubled lawyers, officials, professors and magistrates alike.38  
Our purpose is not to argue that Article 101 TFEU has been misinterpreted 
ever since its enactment. On the contrary, our position is that Article 101 TFEU 
has always been a general (prohibitive) clause.39 This, rather than an 
imperfection, is one if its strengths as it has allowed it, first, to get approved by 
six States with very different legal traditions and, secondly, to adapt to the 
changes in the understanding of competition law and competition enforcement.  
The problem is that the drafter’s mandate – contained in Article 103 TFEU 
(83 TEC) - to develop the principles embedded in Article 101 TFEU into an 
administrative sanctioning system (with its corresponding rules and sanctions), 
has not been adequately fulfilled either by Regulation 17/62 or by Regulation 
1/2003.40  
In the absence of a properly developed system of administrative 
sanctioning rules, this required a strict review by the ECJ of the Commission’s 
practice (before clearly setting out rules and sanctions derived from Article 101 
TFEU), which has not happened either.  
                                            
38 Odudu, O. "Interpreting Article 81(1): Object as Subjective Intent." European Law Review, 
2001 available at http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/faculty-resources/10008953.pdf and the literature 
contained therein.  
 
39 We use the term principle in Alexy’s sense, Alexy, R. "On the Structure of Legal Principles." 
Ratio Juris. Vol. 13 No. 3 September 2000, 2000: 294-304, other authors would prefer a different 
categorization such as a principle in strict sense (Atienza Rodríguez, M., and J. Ruiz Manero. 
"Sobre principios y reglas." Doxa: Cuadernos de filosofía del derecho 10, 1991: 101-120), 
regulatory principles, Ferrajoli, L., and J. Ruiz Manero. "Un diálogo sobre principios 
constitucionales." Doxa 34, 2012: 361-375 or general clauses Miquel Rodríguez, J.M. "Cláusulas 
generales y desarrollo judicial del Derecho." Anuario de la Facultad de Derecho de la 
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid 1, 1997: 297-326. In any event, the key aspect is that it is not 
certainly a rule in classic sense, on the development of the law from principles to rules (and 
viceversa) see (Canaris, 1999) op. cit. page 66.  
 
40 As we will explain Regulation 1/2003 merely deals with procedural aspects but with regards to 
the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU, it does not deal with the “substance” of it. It does not 
provide a further layer of specificity; it merely forwards the interpreter back to the original norm.  
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We hope that our investigation - in search of a better conceptualization of 
Article 101 TFEU - does not affront any of those great minds who have been 
involved in the process of shaping competition law in Europe in the last 50 
years,41 and we sincerely apologize in advance for our boldness. In our defense, 
we can only wield two arguments.   
First, the continuous uncertainty that still surrounds Article 101 TFEU in 
academic writings,42 regarding issues which are far from secondary: What does 
competition mean?;43 what are infringements object and infringements by 
effect?;44 what is the relationship between Article 101.1 and 101.3TFEU?;45 what 
is the meaning of agreement and how does it differentiate from that of concerted 
practices?46   
                                            
41 Even though the Treaty of Rome was enacted in 1957, European Competition Law as such did 
not start to develop until Regulation 17/62 was enacted.  
 
42Motta, M. Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004. Bishop, S., and Walker, M. The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application 
and Measurement. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2010 to get a flavor of this continuous uncertainty 
with regards to some of economic questions that surround competition law.  
 
43, I. " Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law." CLES Working 
Paper Series, 2013. 
 
44 Odudu, O. "Interpreting Article 81(1): Object as Subjective Intent." European Law Review, 
2001.the author tried to develop for a consistent interpretation on the ambiguous case law on the 
meaning of “object” suggesting a double interpretation (subjective and objective) or Lianos, I. 
"Collusion in Vertical Relations Under Article 81 EC." 45 Common Market Law Review, 2008. 
arguing that the formalistic approach currently followed by the Courts in defining the concept of 
agreement under Article 81 EC is theoretically and practically flawed. Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1089681 
 
45 Faull, J., and A. Nikpay. The EU Law of Competition. Oxford: OUP, 2014.  
 
46 Wish, Richard. Competition Law. Oxford University Press, 2012. Bellamy & Child. European 
Community Law of Competition . Oxford: OUP, 2008. Ghezzi, F., and M. Maggiolino. "Bridging 
EU Concerted Practices with U.S. Concerted Actions." 10 Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics 3, 2014 pointing out:  
“On the theoretical level, EU antitrust institutions have always struggled to defined the three 
notions of agreements, decision by associations of undertakings and concerted practices 
separately one form the other”.  
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Secondly, the similar hesitation in Luxemburg, as the recent judgment of 
the ECJ in Groupement français des Cartes Bancaires (“CB”) demonstrates.47 In 
this case, the ECJ ruled that the General Court committed an error of law, in 
finding that an infringement had been an “infringement by object”.  
We believe that these issues clearly reflect the need for a legal 
conceptualization of Article 101 TFEU. After all, if this norm has been in use 
for 50 years, how can the General Court get something so basic wrong? And 
how is it possible that so many conceptual questions have not been resolved yet?  
We offer a simple but strong answer, because the legal theoretical 
foundations (as opposed to the economic ones) have not been clearly developed 
yet.48  
This was not a mistake committed by the drafters of the Treaty, they knew 
perfectly that Article 101 TFEU was imprecise and lack solid legal foundations; 
it had to be to get passed.  
As we will demonstrate, the problem started with Regulation 17/62 and the 
case law that applied it initially but, particularly, when Regulation 1/2003 was 
enacted and cartel enforcement truly became a policy priority in Brussels.  
At that time, the efforts in Brussels and Luxembourg were directed 
towards understanding industrial theory and microeconomics,49 rather than 
                                                                                                                       
 
47 C-67/13 P, Groupement des cartes bancaires (CB) v. Commission, judgment of 11 September 
2014. Hereinafter “CB”.  
 
48 One of the inferences that arises from our research is that competition law has been heavily 
influenced by economic theory and less by other fields of the law (such as criminal or 
administrative law). The result has been the use of two different languages (legal and economic) 
which do not use the same vocabulary and which are not guided by the same principles or goals.  
 
49 Note that the position of the Chief Economist has been in place since September 2003. For more 
information on this position see Roller, L. H., and P. A. Buigues. "The Office of the Chief 
Competition Economist." European Commission, 2005. For an explanation on how this post was 
created after the Court judgments in Airtours, Tetra Laval and Schneider see Lianos, I., and D. 
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providing Article 101 TFEU with the legal theoretical foundations that it always 
required.50  
This thesis relies greatly in several areas of continental law, such as 
criminal, administrative and constitutional law, and its traditional literal, 
historical and systematic methods of interpretation to shift this trend.  
We hope that by the end of this thesis, the reader will be convinced that 
they can be, at the very least, of the same importance to competition law as 
microeconomic theory.51  
B. The structure of this dissertation  
This thesis is divided in three main blocks which seek to answer the three 
key questions described above: an abstract study on the legal nature and 
systematic of Article 101 TFEU; a study on the economic foundations of 
information exchanges as a self-standing infringements, jointly with its current 
fitting within Article 101 TFEU according to the ECJ’s case law, and, ultimately, 
a proposal for a new approach to self-standing information exchanges coherent 
with the legal nature of Article 101 TFEU and the basic tenets of a (quasi-
criminal) sanctioning system.   
                                                                                                                       
Geradin. Handbook on European Competition Law: Enforcement and Procedure. Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2013, page 310.  
 
50 The following quote from the European Commission, "White Paper on Modernisation of the 
Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty"   is quite telling “The reform proposed 
in this White Paper, namely the introduction of such a directly applicable exception system, has 
three main elements: the ending of the system of notification and authorisation, decentralised 
application of the competition rules, and intensified ex post control. The approach taken to the 
application of Article 85 will continue to be rigorously economic.” 
 
51 If competition law has been used as an intellectual tool to analyze other fields of the law, see 
Rock, E. "Corporate Law through an Antitrust Lens." 92 Colum. L. Rev., 1992, we see no reason 
why the opposite should not be, at the very least, tried. See Alfaro, J. "El Proceso de 
Configuración del Derecho de la Competencia a la luz de la doctrina del Tribunal de Justicia de la 
Unión Europea." eXtoikos (eXtoikos), 2014.  
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In the first part, we explore the origins of Article 101 TFEU and seek to 
understand the legal nature of the norm by using the intellectual tools developed 
in continental law theory.  
We will prove how there is key distinction between the general prohibitive 
clause (Article 101 TFUE) and the administrative (quasi-criminal) sanction 
(Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003) which has not been properly identified in the 
case law of the ECJ.   
This distinction is crucial as there might be conducts which fall under the 
general clause and, therefore, shall be prohibited but do not fit necessarily within 
any specific rules (administrative sanctions) that develop it and, as a result, cannot 
(and shall not) be fined monetarily.   
In the second part, we analyze of one of the most controversial Article 101 
TFEU infringements: self-standing information exchanges. This part is divided in 
two main blocks.  
First, we undertake a descriptive analysis on the economics of information 
exchanges. We will demonstrate that there are grounds to believe that strong 
inferences can be made about the possible anticompetitive results of certain 
information exchanges. However, we will also show the difficulties in 
categorizing most information exchanges ex ante as procompetitive or 
anticompetitive, from an economic perspective.  
Secondly, we explore the ECJ case law on information exchanges to 
understand its current fitting within Article 101 TFEU. We will show how the 
“general concept” of information exchanges developed and expanded (jointly with 
the concept of concerted practices) in a very particular context: the ECJ’s case law 
against long and complex cartels.   
Unfortunately, this case law was later applied in the field of self-standing 
information exchanges, transforming this infringement into a catch-all concept for 
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any behavior “sort of collusive”, and distorting, along the way, the meaning of 
concertation or coordination.52  
In the third part, we provide what, in our opinion, should be the key 
parameters when assessing self-standing information exchanges as an Article 101 
TFEU infringement.  
We will explore: a) the different types of values which are protected by any 
administrative or criminal system (individual or collective); b) the mechanisms to 
protect them (crimes of harm or risk offences), and the principles that should 
guide the authorities’ enforcement (culpability, harm and legality).  
Through the application of these basic concepts, we reach the conclusion 
that Article 101 TFEU prevents in most cases, risk offences, i.e. conducts which 
are dangerous but not necessarily harmful.53   
As result, only in those cases where there is an actual harm or where the 
proximity of the harm is more than obvious, it might be appropriate to impose an 
administrative sanction, whereas the remaining cases might call for other types of 
reaction from the administration, such as administrative measures.    
This legal framework when applied specifically to self-standing information 
exchanges means that there might be certain conducts (such as the invitations to 
collude) which fall under the general application of Article 101 TFEU but not 
necessarily under Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003. Therefore, they can be 
prohibited but not be sanctioned.  
                                            
52 Following this view see (Ghezzi & Maggiolino, 2014) op. cit.  “the EU institutions have always 
wanted to frame the class of concerted practices as a catch-all device to grasp the species of 
collusion that do not amount to agreements” and footnote 9 explaining that Decision IV/31.149, 
1986 O.J. L 230, § 87, the Commission stated that the notion of concerted practices is a tool “to 
forestall the possibility of undertakings evading the application of Article [101] by colluding in an 
anticompetitive manner falling short of a definite agreement”. 
 
53 See Immenga, U. & E.J. Mestmäcker. Wettbewerbsrecht, Band 1. EU, Teil 2. Munich: C.H. 
Beck, 2012, page 407 “Daher handelt es sich bei Art. 23 Abs. 2 Unterabs. 1 lit. a i. V.m. Art. 81 
Abs. 1 EG (jetzt: Art. 101 Abs. 1 AEUV) um ein Tätigkeitsdelikt in der Form eines abstrakten 
Gefährdungsdelikts.”  
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C. Our submissions 
First, the legal consequences of infringing Article 101 TFEU (general 
clause) and the one of infringing 101 TFEU as an administrative offence 
(through the referral of Article 23 Regulation 1/2003) should not be confused.   
Indeed, the first one is a general prohibitive clause which just carries by 
default contractual voidness, whereas the second one sets out an administrative 
offence, with its corresponding administrative sanction.  
There are two different legal consequences attached to the infringement of 
Article 101 TFEU, the nullity established in Article 101.2 and the administrative 
sanction established in Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003.  
The interplay of these two legal consequences is complex. Article 101.1 of 
the TFEU is first and foremost a general prohibitive clause – both systematically 
and historically. However, the drafters of the Treaty foresaw that, as culture of 
competition developed in Europe, certain infringements of Article 101 TFEU 
would be so flagrant, so menacing, to competition, that they should be 
sanctioned, given their harm to competition and also due to the need to deter 
those conducts to take place again. That is the mandate contained in Article 103 
TFEU.  
As a result, there are certain conducts which necessarily fall under Article 
101 TFEU that deserve a higher punishment than mere civil nullity. The biggest 
problem that Article 23.2.a) of Regulation 1/2003 poses is that it does not define 
which conducts should fall under this enhanced interpretation of Article 101 
TFEU or which criteria should guide enforcers in deciding which level of 
punishment deserves a specific conduct which infringes Article 101TFE.  
In other words, any conduct that infringes Article 23.2.a) and therefore, 
carries a sanction, it is necessarily an infringement of Article 101 TFEU in broad 
sense and carries, as well, the civil consequences (voidness). However, not 
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every infringement of Article 101 TFEU should necessarily imply the 
infringement of Article 23.2.a) of Regulation 1/2003.  
Put it differently, not every conduct that menaces competition needs to be 
sanctioned, only those that clearly do so based on our prior experience. All other 
which have the object or effect (and we use these terms purposely) of preventing 
or distortion competition shall be prohibited.  
The absence of proper legal (black and white) criteria to distinguish which 
conducts do actually fall within the realm of Article 23.2.a) of Regulation 
1/2003 has forced the European Courts to develop certain rules that allow for a 
more specific and targeted application of Article 101 TFUE that complies with 
the principles of legality, legal certainty, harm and culpability. 
This finding leads itself to two very interesting consequences:  
Monetary fines54 - which are set out in Article 23 of the Regulation 1/2003 
– are the legal consequence (administrative sanction) imposed by the system as 
the result of committing an administrative offence and, therefore, should be 
imposed in accordance with basic tenets developed in continental administrative 
sanctioning law.55 This means that, at the very least, they should be graduated 
according to the risk posed to competition (harm principle) and the subjective 
willingness or negligence – of the parties (culpability). 56   
                                            
54  The Commission has stated that 'the purpose of fines is twofold: to impose a pecuniary sanction 
on the undertaking for the violation and prevent a repetition of the offence, and to make the 
prohibition in the Treaty more effective', see the Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy 1983 at 
para 62. Wils, W. The optimal enforcement of EC antitrust law: essays in law & economics. The 
Hague: Kluwer International, 2002.page 13.  
 
55 Huergo Lora, A. Las Sanciones Administrativas. Madrid: Iustel, 2007. 
 
56 Wils, W. "Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice." 29 World Competition 2, 2006: 
 “With regard to the first task of clarifying the content of the antitrust prohibitions, fines do not 
appear to play a significant role” and footnote 35 “Indeed, in those cases where a competition 
authority would take a decision or bring a prosecution so as to clarify that a certain behaviour, 
the illegality of which was previously not clear, violates the antitrust prohibitions, the imposition 
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Article 101 TFEU can and should be applied as a general prohibitive clause 
without the need to resort to Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003. In other words, 
given its binding character, Article 101 TFEU could (and should) be used by 
Competition Authorities as the legal basis under which they could (and should) 
issue prohibitive decisions. 57  
In other words, not all infringements of Article 101 TFEU should 
necessarily carry an administrative fine, because Article 101 TFEU does not 
share the exact same legal nature as Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003. Even 
though, the legal basis of Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003 is undoubtedly Article 
101 TFEU, its scope of application is different, Article 23.2.a) of Regulation 
1/2003 tells us that there are certain conducts that infringe Article 101 TFEU so 
flagrantly that they deserve an administrative fine. This is a very important 
distinction factor.  
                                                                                                                       
of a fine would legally not be possible. In the case of fines imposed by the European Commission 
for violation of Articles 81 or 82 EC, the 'intent or negligence' required by Article 23(2) of 
Regulation No 1/2003, as note 6 above, would be lacking; see also Judgment of the EC Court of 
First Instance of 30 September 2003 in Joined Cases T-191/98 etc. Atlantic Container Line and 
Others v Commission [2003] ECR 11-3275, paragraphs 1611 to 1633.” 
 
57 In essence, the argument is that Article 101 TFEU contains both a general prohibition and an 
administrative offense by reason of the inadequate use of the powers conferred by Article 103 
TFEU. The general principle only encapsulates a prohibition consequence (see 101.1 and 101.2 
TFUE) and, therefore, allows for a more regulatory (ex ante) approach, whereas the administrative 
offence (Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003) applies an ex post approach. This division is slightly 
more clear in US antitrust law given the different (although intermingled) roles of the FTC (as 
regulator) and the DOJ (as an enforcer) respectively.  
 
See, among others, Kovacic, W., and M. Winerman. "Competition Policy and the Application of 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act." 20 Minn. J. Int'l L. 274 , 2010: 1001-1022. 
Cooper, J. "The Perils of Excessive Discretion: The Elusive Meaning of Unfairness in Section 5 of 
the FTC Act." George Mason University Law and Economics Research Papers, 2014 and 
Hovenkamp, H. "The Federal Trade Commission and The Sherman Act." Florida Law Review, 
Vol. 62, 2010. Similarly, in Switzerland see the ASCOPA case cited in section I.I.2 and discussed 
in Alfaro, J. “Como se analiza un intercambio de información o qué bien legislan los suizos: Caso 
suizo de cosmética de lujo." Blog Derecho Mercantil, February 23, 2012.  
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This means that there is much room for the Authorities to maneuver, 
provided that they are consequent with the legal consequences attached to the 
behavior under scrutiny.  
Secondly, in order to collude, firms might undertake preparatory acts 
which, depending on the circumstances, shall be sanctioned with lower fines 
than collusion itself or even with no sanction at all. 58 In other words, any 
crime can be committed, but it can also be prepared (designed) or be attempted, 
why should it be different for competition law infringements?  
As we will show, most article 101 TFEU infringements are generally risk 
offences. By this we mean that the offender is not sanctioned because he has 
caused a specific harm to specific individuals. Instead, the wrongdoer is 
sanctioned by reason of the, more or less accurate, danger posed to competition as 
a collective value deserving protection.59  
Information exchanges go a step further and advance the scope of protection 
to practices that might facilitate creating that risk. As such, we firmly believe they 
should be applied (and punished) restrictively. 
Thirdly, these findings, translated into the field of information 
exchanges, take us to the conclusion that there is room to incorporate an 
invitation to collude doctrine that might help prevent unilateral disclosures 
                                            
58 In a way, one could say we are following the path opened by (Lianos, Some Reflections on the 
Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law, 2013) op. cit. when he concluded “defining the 
contours of what constitutes true unilateral conduct is essential in order to define the concept of 
antitrust agreement and not the opposite”.  
 
59 Schaub, A. "Working Paper X." In European Competition Law Annual 2000: The 
Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy, by C. Ehlermann, & I. Atanasiu. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2001 page 247 “It is clear from the very content of the Treaty that effective competition constitutes 
a public good that must be protected”. Mr. Schaub was Director General of DG COMP at the time.  
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of information that, although dangerous, do not fit well in the traditional 
understanding of concertation. 60  
An invitation to collude concept can relieve authorities (and Courts) from 
stretching the meaning of concertation beyond any logical limits. Additionally, it 
is consistent with a broad interpretation of Article 101 TFEU, provided that 
Competition Authorities only impose injunction orders.61   
                                            
60 See the very interesting discussion between Advocate General Mayras in Dyestuffs and 
Advocate General Vesterdorf in Rhône-Poulenc (infra note 449), at II-934 “In a later section, 
devoted to the adverse effect on competition, Mr Advocate General Mayras further stated (p. 682, 
right-hand column) : 'However, there are some academic writers who say, attaching particular 
importance to objective factors in defining the concept of a concerted practice, that to fall under 
Article 85 such a practice must actually and concretely have had the effect of altering the 
conditions of competition. In his opinion on the Chemiefarma case, Mr Advocate General Gand 
seemed to take the same view. He said ... . I have already given you to understand that my opinion 
is not very far removed from that expressed in those words. Would it be possible to go further and 
to take into consideration not the result, the actual effect of the practice, but also its potential 
effect} There can be no doubt that it would seem curious for a concerted practice which has not 
had any material effect on the competitive situation, despite the intention of the participants and 
because of circumstances beyond their control, to escape the application of Article 85.1 should be 
tempted to say that in such a case merely to attempt or to initiate execution would be enough to 
justify the application of Article 85(1).' What is interesting about that argument for the purposes 
of the present cases is that Mr. Advocate General Mayras tries to introduce a doctrine of attempt 
into the concept of concerted practice as used in Article 85(1). However, the theory ventured by 
him has not been supported or commented upon in later judgments of the Court of Justice or by 
its Advocates General.” In fact, our proposal is not that original. In 1953 when the French 
Government passed the Decree, whose wording significantly resembles the one use the draftsmen 
of the Treaty of Rome, it did include the following provision: “Est assimilé à la pratique des prix 
illicites le fait: (…) 3º Par toute personne responsable d’une action concertée de se livrer ou 
d’inciter à se livrer à une pratique prohibée para l’article 59 bis de la présente ordonnance” 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf/common/jo_pdf.jsp?numJO=0&dateJO=19530810&pageDeb
ut=07045&pageFin=&pageCourante=07046 
 
61 This is not such a drastic proposal if one notices that this happens already with most 
commitment decisions and that, in fact,  during the discussions on the modernization of 
competition policy, the White Paper expressly acknowledged that the Commission could go 
beyond sanctioning (and even prohibiting decisions) to issue positive decisions: 
 
“It is true that the Commission would no longer adopt exemption decisions under Article 85(3) as 
it does now, but it should nevertheless be able to adopt individual decisions that are not 
prohibition decisions. Where a transaction raises a question that is new, it may be necessary to 
provide the market with guidance regarding the Commission’s approach to certain restrictions in 
it. Positive decisions of this kind would therefore be taken in exceptional cases, on grounds of 
general interest.” 
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In short, we believe that a clear understanding of Article 101 TFEU might 
help us deal with those cases which lay on the limits such as self-standing 
information exchanges, whose difficulties adequately test the consistency of any 
legal system.62  
Or the other way around, there is a need, and a way, to better conceptualize 
information exchanges and, as result the concept, of concerted practices and, 
ultimately, Article 101 TFEU.  
                                            
62 (Canaris, 1999) op. cit. After all, how is it possible that the same conduct – exchanging 
information – admits any possible legal characterization under EU Competition law? Or even, 
similar facts, can lead to different conclusions depending on the Authority reviewing the conduct? 
How is it possible that one single information disclosure amounts to an infringement by object?  
PART ONE - THE LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS ARTICLE 
101 TFEU 
II. A LITERAL AND SYSTEMATIC 
INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 101 TFEU   
In what follows, we study Article 101 TFEU always keeping in mind the 
two basic angles of any norm: the conduct that is expressly forbidden and the 
consequences that are attached to its infringement.  
This classic distinction between the “unrecht” and the “unrechtsfolge”63 will 
invaluably help us understand two prominent features of Article 101 TFEU: a) 
that despite being an imperative norm, it is still a general clause, and that b) as 
such, when it was enacted, its infringement originally carried only a civil 
consequence and not an administrative monetary fine.  
A. Article 101 TFEU: An imperative but general clause  
Article 101 TFEU is located within Title VII (common rules on 
competition, taxation and approximation of laws), Chapter 1 (rules on 
competition), Section 1 (rules applying to undertakings).  
The English version of the Treaty does, therefore, categorize Article 101 
TFEU as a “rule”. Similarly, the French version uses the term “règles” and the 
German version refers to it as “Wettbewerbsregeln”, which literally translate as 
rules.  
                                            
63 Bobbio, N. Teoría General del Derecho. Bogotá - Colombia: Temis, 2007 pages 113 and 116 on 
the legal sanction and the need or not for a sanction in order to have a valid legal norm. Casado, B. 
"El art. 6.3 CC, ¿punto de partida para el establecimiento de un régimen sancionador en el código 
civil?" Estudios sobre invalidez e ineficacia, 2006,  (Larenz, 2009) op. cit., Muñoz Conde, F. 
Derecho Penal, Parte General. Tirant Lo Blanch, 2002,  (Muñoz Conde, 2002), for a summary see 
also De la Torre Díaz, F. Ética y Deontología Jurídica. Madrid: Dykinson, 2000 page 200 and seq. 
among many others.  
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The Spanish version of the Treaty, however, uses, instead, the more generic 
term “norm” (“normas”), whereas, the Italian version refers generally to the 
chapter as norms (“norme”), and to the section as rules (“regole”).  
Oddly enough, Article 103 all of these versions refer to Article 101 and 102 
as “principles” rather than as “rules”.64 
This terminology shows, in our opinion, the controversy that surrounded 
Article 101 TFEU at the time of its drafting. However - leaving historical 
considerations aside, which will be covered in the next chapter - it is possible to 
reach a conclusion as to the legal nature of Article 101 that provides an 
explanation for all these different terms.  
The distinction between norms, rules and principles has long been debated 
both in continental and Anglosaxon law, particularly, with regards to the legal 
nature of constitutions and constitutional provisions.  
As it is well-known, whether the Treaties are constitutional or not is still 
debated.65 Nonetheless, for our purposes it suffices to notice that, even if not 
purely constitutional in nature, the TFEU and the TEU are closer to constitutional 
norms, than they are to regular Acts of the Parliament.66 This observation is 
relevant as it guides us towards a breadth of constitutional law literature which 
has discussed the nature and categories of constitutional provisions.  
                                            
64 103.1 “The appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the principles set out in 
Articles 101 and 102 shall be laid down by the Council, on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consulting the European Parliament”. 
 
65 For a summary of the main literature, see Devuyst, Y. "The European Union's Constitutional 
Order - Between Community Method and Ad Hoc Compromise." 18 Berkeley J. Int'l Law 1, 2000 
footnote 4 and De la Sierra, S. "The Constitutional Bases of European Administrative Law." 
What's New in European Administrative Law, Florence: EUI Working Paper, 2005. 29 - 42.  
 
66 According to the European Court of Justice, “the EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an 
international agreement, none the less constitutes the Constitutional Charter of the Community 
based on the rule of law.” Case 294/83, Les Verts v. Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, 1365. 
(Devuyst, 2000) 
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In the United States, the general view, following Professor Cooley and the 
US Supreme Court case law, is that constitutional provisions can be divided in 
two broad categories: self-executing and not self-executing. The definition can be 
found in United States Supreme Court in Davis v. Burke: 
"A constitutional provision may be said to be self-executing if it 
supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed 
and protected, or the duty imposed may be enforced; and it is not self-
executing when it merely indicates principles, without laying down rules 
by means of which those principles may be given the force of law.” 67 
Compared to the continental literature on the matter this distinction might be 
too general, but it helps us understand that there is more than prohibitions and 
general principles within a constitutional norm. There might be provisions that 
even though are mandatory in nature, require an act of law to ensure full 
effectiveness. According to Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations: 
"A constitutional provision does not lose its self-executing quality 
merely because it provides that the legislature shall by appropriate 
legislation provide for carrying it into effect; and the mere fact that 
legislation might supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the 
violation of a self-executing provision does not render such provision 
ineffective in the absence of such legislation."68 
In other words, the fact that a provision might be to general or broad does 
not preclude its normative character. One can see the parallelism between the 
above quoted text and the functioning of Article 103 TFEU that foresees future 
regulations and directives that will establish both the fines for the infringements of 
Article 101.1 and the exceptions foreseen in Article 101.3 TFEU.  
                                            
67 179 U.S. 399, 21 S.Ct. 210, 212, 45 L.Ed. 249 (1900) 
 
68 Cooley, T. A treatise on the constitutional limitations which rest upon the legislative power of 
the state of the American union, Boston: Little Brown, 1927, 8 ed., Vol. 1, p. 170 
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The same ideas are present in the continental literature, although they are 
discussed much more in depth.69 Fortunately, they are greatly summarized by 
García de Enterría70 and Nieto71 in two works following the enactment of the 
Spanish constitution.  
In short, the main idea that prevails among scholars is that there is a 
distinction between the normative nature of the constitution as such, which is 
clearly a norm, and the enforceability of each of its precepts separately.  
In this regard, Nieto explains, by reference to the German literature, how 
there are norms which are defined as imperative but incomplete. These norms 
require an act of law that further completes the norm to make them fully effective. 
However, this does not mean that, even if not developed further, they cannot be 
interpreted and applied by a Court.72   
This is precisely what happened with Article 101 in Bosch, 73 when the ECJ 
ruled that this provision (Article 101) had direct effect, and acknowledged its 
                                            
69 See summarily supra in footnote 8.  
 
70 García de Enterría, E. La Constitución como norma y el Tribunal Constitucional. Madrid: 
Civitas, 1985, for a summary here http://www.uned.es/dpto-derecho-
politico/V._Eduardo_Garcia_de_Enterria_1_%20bis.pdf  
 
71 Nieto, A. "Peculiaridades Jurídicas de la Norma Constitucional." RAP 100-102, 1983. 
 
72 (Nieto, Peculiaridades Jurídicas de la Norma Constitucional, 1983) op. cit. page 393 “La 
incomplitud de la norma originaria no implica siempre, pues, de forma necesaria un estado de 
quiescencia. La incomplitud es, con frecuencia, un fenómeno deliberado: el autor de la norma no 
quiere autovincularse pronunciándose definitivamente sobre un tema, al ser consciente de la 
variabilidad de las circunstancais, y prefiere dejar las puertas abiertas para que una norma 
futura de rango inferior vaya adptando el orden jurídico a la realidad política de cada momento.”  
 
This debate is also very well explained in the Spanish translation of Afonso da Silva, J. 
Aplicabilidad de las Normas Constitucionales. México: Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas 
UNAM, 2003, he defines these norms as norms of limited but direct application. His 
categorization, by reference to the Italian literatura, is as follows: “(I) normas de eficacia plena y 
aplicabilidad directa, inmediata e integral; (II) normas de eficacia contenida y aplicabilidad 
directa e inmediata pero posiblemente no integral: (III) normas de eficacia limitada.” 
 
73 13/61, De Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Bosch and others, [1962] ECR p. 45 
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normative and imperative character regardless of the fact the Treaty, already, had 
acknowledged (in Article 103 TFEU) that it was incomplete provision.74  
That we are in front of a legal norm which was never merely 
programmatic;75 is evident in the light of Article 85.2 which read very clearly: 
“Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be 
automatically void.” However, whether this norm which contained then only a 
general prohibition clause, was (or could convert into) a proper finable 
administrative rule76 is more debatable.   
In the 1980’s Professor Alexy proposed a very useful distinction between 
rules and principles that moved beyond their normative character.77 According to 
his theory, principles are norms which contain optimization commands, 
characterized by the fact that they are meant to be satisfied to the greatest extent 
possible given the legal and factual possibilities. Principles can be satisfied to 
                                            
74 In fact, in Bosch, op. cit. the German Government argued, and the AG agreed that “A literal 
interpretation does not shed any light, but this may be obtained from the sense and purpose of 
Article 85. This provision is based on the principle laid down in Article 3 (f) of the Treaty, 
whereby the Community must institute a system ensuring that competition in the Common Market 
is not distorted. Article 85 then is intended to protect the free play of competition. This principle is 
violated or (and this is sufficient for the purposes of Article 85) endangered when a restriction 
on competition within the meaning of Article 85 (1) leads to the diversion of trade from its normal 
and natural routes, since the increase of trade by one route must normally lead to an unfavourable 
change in respect of another route. For this reason, every factor which affects trade, even though 
to no great extent, constitutes an obstacle in the sense of Article 85 (1). Further, this provision 
does not depend on the obstacles actually affecting trade between Member States; it is enough that 
it 'may' do so. Thus, every obstacle to competition which may have effects of any moment at all on 
the economy of the Member States may affect trade adversely.” 
 
75 On this point, it is very interesting to read Von Der Groeben, H. "Policy on Competition in the 
EEC." Bulletin of the European Economic Community, 1961: “the cartel provisions of the Treaty 
were drawn up nor merely as programmes but as direct and' immediately applicable law” and the 
footnotes that ensue this statement.”  
 
76 Norberto Bobbio studied in depth the issue on whether a norm could be considered as such if 
there was no sanction. He reached the conclusion that the more on it moves up the hierarchy of the 
norms, the more plausible it is that there will be no sanction. (Bobbio, 2007) op. cit. For an 
explanation of his views, Fairén Guillén, V. "La defensa (autodefensa, autocomposición, pacto, 
contrato, proceso)." Revista Crítica de Derecho Inmobiliario, 1990: 467-520. These issues are 
brilliantly explained in (Nieto, Peculiaridades Jurídicas de la Norma Constitucional, 1983) op. cit.  
 
77 Alexy, R. A Theory of Legal Argumentation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. 
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varying degrees and their appropriate degree of satisfaction depends not only on 
what is factually possible, but also on what is legally possible. 78 Rules, on the 
contrary, are norms which are always either fulfilled or not. If a rule validly 
applies, then the requirement is to do exactly what it says, neither more nor less. 79 
This classification is merely a doctrinal attempt to categorize reality -similar 
to the American “standards versus rules” distinction -80 however, one can see how 
there is a very sensible conclusion attached to it: imperative norms will normally 
be located within a broad spectrum, where at one end, they are general and 
balanced against each other, and at the other, they are specific and exempted only 
under very concrete circumstances.  
Looking at Article 101 TFEU from this perspective, we realize that its 
location, within this range, is probably closer to the more general norms than to 
the specific rules.81 
 In other words, Article 101 TFEU seems to contain rather a general clause 
developing a general principle (free competition) than a specific rule. 
Two particularities seem to confirm this conclusion. First, that the conduct 
strictly forbidden is, aside from the five examples provided, very uncertain as it 
depends on the regulations and directives that will be developed later on under the 
                                            
78 Alexy, R. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
 
79 (Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, 2002) op. cit. For a summary see, Alexy, R. "On the 
Structure of Legal Principles." Ratio Juris. Vol. 13 No. 3, 2000: 294-304. 
 
80 Kaplow, L. «Rules vesus Standards: An Economic Analysis .» 42 Duke L. J. 557, 1992: 557 - 
629. 
 
81. On general clauses (Miquel Rodríguez, 1997) op. cit., (Larenz, 2009) op. cit., (Canaris, 1999) 
op. cit. This fits nicely with the opinion of AG Lagrange in Bosch (AG Lagrange drafted the 
TECSC Treaty), above at footnote 74.  
 
In any event, what is undoubtedly clear is that they cannot be classified as a properly defined rule 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of legality and, consequently, culpability that any quasi-
criminal sanction requires as we will see later on. On these issues, brilliantly, Roxin, C. Derecho 
Penal. Parte General. Tomo I. Madrid: Civitas, 2008 pages 169 a 174, (the German version is 
titled “Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil Band I”).  
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mandate of Article 103, and secondly, that rather than exempted, Article 101 
TFEU will be balanced against other interests, foreseen but not developed in 
101.3 TFEU.82 Indeed, as Article 101.3 TFUE shows, it is more an optimization 
command than a “yes or no” rule.83 
B. Article 101 TFEU: the distinction between administrative 
sanctions and administrative measures  
Broadly speaking there are three layers of sanctions that the rule of law 
(moral considerations aside) can impose for any specific infringement of a 
binding norm: (i) civil, (ii) administrative and (iii) criminal.  
The first layer refers to the consequences within the private relations of 
parties that have infringed the norm. The consequence will be that any contracts 
or other actions taken are void or voidable under civil law. This is just the logical 
consequence of the infringement of an imperative norm. If a norm is part of the 
                                            
82 Article 103 does not introduce an exception between rules, but rather it provides the criteria that 
should guide the balancing of the collusion of principles, (Alexy, On the Structure of Legal 
Principles, 2000) op cit.  
 
“The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:  
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, 
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical 
or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which 
does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the 
attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial 
part of the products in question.” 
 
83 A similar categorization is also present in (Nieto, Peculiaridades Jurídicas de la Norma 
Constitucional, 1983) op. cit. when he distinguishes (following Tomás y Valiente and Schenuer) 
between a) fundamental rights, institutional guarantees, c) mandates to the legislator and d) 
fundamental principles and State’s goals.  
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legal system and its compliance its compulsory, other legal acts will not be valid 
if they contradict this norm, unless there is a legal exception within the system.84 
The second layer refers to the sanctions or other measures85 that can be 
imposed by the Administration to the infringing parties, for example the 
obligation to pay a fine or to reestablish the situation existent prior to the 
infringement (i.e. the demolition of a building constructed in a natural park). 
The third layer refers to the sanctions that can be imposed by criminal 
Courts in accordance with the national penal codes and that, normally, will consist 
in imprisonment sentences.86  
As we can see, it seems reasonable to think than the broader and more 
general the norm the lower the legal consequence attached to it.  
Thus, the infringement of general clauses will normally carry a civil “fine” 
if infringed, whereas specific rules will be the ones that carry administrative or 
criminal punishments and, as such, will require further guarantees for the 
addressee before they are applied.  
                                            
84 See Article 6.3 of the Spanish Civil Code for example: “Los actos contrarios a las normas 
imperativas y a las prohibitivas son nulos de pleno derecho, salvo que en ellas se establezca un 
efecto distinto para el caso de contravención.” (Canaris, 1999) op. cit.  
 
85 It is important to bear in mind, in this regard, that an administrative measure (for example, to 
revoke a subsidy for not meeting the requirements) is a very different legal consequence than an 
administrative sanction (for example, not to be able to apply again for 5 years to any subsidy, for 
lying in the documents submitted to obtain the revoked subsidy) This distinction is well-known in 
continental administrative law, among others, Nieto, A. Derecho Administrativo Sancionador. 
Madrid: Tecnos, 2012, (Huergo Lora, 2007) op. cit. or De Moor-van Vugt, A. "Administrative 
Sanctions in EU law." 5 Review of European Administrative Law 1, 2012: 5 to 41, among others, 
and it has been incorporated into EU law, for example, in Regulation Council Regulation (EC, 
Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European Communities 
financial interests. 
 
86 The distinction between the second and third layer is not as simple as this categorization implies. 
For a more detailed explanation of the intermingling of these two categories in comparative law, 
see (Huergo Lora, 2007) op. cit. pages 53 and seq.  
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In other words, there is relationship of direct proportion between the 
severity of the punishment and the degree of certainty as to the behavior that 
carries such sanction.87  
Looking at Article 101 TFEU from this perspective reinforces our thesis that 
it was not truly an administrative offence (with its corresponding administrative 
sanction) at the time of the drafting of the Treaty.  
To our knowledge there are only three references - within section 1 of 
chapter 1, title VII - to the possible legal consequences which seem relevant and 
nicely reflect the three layers just explained, i.e. those contained Article 101.2, 
Article 105 TFEU and Article 103.   
The first reaction, according to Article 101.2 TFEU, is that any agreements 
or decisions prohibited pursuant to Article 101 TFEU shall be automatically 
void.88 This is the perfect example of “civil” type of consequence. Those contracts 
or legal acts which infringe competition law shall not have any binding effects. 
This demonstrates the binding and not programmatic nature of the provision.  
The second level of reaction is developed in Article 105 TFEU which 
expressly acknowledges that the Commission shall ensure the application of the 
principles laid down in Articles 101, the Commission shall investigate cases of 
suspected infringement of these principles and if it finds that there has been an 
infringement, it shall propose the appropriate measures to bring it to an end. 
                                            
87 (Huergo Lora, 2007) op. cit.. Demanding this principle in the ECJ case law, see Schwarze, J., 
and R. Bechtold. Deficiencies in European Community Law, Critical Analysis of the Current 
Practice and Proposals for Change. Brussels: Gleiss Lutz, 2008: “a correlation must be 
recognised to the effect that the less protection provided by administrative proceedings to the 
parties concerned in terms of the rule of law, the more extensive the judicial remedy must be”. 
Discussing this correlation in German criminal law, also (Roxin, Derecho Penal. Parte General. 
Tomo I, 2008) page 171.  
 
88 This statement might have seen unnecessary in any system guided under the rule of law as it 
seems a logical consequence of any coherent system. Nonetheless, it might have been justified 
under historical reasons to highlight the binding (or normative character of the norm), as we will 
see later on. 
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This is an example of an administrative measure, this means that the powers 
of the authority are limited to bring the situation to an end, to restitute the legality 
but there is no possibility to punish said behavior.  
The third level of reaction is merely announced in Article 103 according to 
which, the appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the principles set 
out in Articles 101 and 102 shall be laid down by the Council, on a proposal from 
the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament. These regulations 
or directives shall be designed in particular to ensure compliance with the 
prohibitions laid down in Article 101(1) by making provision for fines and 
periodic penalty payments. 
This means that at the time of the drafting of the Treaty, the infringement of 
Article 101 TFEU did not carry an administrative fine. The development of an 
administrative sanctioning regime would be the duty of the Council, the 
Commission and the Parliament through detailed regulations or directives to such 
purpose. In other words, infringing Article 101 TFEU was not truly an 
administrative offence.  
C.  Article 23.2.a) of Regulation 1/2003: a forwarding 
provision 
As it is well-known, Regulation 1/2003 is the current EU legislator’s 
response to the mandate contained in Article 103 TFEU. The Regulation deserves 
much credit as it allowed for a considerably homogenous competition law regime 
to develop all around the EU. However, its merits lay more on the procedural side 
of the application of Article 101 TFEU, than on its substantive part.89  In fact, 
                                            
89 (Schwarze & Bechtold, 2008) op. cit. “There are considerable doubts about the existence of 
such a “clear and unambiguous legal basis”34, because the nature of Art. 23 of Reg. 1/2003 as a 
substantive rule is insufficient with regard to the imposition of fines. For example, the provision 
merely requires an intentional or negligent infringement by an undertaking or association of 
undertakings of the essential competition provisions of Art. 81 or 82 EC, which are broadly 
worded giving them a general-clause-like character (Art. 23 (2) of Reg. 1/2003).” 
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going through the Regulation on realizes that the only reference to the substance 
of Article 101 TFEU is contained in Article 23.2.a) which states: 
“The Commission may by decision impose fines on undertakings 
and associations of undertakings where, either intentionally or 
negligently: (a) they infringe Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty…” 
Regulation 1/2003 is a good example of delegated legislation. The drafters 
delegated in the Parliament, the Council and the Commission the power to further 
develop into proper rules the principles contained in Article 101 TFEU.   
As it is well known there is breath of literature, particularly in criminal law, 
which has studied the phenomenon of the delegated legislation, by studying this 
literature we can realize that problem of Regulation 1/2003 is not exactly one of 
ultra-vires expansion of the reach of Article 101 TFEU or one of legitimacy, as it 
is normally the case in said literature. 90  
The problematic of Article 101 TFEU is the opposite: it does not elaborate 
at all the principle. In fact, under criminal law theory, we could define Article 23 
of Regulation 1/2003 as “reverse blank norm”91 or if we prefer a more 
“administrative” terminology an unfinished referral (“remisión incompleta”).  
Why? Because all that the Regulation does - in order for us to better 
understand the administrative offence - is to send us back to Article 101 TFEU. In 
                                            
90 (Muñoz Conde, 2002) op. cit. (Huergo Lora, 2007) op. cit.  
 
91  Mir Puig, S. Derecho Penal (Parte General). Barcelona: Reppertor, 2011, this doctrine is much 
more controversial and the general view is that they should be considered unconstitutional. 
(Immenga & Mestmäcker, 2012) op. cit. page 405 define it as a blank norm “Um den Inhalt der 
Bußgeldtatnemstamde zu bestimmen, bedarf es also des Zusammenlesens von verweisendem und 
ausfüllendem Gesetz. Erst auf diesem Weg kann der voll-ständige Tatbestand gebildet werden. Da 
die Bußgeldvorschrift des. Art. 23 Abs. 2 Unterabs. 1 lit. A auf eine Norm  verweist, die durch eine 
andere als die die Bußgeldandrohung erlassende Instanz gesetz worden ist, handelt es sich hierbei 
um ein echtes Blankettgesetz. Die durch Art. 23 Abs. 2 Unterabs. 1 lit. a in Bezug genommenen 
außerstraftrechtlichen Normen der Art. 81 und 82 EG erlagen durch das Zusammenslesen nicht 
die Recthsqualität einer Bußgeldnorm.” 
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other words, instead of telling us what rules are embedded in Article 101 TFEU, 
all that Regulation 1/2003 does is to tell us that there are rules within that 
principle.   
 As a result of Article 23.2.a) of Regulation 1/2003 and the requirement 
imposed by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, the EU Courts are now 
forced to extract from the general principle contained in Article 101 TFEU, those 
rules that allow for the imposition of administrative sanctions without infringing 
the basic principles of legality,92 legal certainty, culpability or harm.93 
D. Article 101 TFEU under the light of Article 2.2 of 
Regulation 2988/95: an administrative irregularity not an 
administrative sanction 
Outside of the Treaty itself, there are other norms which prove our point. 
Regulation 2988/95, for example, provides an additional justification for our 
conceptualization of Article 101 TFEU.  
Regulation 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European 
Communities financial interests was adopted to set out general rules “relating to 
homogenous checks and to administrative measures and penalties concerning 
irregularities with regard to Community law”.  
According to the norm, “Irregularity` means any infringement of a provision 
of Community law resulting from an act or omission by an economic operator, 
                                            
92 This could be a valid alternative in Anglo-saxon countries where the common law is accustomed 
to develop such rules through precedents, however, it is less useful in continental countries where 
judges tend to recur more often to the black letter law and only use precedent as guidance without 
the critical and systematic analysis which is mandatory under the common law.   
 
93This point will be further developed in chapter VI.  
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which has, or would have, the effect of prejudicing the general budget of the 
Communities or budgets managed by them.94  
Article 2 sets out the general rules for any administrative irregularity. Thus, 
even though not strictly applicable to competition law, it does provide a very 
interesting theoretical framework as to the minimum requirements imposed by EU 
law to punish such irregularities.  
According to Article 2: 
“1. Administrative checks, measures and penalties shall be 
introduced in so far as they are necessary to ensure the proper application 
of Community law. They shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive so 
that they provide adequate protection for the Communities' financial 
interests. 
2. No administrative penalty may be imposed unless a Community 
act prior to the irregularity has made provision for it. In the event of a 
subsequent amendment of the provisions which impose administrative 
penalties and are contained in Community rules, the less severe provisions 
shall apply retroactively. 
3. Community law shall determine the nature and scope of the 
administrative measures and penalties necessary for the correct 
application of the rules in question, having regard to the nature and 
seriousness of the irregularity, the advantage granted or received and the 
degree of responsibility. 
4. Subject to the Community law applicable, the procedures for the 
application of Community checks, measures and penalties shall be 
governed by the laws of the Member States.” 
                                            
94 See Article 1 of Regulation 2988/95.  
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Under a literal interpretation, it seems debatable whether Article 2.2 of 
Regulation 2988/95 demands that the EU legislator sets out a the offence (the 
irregularity) and consequence (the measure or sanction) within the same norm, as 
some authors read,95 or whether it just demands the sanction to be properly 
developed in a black letter norm, whereas the irregularity can be derived from 
other parts of the “Community acquis”.  
Even though the first possibility seems the most logical one to comply with 
the principles of legality and legal certainty,96 Article 2 undoubtedly demonstrates 
that the infringement of Article 101 TFEU prior to Regulation 17/62 (i.e. prior to 
any monetary sanction) was, at the most, under the EU law an “administrative 
irregularity” with no specific (and even less graduated or proportionate) 
administrative sanction attached to it.   
In other words, even though Article 103 TFEU referred to the possibility of 
future sanctions, because there was not a specific administrative penalty attached 
to the infringement of Article 101 TFEU, one can ultimately conclude that Article 
101 TFEU was not envisioned as a specific administrative rule but rather as a 
general clause with the legal consequences that this entails.  
E. A comparative law check: the U.S. Distinction between 
section 1 of the Sherman act and section 5 of the FTC act  
Ultimately, we can obtain further support for our theory, from a policy 
approach, from the analysis of the U.S. antitrust laws. As opposed to the 
                                            
95 (Huergo Lora, 2007) op. cit. at page 121 “El Reglamento 2988/1995 no es un código de 
infracciones y sanciones administrativas, sino una <<parte general>> de éstas y (por separado) 
de otras medidas no sancionadoras que también sirven como reacción frente a comportamientos 
ilegales. La función de tipificar las infracciones y sanciones corresponde a otras normas 
comunitarias, de carácter sectorial o especial (2.2)…” 
 
96 Similarly, (De Moor-van Vugt, 2012) op. cit. “This text might suggest that the principle of 
legality only applies to the penalties. In the Kınicke case, however, the Court emphasized that 
‘penalty, even of a non-criminal nature, cannot be imposed unless it rests on a clear and 
unambiguous legal basis’. Case 117/83, [1984] ECR 3291  
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simplicity of EU competition law, in the United States, Antitrust Agencies apply 
three different Acts: (i) the Sherman Act of 1890, (ii) the FTC Act and (iii) the 
Clayton Act, these last two of 1914, in the fight against collusion. 
Of these three norms the Federal Trade Commission Act which bans "unfair 
methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" remains 
probably the less known in Europe.  
The exact meaning of these words is highly debated and it is breadth has 
fluctuated over the years depending on the majorities existing at the Supreme 
Court. Nonetheless, one thing is certain: according to the Supreme Court all 
violations of the Sherman Act also violate the FTC Act.97  
Thus, although the FTC does not technically enforce the Sherman Act, it 
can bring cases under the FTC Act against the same kinds of activities that violate 
the Sherman Act. The FTC Act also reaches other practices that harm 
competition, but that may not fit neatly into categories of conduct formally 
prohibited by the Sherman Act, such as the invitations to collude. 98   
This provides the FTC with a very wide toolkit to prosecute cases that under 
the Sherman act would be, at the most, considered as borderline. Only the FTC 
brings cases under the FTC Act (there is no room for civil actions) and it cannot 
impose monetary fines (unless it is for infringing a prohibition decision).99 
                                            
97 See Peritz, R. "Unfair Methods of Competition Under FTC 5: Beyond the Sherman Act and an 
Ex post Model of Enforcement." 56 Antitrust Bulletin 825, 2011. and (Kovacic & Winerman, 
Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 2010) 
op. cit.  
 
98 The first cases date back to the early 80’s with the blunt proposal of American Airlines to his 
counterpart at Braniff to “raise you goddam fares twenty percent [and] I’ll raise mine the next 
morning” [United States v. American Airlines, 734 F.2d 1114, 1116 (5th Circ. 1984)] although the 
concept consolidated in the early 90’s with Quality Trailer Products seen above. Fullerton, L. 
"FTC Challenges to Invitations to Collude." 25 Antitrust 2, 2011: 30-35. 
 
99 See the summary provided by the FTC, available at http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws 
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Section 5 claims are, therefore, brought only by the FTC before an expert 
administrative tribunal (an Administrative Law Judge whose decision can be later 
reviewed by the Commission and, subsequently by Federal Courts) which has 
power to impose prospective equitable relief (not monetary remedies or criminal 
sanctions), whose decisions interpreting Section 5 have no collateral effects in 
private litigation (there are no treble damages and only the FTC can start such an 
action) and whose work is reviewed by appellate courts under a more deferential 
(Chevron)100 standard101 than the DoJ.  
Thus, in all collusion cases, the Agency has the alternative to choose one 
legal basis or other. In fact, it is generally understood that Congress intended 
Section 5 to be a mechanism for upgrading the U.S. system of competition law by 
permitting the FTC to reach behavior not necessarily proscribed by the other U.S. 
competition statutes, including the 1890 Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.102  
This distinction between a criminal norm (the Sherman Act) and the purely 
administrative offence (the FTC Act) resembles the differentiation exposed above 
between Article 101 TFEU as a principle and as a rule.  
The norm which allows the broadest application (FTC Act) empowers the 
Authority only to prohibit the behavior, while the norm (the Sherman Act) that 
imposes both monetary and criminal sanctions requires a much more strict 
                                                                                                                       
 
100 This issue of whether the Chevron standard applies as to other administrative agencies is 
debated, see (Cooper, 2014) op. cit.  
 
101 (Kovacic & Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 2010) op. cit., see also the speech by Commissioner Wright, J. What's 
Your Agenda. Washington: ABA Spring Meetings, 2013. 
  
102 (Kovacic & Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 2010) op. cit. As it is well-known that Congress intended Section 5 to be a 
mechanism for upgrading the U.S. system of competition law by permitting the FTC to reach 
behavior not necessarily proscribed by the other U.S. competition statutes, including the 1890 
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. 
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application, through its subsidiary rules, of the principles of foreseeability, 
culpability and harm.103  
 This distinction supports, in our opinion, the feasibility - at least 
theoretically - between the application of competition law at two levels or two 
speeds: one more broad and general, perfectly suitable for competition policy, 
another one more specific and strict, perfect for enforcement and deterrence.104  
                                            
103 These issues are subtlety mentioned in Rybnicek, J., and J. Wright. "Defining Section 5 of the 
FTC Act: The Failure of the Common Law Method and the Case for Formal Agency Guidelines." 
21 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 5, 2014: 1287 -1315, when they explain the common law evolution of the 
Sherman Act. Very interestingly, as well, Bork, R. The Antitrust Paradox. New York: Free Press, 
1993.page 20 when talking about the Sherman Act emphasizes the need to create subsidiary rules 
“The statute was intended to strike at cartels, horizontal mergers of monopolistic proportions, and 
predatory business tactics. Wide discretion was delegated to the courts to frame subsidiary rules”, 
also ABA. Monograph nº23, The Rule of Reason. Chicago: ABA, 1999, pages 21 to 33.  
 
104 In fact, we find surprisingly much support for our thesis in the conclusions of Bork’s famous 
Antitrust Paradox, (Bork, 1993) op. cit. pages 408 to 418. Even though Bork criticize the lack of a 
clear understanding of the economic theory, some assertions clearly point out the elusive nature of 
the Sherman act and the need for precise rules to be drafted in landmark cases by the adequate 
parties “The central institution is making antitrust law has been the Supreme Court. That is true 
because the antitrust laws are so open-textured, leave so much to be filled in by the judiciary, that 
the Court plays in antitrust almost as unconstrained a role as it does in constitutional law” (…) 
“Yet the performance of the courts would have been far better in antitrust, as in other fields of law, 
had they received the support they were entitled to expect from the other participants in the 
policymaking enterprise”.  
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III. A HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 101 
TFEU 
A review of the history of Article 101 TFEU does, in fact, confirm our theoretical 
conclusions as to the legal nature of Article 101 TFEU as a general clause which 
required specific rules to impose administrative sanctions.   
A. The drafting of Article 101 TFEU (85 TEC): a general clause 
aimed at dismantling “public cartels” in Europe 
In 1951, West Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries ratified the 
Treaty Establishing the Coal and Steel Community (“TECSC”). One of the basic aims 
of the international agreement was to create a system of undistorted competition in the 
coal and steel market. Article 65, which contained the seed for our Article 101 TFEU 
today105, read:  
“All agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices tending directly or indirectly to prevent, 
restrict or distort normal competition within the common market shall be 
prohibited, and in particular those tending: (…)” 106 
In 1957, the same countries that formed part of the Coal and Steel Community 
ratified the Treaty of Rome, the starting point of the European Union. The Treaty 
mirrored the main concepts of the TECSC.107 Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome read: 
“The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common 
market: all agreements between undertakings, decision by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member 
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
                                            
105 Chirita, A. "A Legal Historical Review of the EU Competition Rules." International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 2013, also Italianer, A. "The Object of Effects." CRA Conference. Brussels, 2014 saying 
that the object and effect distinction was in “embryonic form” in the TESCS.  
 
106 Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:11951K:EN:PDF  
 
107 (Chirita, 2013) op. cit.  
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distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular those 
which: (…)” 
The view among the scholars that have studied the historical origins of Article 
101 TFEU is that Article 85, at the time, whilst influenced by Article 65 TECSC went 
considerably beyond it in both width of application and in the specification.108  
Nonetheless, the distinction between “tending directly or indirectly to prevent”109 
to “which have as their object or effect the prevention”110 has not received significant 
attention, despite the fact that these few words have been one of the biggest headaches 
for competition law experts since then.111  
Even though much has been written about the distinction between infringements 
by object and effect,112 the number of studies that have sought to understand the norm 
through a historical analysis is still quite limited.113  
Indeed, the academic literature has focused normally on: (a) the interpretation 
given to these terms by the European Courts, (b) their parallelism (or not) with the “per 
se” and “rule of reason” distinction in the United States, (c) the burden of proof and (d) 
                                            
108 Goyder, D.G. EC Competition Law. Oxford University Press, 1993, page 31.  
 
109 Article 65 TECSC. 
 
110 Article 101 TFEU.  
 
111 See (Italianer, The Object of Effects, 2014) op. cit.  
 
112 See the opinions of the AG Cruz in case C-32/11, Allianz Hungária Biztosító Zrt. and others v. 
Gazdasági Versenyhivatal and of AG Wahl in C-67/13 P, Groupement des cartes bancaires (CB) v. 
Commission, for a summary of the main issues of the distinction.  
 
113 See (Faull & Nikpay, 2014) op. cit., Gerber, D. Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: 
Protecting Prometheus. Oxford University Press, 2001 and Patel, K. and H. Schweitzer. The Historical 
Foundations of EU Competition Law. Oxford Univeristy Press, 2012.  
 
As explained by AG Vesterdorf in Rhône-Poulenc, T-1/89, joined opinion delivered on 10 July 1991, 
ECR-869, at 927 “The interpretation of the Treaties on the basis of the travaux préparatoires is a 
notoriously difficult area in Community law, one reason for this being that a large number of the 
preparatory documents have not been published. In the area of competition law, the difficulties are 
illustrated, for example, by Ellis's examination of the known, more or less official, preparatory documents 
relating to Article 85. It is probably also indicative that the applicants have not pointed to any specific, 
written elements in the genesis of Article 85 in support of their view.  
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the possibilities of rebuttal under Article 101.3 TFEU.114 These are important aspects, 
no doubt about it. However, if one traces the problem back to its origins, he realizes that 
it might have been looked under the wrong light.  
A simple explanation115 for the distinction between “directly or indirectly” and 
“object or effect” could be that they are just not that different. In fact, one could 
reasonably argue that these are just linguistic mechanisms in order to capture all 
possible behavior that can have an impact in competition. Either because the impact was 
direct, the conduct has as its objective (its goal) to infringe competition, or because the 
impact was indirect, despite the intention of the parties, the conduct had an effect in 
competition. In other words, a device in order to capture all possible fact patterns with 
an impact (threat) on the public interest protected by the rule of law: competition. This 
interpretation would match nicely with the general understanding of a principle under 
Alexy’s definition as explained above.116  
As over simplistic as this might sound - and despite the ECJ case law on the 
contrary - we firmly believe (and sincerely apologize for our boldness) that this was the 
initial intention of the draftsmen of the Treaty of Rome.117  In our opinion, the lack of a 
proper development of Article 101 TFEU through a Regulation with its corresponding 
rules and sanctions has forced the ECJ to develop a theory on competition law from the 
                                            
114 (Bellamy & Child, 2008) op. cit., (Wish, Competition Law, 2012) op. cit, (Faull & Nikpay, 2014) op. 
cit. 
 
115 We submit that it is “simple” if we obliterate the case law of the ECJ for a moment for the sake of the 
discussion.  
 
116 (Alexy, On the Structure of Legal Principles, 2000), op. cit. Not only so, but it correlates quite nicely 
with the preliminary draft of the Sherman Act sent to Congress “all arrangements, contracts, agreement, 
trusts or combinations between persons made with a view, or which tend to prevent full and free 
competition”, (ABA, 1999) op. cit.  
 
117 AG Vesterdorf in Rhône-Poulenc, T-1/89, joined opinion delivered on 10 July 1991, ECR-869, at 927: 
“It is certainly not improbable that the applicants may well be right in their observations on the historical 
background, but the significance which can be attached to them is hardly decisive. When one considers 
the wording of the provision, which is plainly intended to embrace all anticompetitive activity 
incompatible with the common market, it cannot be presumed without very solid evidence that the 
authors of the Treaty wished to exclude from the scope of the provision a whole category of 
questionable business initiatives. The Court of Justice has made no such assumption in the cases in 
which it has had occasion to address this matter, as is clear from the judgments cited below. Nor do I see 
any decisive criteria for interpretation which would compel the Court to limit the scope  of Article 85 in 
that way.” 
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limited words of Article 101 TFEU which is precisely the seed of the obtuse meaning of 
“object or effect” nowadays.  
As it is well-known nowadays, during the discussions over the draft of Article 85 
TEC, there was a clash between two opposing views on the role that competition norms 
should play in the market. One the one hand, one party defended its binding and 
compulsory character (the Ordoliberal German School) while, on the other, others 
defended a more flexible approach as a guiding principle, rather than a prohibiting 
provision.118  
The traditional view is that German Ordoliberal School prevailed.119 However, 
recent studies have shown that, even after Article 85 TEC was drafted, there were 
serious discussions as to its exact scope of application and the influence of the 
Ordoliberal School, even though important, might have been overemphasized.120  
An important fact that has to be born in mind in this regard is that the German 
Law on Restraints of Competition was being debated at the same time as the Treaty of 
Rome was being drafted. This should caution against making an interpretation of the 
wording of Article 85 TEC using concepts that were developed by the German 
Ordoliberal School after the German Law entered into force.121 
Keeping this in mind, it is very interesting to acknowledge the similarities 
between Article 85 TEC and the French Price Control Ordinance of 1953. Indeed, 
Article 59 bis of the Price Control Ordinance of 1945, introduced through the Decree of 
                                            
118 (Chirita, 2013) op. cit., Alm, L. What is the point of European Competition Law? Lund: University of 
Lund , 2007 and (Patel & Schweitzer, 2012) op. cit.  
 
119 (Faull & Nikpay, 2014). For a good summary of the evolution of EU Competition law, although 
following in some general common places see Weibrecht, A. "From Freiburg to Chicago - 50 years of 
Competition Law Enforcement." E.C.L.R. 2, 2008.  
 
120 See (Patel & Schweitzer, 2012) op. cit. Buxbaum, H. "German Legal Culture and the Globalization of 
Competition Law: A Historical Perspective." Faculty Publications, Indiana University, Paper 327, 2005, 
Schwartz, I. "Antitrust Legislation and Policy in Germany - A Comparative Study." 105 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 617, 1957 and “The Drafting of Article 81 EC” available at 
http://www.european-law.it/upload/1271921852.pdf  
 
121 (Patel & Schweitzer, 2012) op. cit.  
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9 August 1953, which regulated the ‘délit de coalition’, expressly prohibited all 
agreements the object or effect of which was to distort competition122 as follows:  
“Sont prohibées, sous réserve des dispositions de l’article 59 ter, toutes les 
actions concertées, conventions, ententes expresses ou tacites, ou coalitions sous 
quelque forme et pour quelque cause que ce soit, allant pour objet ou pouvant 
avoir pour effet d’entraver le plein exercice de la concurrence en faisant 
obstacle à l’abaissement des prix de revient ou de vente ou en favorisant une 
hausse artificielle des prix.” 123 
There is however, an older precedent, law nº56 of 1947 passed by the American 
Forces124 in Occupied Germany125 even closer, prohibiting: 
“Cartels, combines, syndicates, trusts, associations or any other form of 
understanding or concerted undertaking between persons, which have the 
purpose or effect of restraining, or of fostering monopolistic control of domestic 
or international trade or other economic activity, or of restricting access to 
domestic or international markets.”126 
This norm is, as far as we know, the oldest precedent of the wording later used in 
Article 85 TEC.127 If we look at Article 85 TEC, under this light, our suggestion that it 
was a catch-all prohibition gains strength.128  
                                            
122 Brilliantly explained in Riesenfeld, S. "The Legal Protection of Competition in France." 48 California 
Law Review 574, 1960.  
 
123 Notice that the French norms were focused on final prices, therefore, clearly on consumer welfare. 
This issue was brought indirectly in the T-Mobile case, where it was argued by the parties that only 
information exchanges with a direct impact on final prices could amount to infringements by object.   
 
124 (Schwartz, 1957) op. cit.  
 
125 Followed by similar norms by the forces in other occupied zones of Germany, see (Patel & 
Schweitzer, 2012) op. cit. page 97.  
 
126 Brand, L. Antitrust auf deutsch: der Einfluss der amerikanischen Aliierten auf das Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB) nach 1945. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004. (Brand, 2004) available 
at http://books.google.es/books/about/Antitrust_auf_deutsch.html?id=UBKl_UWHeEcC&redir_esc=y  
 
127 By this we mean with the same words, as explained above, the first draft of the Sherman Act, seems to 
be also interestingly close “all arrangements, contracts, agreement, trusts or combinations between 
persons made with a view, or which tend to prevent full and free competition”,  (ABA, 1999) op. cit. 
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Jean Monnet attributed in his memories the authorship of Articles 65 and 66 of the 
TESCS (the closest precedent of Article 85 TEC) to the American professor and civil 
servant Robert Bowie.129 This seems to be also the general view among the limited 
literature that has dealt with the historical underpinnings of Article 101 TFEU.130  
Today, it is impossible to know what had Professor Bowie in mind when he wrote 
the seed of Article 101 TFEU and, all we have is his recollection of what was happening 
at the time.131 Moreover, there seems to be an agreement that the norm was adjusted to 
European standards by Maurice Lagrange, a member of the French Conseil d’État and 
later on, advocate general of the ECJ.132  
Despite these limitations, the documents that have survived to our days,133 
demonstrate that the main concern at the drafting or Article 65 TEC was to ensure a 
smooth transition from the breaking up of the German industry (particularly through 
                                                                                                                                
128Scherer, F. Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy. Washington: The Brookings 
Institution, 1994 page 29, links the policy on cartels to the Postdam Agreement and the agreements 
between Churchill and Roosevelt agreement to convert Germany into a country “principally agricultural 
and pastoral”. (Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus , 
2001) op. cit. nuances it by pointing out that this provisions came into force once the “Morgenthau” Plan 
was abandoned.  
 
129 See, the Spanish translation of his « memoirs », Monnet, J. Memorias. Madrid : Encuentro, 2010, page 
395, talking about McCloy’S companion, profesor Robert Bowie “Tenía a su lado a un joven profesor de 
Harvard, Robert Bowie, considerado como el mejor especialista en la legislación anti-trust que los 
Estados Unidos aplicaban con el mismo rigor que si se tratara de principios morales” and 396 
“Finalmente, el 14 de marzo de 1951, el plan aliado de descartelización obtuvo el acuerdo de Adenauer, 
y de inmediato Hallstein aceptó los dos artículos pendientes. Éstos habían sido redactados por Bowie con 
meticulosa precisión.” 
 
130 See Wells, W. Antitrust and the Formation of Postwar World. New York: Columbia University Press, 
2002. Ulrich, H. The Evolution of European Competition Law: Whose Regulation, Which Competition? 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006, page 26 and McGowan, L. The Antitrust Revolution in Europe: 
Exploring the European Commission's Cartel Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010 page 82 and 
Akman, P. The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law and Economic Approaches. Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2012 pages 70 and 71. 
 
131 Duchène, F. Interview with Robert Bowie. Florence: EUI, 1987 available at 
http://archives.eui.eu/en/oral_history/INT490 page 21. ”It was his initiative, not mine, to say to me, would 
you draw us up what you think we should have in the way of anti-trust law? So I tried”.  
 
132 For a summary of the literature on this issue see (Chirita, 2013) op. cit.  
 
133 The memoires of Jean Monnet and the interviews with relevant figures of time, available at the 
historical archives of the EUI in Florence 
http://www.eui.eu/Research/HistoricalArchivesOfEU/Index.aspx  
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Law nº27)134 towards a union were Germany would not feel disfavored vis-à-vis the 
other European countries, while ensuring that the cartels that sustained the warfare 
machinery could never gain the same power again.135  
Thus, the parallels with the norm of 1947 just explained are considerable. Just 
glancing at this historical precedent, and the recollection of these prominent figures, one 
realizes soon that the very first purpose was very clear: to “prevent Germany from 
endangering the safety of her neighbors and again constituting a threat to international 
peace”.136  
The goal, therefore, was to ensure that all “public” cartels (trusts in American 
terminology) were dismantled.137 The norm was essentially prohibitive and technically, 
                                            
134 Law 27 on the reorganisation of the German coal and steel industries (16 May 1950), available at 
http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/law_no_27_on_the_reorganisation_of_the_german_coal_and_steel_industries
_16_may_1950-en-6148d81c-88f9-4afd-9f95-d2b626b9ed0b.html  
 
135 (Duchène, 1987) op. cit. available at http://archives.eui.eu/en/oral_history/INT490 “I think the United 
States felt really, over a period of several years earlier than this, that a policy towards Germany which 
had any of the elements of memories of Versailles, was bad. Anything which essentially perpetuated a 
picture of a Germany which was being held down by the others, and being discriminated against was not 
a good viable solution for the indefinite future. It had in it all the seeds of trouble and tension that 
developed after Versailles. Therefore, the Schuman Plan was greeted with great satisfaction on the 
American side, because it was felt that this at least purported to put Germany and France on a basis of 
reconciliation and cooperation. and of accepting whatever constraints there would be as mutual 
constraints, and therefore ones which could endure without necessarily creating frictions and hostility, 
which were almost inherent in any kind of unilateral imposition of restrictions which were represented by 
Law 27. The idea that Law 27 would be carried out enough to put German industry essentially on a 
similar footing to that in France and the other members of the Coal and Steel Community was thought to 
be acceptable, defensible, but it was certainly welcomed that this would be superseded by a mutual 
system of restraint thereafter.”  
 
136 Brilliantly explained in (Schwartz, 1957) op. cit.  
 
137 In this regard, it is fascinating to read the letter written by F.D. Roosevelt to the Secretary of State in 
1944: “Dear Mr. Secretary: During the past half century the United States has developed a tradition in 
opposition to private monopolies. The Sherman and Clayton Acts have become as much a part of the 
American way of life as the due process clause of the Constitution. By protecting the consumer against 
monopoly these statutes guarantee him the benefits of competition. This policy goes hand in glove with 
the liberal principles of international trade for which you have stood through many years of public 
service. The trade agreement program has as its objective the elimination of barriers to the free flow of 
trade in international commerce; the anti-trust statutes aim at the elimination of monopolistic restraints 
of trade in interstate and foreign commerce. Unfortunately, a number of foreign countries, particularly m 
continental Europe, do not possess such a tradition against cartels. On the contrary, cartels have 
received encouragement from some of these Governments. Especially is this true with respect to 
Germany. Moreover, cartels were utilized by the Nazis as governmental instrumentalities to achieve 
political ends. The history of the use of the I. G. Farben trust by the Nazis reads like a detective story. 
The defeat of the Nazi armies will have to be followed by the eradication of these weapons of economic 
warfare. But more than the elimination of the political activities of German cartels will be required. 
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under Administrative law, there was no administrative monetary sanction138 since the 
consequence was just an administrative measure:139 imposing the obligation to bring the 
situation back into legality, through the dismantling of the German trusts existing in 
specific industries.140   
It was completely sensible that no monetary penalties were attached to it, not only 
not to make Germany feel disfavored, but also because most European countries were 
cartelized (and had been so under the government’s auspices). In other words, the fight 
against cartels at the time was not one against secret cartels as it is today; it was the 
search for a different economic regime.  
Put it differently, the object or effect distinction within Article 101 TFEU was not 
inspired in the procedural and judicial American distinction between per se and rule of 
reason, it had a very different purpose: to make the prohibitive principle as broad as 
possible with regards to its factual application.141  
If we link these findings to the state of Article 85 TEC at the time of signature of 
the Treaty of Rome, we realize that Article 85 TEC was conceived initially purely as a 
                                                                                                                                
Cartel practices which restrict the free flow of goods in foreign commerce will have to be Curbed. With 
international trade involved this end can be achieved only through collaborative action by the United 
Nations.” Available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16554 and cited, among others, in 
(Freyer, 2006) page 53 
 
138 (Nieto, Derecho Administrativo Sancionador, 2012) op. cit. and Rebollo, M. Derecho Administrativo 
Sancionador. Valladolid: Lex Nova, 2010. This should not surprise us, afterall, since Maurice Lagrange, 
the member of the Conseil d’État, which translated the texts of the TECSC, was an expert in 
administrative litigation according to Jean Monnet, see (Monnet, 2010) at 395 “Tenía el tratado encima 
de mi mesa desde hacía tres meses: cien artículos redactados, pero dos de ellos afectados por una 
reserve que lo bloqueaba todo. La redacción era obra básicamente de Uri y de un gran jurista, Maurice 
Lagrange. Una vez más nos acompañó la suerte (…) la designación recayó en un austero y modesto 
abogado de lo contencioso…” 
 
139 (De Moor-van Vugt, 2012) op. cit. Not all infringements carry out a monetary fine or sanction, in fact, 
many times the law just requires a measure that re-establishes the legality without any further obligation 
on the side of the wrongdoer.  
 
140 (Goyder, 1993) op. cit. page 17: “The original policy objectives behind these measures had been 
largely negative (to prevent Germany from again become a threat to peace) and restrictive, the 
‘decartelization’ of the existing structures of industry in the various sectors (coal, iron and steel, 
chemicals, plastics, heavy engineering, banking, etc.)”.  
 
141 For a very good explanation of the purposes behind Roosevelt interest’s in setting up a law against 
cartels, see Haley, J. Antitrust in Germany and Japan, The First Fifty Years, 1947-1998. Washington: 
University of Washington Press, 2001.  
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prohibitive norm (directly applicable)142 incorporating the lowest sanction possible: 
nullity according to civil law and measures to reestablish the legality.143  
This is further supported by Spaak report, the document preceding the Treaty of 
Rome, that clearly set out that the Treaty was to contain the general principles, not the 
administrative rules: 
“Les principes inscrits dans le traité doivent être assez précis pour 
permettre à la Commission européenne de prendre des règlements généraux 
d’exécution, qui seront soumis au vote de l’Assemblée, et qui auront pour objet 
d’élaborer les règles détaillées concernant la discrimination, d’organiser un 
contrôle des opérations de concentration, et de mettre en pratique une 
interdiction des ententes qui auraient pour effet un répartition ou une 
exploitation des marchés, une limitation de la production ou du progrès 
technique.”144 
In fact, even though, the draftsmen of the Treaty foresaw the possibility to impose 
administrative sanctions (monetary fines) as a coercive method in order to ensure 
compliance with Article 85TEC, these were not expressly included given the 
impossibility to reach a consensus at the time.145  
                                            
142 Under this historical explanation, the opinion of Advocate Lagrange in Bosch (where he made a clear 
defense of the direct application of Article 85 at the time) becomes even more interesting.  
 
143 For a summary of the evolution see also Deringer, A. "Las Régles de la Concurrence au Seind de la 
C.E.E." 7 Revue du Marché Commun 560, 1965. An Spanish translation is available at 
http://www10.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/Derecho_Integracion/documentos/002-Estudios_05.pdf  
 
144 Spaak Report, "Report of the Heads of Delegation of the Governmental Committee set up by the 
Messina Conference and addressed to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs." 1956. 
 
145 (Patel & Schweitzer, 2012) op. cit. That is the reason why Article 87 TEC set out then:  “1. Within 
three years of the entry into force of this Treaty the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from 
the Commission and after consulting the Assembly [European Parliament], adopt any appropriate 
regulations or directives to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 85 and 86. If such provisions 
have not been adopted within the period mentioned, they shall be laid down by the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly [European 
Parliament]. 2. The regulations or directives referred to in paragraph 1 shall be designed in particular: 
(a) to ensure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in Article 85(1) and in Article 86 by making 
provision for fines and periodic penalty payments.”   
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The conclusion that should be inferred from the above, in our opinion, is that the 
wording of Article 101 TFEU was set out only to determine a general prohibition - as 
broad as possible - which carried a civil sanction: nullity. As a result, the terms object 
and effect should be read within this context and not according to the very confusing 
case law of the European Courts.146  
In other words, the draftsmen envisioned that the finable administrative rules 
would be drafted separately and, carefully, into a different legal norm. Unfortunately, as 
we will show in the next section, the drafting of these administrative sanctions was 
anything but perfect.   
B. Regulation 17/62: a missed opportunity to develop detailed 
administrative rules 
In 1957 Article 85 TEC established a general clause: those conducts that directly 
or indirectly affected competition ought to be prohibited. There was no express 
reference to “when” they should the punished administratively.147  
Until the regulations or directives foreseen in Article 87.2 TFEU were passed, the 
agreement reached was that the authorities in Member States shall rule on the 
admissibility of agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the common market in 
accordance with the law of their country.148 It was for national agencies to decide and it 
                                            
146 Something which started with Consten Joined cases 56 and 58-64, Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. 
and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission of the European Economic Community, 13 July 1966. 
English special edition Page 00299, hereinafter (“Consten”) and has survived to our days as the Cartes 
Bancaires case demonstrates.   
 
147 Look how different the system had become from the 1947 Prohibition of Excessive Concentration of 
German Economic Power which contained a specific section – in the Anglosaxon style – called 
“definitions” which contained the infringements that shall be included within that definition.  
 
148 See Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty of Rome: 
“ARTICLE 87 1. Within three years of the entry into force of this Treaty the Council shall, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly [European 
Parliament], adopt any appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the principles set out in 
Articles 85 and 86.  If such provisions have not been adopted within the period mentioned, they shall be 
laid down by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the Assembly [European Parliament].  2. The regulations or directives referred to in 
paragraph 1 shall be designed in particular: (a) to ensure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in 
Article 85(1) and in Article 86 by making provision for fines and periodic penalty payments; (b) to lay 
down detailed rules for the application of Article 85(3), taking into account the need to ensure effective 
supervision on the one hand, and to simplify administration to the greatest possible extent on the other; 
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is submitted that all decisions in France during that time ended without a fine.149 The 
reason was that even after the enactment of Article 85, the exact scope of Article 85 and 
particularly Article 85.3 was a matter of discussion.150  
Thus, prior to 1962, nowhere in the Treaty it was expressly mentioned that 
competition law infringements were punished with a monetary sanction, it just said that 
those administrative sanctions should be incorporated into the legal system.  
It was Regulation Nº17 (First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty),151 the legal norm that expressly acknowledged that violating the rules set in 
Article 85 was, in fact, an infringement that carried specific monetary sanctions of up to 
10% of the turnover of the company in the preceding year. This might seem irrelevant 
today, when it is undisputed that competition law infringements should carry a fine, but 
if we go back to the times of Consten (analyzed in the next section), the perspective 
changes.  
                                                                                                                                
(c) to define, if need be, in the various branches of the economy, the scope of the provisions of Articles 85 
and 86; (d) to define the respective functions of the Commission and of the Court of Justice in applying 
the provisions laid down in this paragraph; (e) to determine the relationship between national laws and 
the provisions contained in this Section or adopted pursuant to this Article.  
 
ARTICLE 88 Until the entry into force of the provisions adopted in pursuance of Article 87, the 
authorities in Member States shall rule on the admissibility of agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices and on abuse of a dominant position in the common market in accordance with the law of their 
country and with the provisions of Article 85, in particular paragraph 3, and of Article 86.” 
 
149 In fact, in 1957, as explained by the French Secretary of State of Economic Activities in its appearance 
before the French Assembly to provide explanations on the functioning of Article 59 bis later mirrored by 
article 85 TEC 
Available here http://4e.republique.jo-an.fr/page2/1957_p4569.pdf?q=28+fevrier+1950  
Also, (Riesenfeld, 1960) op. cit.  
 
150 It is submitted that it was Hans von der Groeben, the German Chairman of the subgroup dealing with 
competition questions (one of the authors of the Spaak Report) with close ties with the Freiburg 
Ordoliberal School, put forward the proposal of an Article 85.1 and 85.3 and the idea to postpone the 
controversial decision as how the exception of Article 85.3 should work to later on, on a specific 
Regulation. Later on, Mr. von der Groeben became the first Director General for Competition in the 
Commission and started the trend of German Director Generals. (Patel & Schweitzer, 2012) On the 
influence of the German Ordoliberal School in the application of Article 101TFEU see (Faull & Nikpay, 
2014) op. cit. The German influence was also visible on Regulation nº17 through Arved Derringer, the 
German rapporteur of the Regulation. See also (Deringer, 1965) op. cit.  
 
151 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31962R0017:EN:HTML  
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Particularly, when one reads the very first Article of said Regulation which 
expressly indicated that agreements, decisions and concerted practices of the kind 
described in Article 85 (1) shall be prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being 
required.152  
Article 15, paragraph second, of Regulation nº17 read as follows: 
 “The Commission may by decision impose on undertakings or 
associations of undertakings fines of from 1000 to 1 000 000 units of account, or 
a sum in excess thereof but not exceeding 10 % of the turnover in the preceding 
business year of each of the undertakings participating in the infringement 
where, either intentionally or negligently: (a) they infringe Article 85 (1) or 
Article 86 of the Treaty; or (b) they commit a breach of any obligation imposed 
pursuant to Article 8 (1). In fixing the amount of the fine, regard shall be had 
both to the gravity and to the duration of the infringement.” 
In our opinion, in 1962, when Regulation nº17 was passed, the legislator 
committed a fatal mistake: not differentiating the general clause from the administrative 
“crime”. Up to then, the volitive element of the conduct was irrelevant; the consequence 
was just the prohibition and the voidness under civil law of any agreements or decisions 
that directly or indirectly restricted competition.153  
However, once the conduct became an “infringement”154 subject to monetary 
penalties, there was a need to ensure that the sanctions complied with a stricter 
application of the principles of legal certainty, harm and culpability.155  
                                            
152 The fact that this provision was needed and even set out as a basic principle “Disposition de principe” 
is a very strong indicator of the ambiguity surrounding the application of the general principle and helps 
us understand better the abstract nature of the provision at the time. Discussing these issues, see the 
opinion of AG Lagrange in Bosch op. cit.  Lagrange as explained above was the person in charge of 
translating and drafting the first version of the ECSC Treaty, see (Monnet, 2010) op. cit.   
 
153 See the Bosch judgment,13/61, De Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Bosch and others, [1962] ECR for a 
summary of the situation, particularly the AG opinion.  
 
154 In fact, reading Regulation 17/62 carefully, one realizes that the Regulation does not say that 
infringing Article 101 TFEU carries a sanction. Instead, what it says is that within the conducts forbidden 
by Article 101 TFEU, one can find punishable infringements. Notice how the French version said “une 
infraction aux dispositions de l'article 85, paragraphe 1, ou de l'article 86 du traité” and not “une 
infractión de l’article” a subtle but importan nuance, similarly, the Spanish version said “cometan una 
infracción a las disposiciones del apartado 1 del artículo 85 , o del artículo 86 del Tratado” and not “una 
infracción del artículo ..” 
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This means, in our opinion, that there was a need to clearly regulate the 
differences between willingness, negligence and attempt in order to fully ensure that 
sanctions were imposed in accordance with the basic tenets of the rule of law.156 In 
other words, there was a need for the detailed rules foreseen in the Spaak Report or at 
the very least for some criteria to distinguish when the infringement should carry a 
monetary fine and when not.   
In Regulation nº17, the legislator acknowledged that the infringement could be 
committed both negligently and willfully, thus, in principle, ruling out the possibility for 
attempt to be sanctioned. However, it made no express insinuation that these two forms 
should be fined differently. Moreover, it made no express differentiation between 
sanctioning collusion and sanctioning facilitating practices. All that was said is that the 
amount should take into account the gravity and the duration, but what did this exactly 
mean?   
From the wording of Regulation nº17, one can infer that the system that was being 
developed was not one of objective liability (as it required the conduct to take place 
willingly or negligently), however it was not clarified “how” Article 85 TEC could be 
infringed. In other words, the Regulation did not shed any light on which were the facts 
that suited the crime and, therefore, on the knowledge that was necessary to accomplish 
the infringement either willingly or negligently.157  
In our opinion, even though it is true that Regulation nº17/62 distinguished 
between different fines according to the infringement (it is not the same to collude than 
to refuse to reply to a request for information); it did not acknowledge that even within 
                                                                                                                                
 
155 An study of the application of these principles to EU administrative sanctions in (De Moor-van Vugt, 
2012) op. cit. and (Huergo Lora, 2007) op. cit.  
 
156 For a summary of the principles of harm and culpability see above I.C. On the principle of legal 
certainty see Tridimas, T. The General Principles of EU Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.  
 
157 Even though the general view is that objective liability is outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU, 
(Faull & Nikpay, 2014) op. cit. several presumptions used by the European Courts (aside of the ones 
already mentioned) for example, the one on parental liability raise some doubts about it, Bronckers, M., 
and A. Vallery. "No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of Fundamental Rights on Certain Dogmas of 
EU Competition Law." World Competition, 2011.  
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Article 101 TFEU, it was not obviously the same to collude than to facilitate collusion 
or to attempt to collude.  
There are two reasons that justify the need for such distinction: first, because the 
intention of the parties is not the same and that should be taken into account when 
imposing the fine [culpability] and, secondly, because the harm or threat posed to 
competition is not the same either [harm].  
Probably, the legislator had its own motives at the time not to draft a more 
detailed regulation, we can think of at least five possible ones: (a) the fact that the 
initial drafts did not include this type of fines158 (only fines for infringing a 
prohibition decision plus the procedural ones),159 (b) the inherent difficulty in 
drafting such provisions, (c) the struggle in reaching a political consensus,160 (d) the 
thought that authorization system created by the Regulation would, in fact, mitigate the 
                                            
158 The opinion of the Economic and Social Committee to the draft of Regulation 17/62 is quite telling in 
this regard “Il importe que les sanctions pour infractions aux articles 85, 1 et 86 du Traité ainsi que les 
règles et garanties de procédure, soient prévues les plus rapidement possible et en principe en même 
temps que la mise en aplication du premier Règlement, sans que ceci ait pour effet d’en retarder 
l’elaboration.” See here http://archives.eui.eu/en/files/inventories/15313?d=inline 
 
159 See the article written by the first Commissioner on Competition (Von Der Groeben, 1961) op. cit. 
page 23 omitting even this possibility and the background information to the draft regulation, available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/53869/1/ECIS_11.10.60.pdf  
 
This lack of fines was criticized by the Social and Economic Committee as pointed out by Ellis, J. "Les 
règles de concurrence du traité de Rome applicables aux entreprises." Revue Internationale de Droit, 
1963: 299-328, page 315 and introduced later on, although the view back then seemed to be that were a 
mechanism to ensure compliance within prohibition decisions, see page 325 : 
 
 “La Commission peut infliger des amendes aux entreprises qui commettent une infraction de propos 
délibéré ou par négligence aux articles 85 paragraphe 1 et 86 et aux conditions imposées pour obtenir 
une exemption ; ces amendes varient de 1 000 à 1 million de dollars mais elles peuvent être portées à 10 
% du chiffre d'affaires annuel de l'entreprise en question. Cependant, dans le cas d'accords qui ont été 
notifiés, cette disposition ne sera pas appliquée aux agissements décrits dans la notification. Cette 
disposition ne sera pas appliquée non plus, dans le cas d'ententes existantes notifiées dans les délais 
prescrits ni dans le cas d'ententes existantes tombant sous le régime spécial et notifiées avant le 1er 
janvier 1961«, aux agissements qui se sont produits avant la date de notification. Cependant la non-
application, citée dans les deux cas ci-dessus, ne joue pas dès lors que la Commission a fait savoir 
qu'après examen provisoire elle estime qu'il n'est pas justifié d'accorder une exemption à une entente 
tombant sous le coup de l'article 85 paragraphe 1. En outre, des amendes et astreintes sont prévues pour 
les infractions à certaines dispositions du Règlement et aux décisions prises par la Commission en 
application du Règlement”  
 
160 On this particular aspect (Patel & Schweitzer, 2012) op. cit.  
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risks of unnecessary sanctions considerably,161 and (d) ultimately, the strong (but 
incorrectly understood) power granted to the ECJ to have full jurisdiction over decisions 
setting out monetary fines.162   
The result was that the Courts were left with a very broad provision and forced 
either to incorporate both, the mental state (culpability) and fact pattern, the conduct and 
its threat to competition (illegality), into the wording of Article 85 TEC or to admonish 
the Commission severely in the first decisions.  
Not surprisingly, the Courts chose the first alternative, because after all, Article 
101 TFEU was then just out a very general prohibition which carried just a civil 
sanction,163 and no (real) monetary sanctions were imposed yet.164    
                                            
161 On this later aspect, note that the functioning of Regulation nº17 was very specific. Under the terms of 
the compromise that was reached, undertakings were required to notify agreements to the Commission 
with the consequence that if rejected the agreement would be unlawful ab initio (obviously concerted 
practices could not be notified). However, even if the agreement turned out to be illegal, Article 15(5) of 
Regulation nº17 provided that notification prevented fines from being imposed with regard to the period 
between notification and the Commission’s decision on the substance. Furthermore, Regulation nº17 set 
out, allegedly at France’s request, that existing agreements were to benefit from temporary validity until 
the Commission had taken a decision, irrespective of whether or not they had been notified. See “the 
history of Article 81” op. cit.  
 
162 This issue cannot be sufficiently dealt in this thesis. As it is well-known, the general view is that the 
ECJ has unlimited jurisdiction over the setting of the fine but not with regards other aspect of the 
Commission decision. However, if one looks at the recitals of Regulation 17/62, one can understand this 
power differently. The Commission could issue prohibitive decisions and sanctioning decisions. The 
ECJ’s powers over these different acts should be necessarily different. This reading matches perfectly 
with our theory and it is supported by the following statement in the Recitals “Whereas all decisions 
taken by the Commission under this Regulation are subject to review by the Court of Justice under the 
conditions specified in the Treaty ; whereas it is moreover desirable to confer upon the Court of Justice, 
pursuant to Article 172, unlimited jurisdiction in respect of decisions under which the Commission 
imposes fines or periodic penalty payments”. Even clearer in the French version “considérant que toutes 
les décisions prises par la Commission en application du présent règlement sont soumises au contrôle de 
la Cour de justice dans les conditions définies par le traité et qu'il convient en outre d'attribuer à la Cour 
de justice, en application de l'article 172, une compétence de pleine juridiction en ce qui concerne les 
décisions par lesquelles la Commission inflige des amendes ou des astreintes.” 
 
 
163 In France, the birthplace of the provision, only twenty decisions were taken between 1953 and 1960 
and they ended always in a consent decree, no sanctions were imposed. (Riesenfeld, 1960) op. cit. 
Moreover, the German law up to 1957 did not mention fines since it was intended to decartelize the 
industry not to sanction intents to cartelize.   
 
164 Those only really became mainstream after Regulation 1/2003 and the fight against hard core cartels 
with an effective leniency policy.  
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In other words, what it should have been a clarifying and completing norm 
became a forwarding norm,165 leaving competition law thereafter trapped in continuous 
circle or re-interpretation. These historical reflections shed a new light into the Consten 
judgment and the jurisprudence that followed it. 
C. The Consten judgment: the beginning of the theoretical 
confusion  
In 1966, in Consten166 the European Court of Justice was confronted - for the first 
time - with a case that was complex enough to require a solid legal reasoning, as well as 
a thorough exegesis, of Article 85 TEC (later Article 101 TFEU).167  
The case concerned an appeal against the Commission decision that declared that 
an agreement between the TV manufacturer, Grundig, and its French distributor 
(Consten), was incompatible with the Treaty, due to the exclusivity clause and the 
territorial protection clause contained therein; jointly with a trademark authorization, 
which gave Consten the exclusive right to sell Grundig televisions in France and 
prevented it from delivering any Grundig products directly or indirectly outside 
France.168  
One of the most intricate issues was whether the agreement did actually have a 
negative effect on competition, given that it was not a horizontal agreement (that is, an 
agreement between competitors).  
The answer of the European Court of Justice is well known. The Court explained 
that the Commission did not need to show the effects when dealing with infringements 
by object: 
                                            
165 Following Larenz’s categories, see (Larenz, 2009) op. cit.  
 
166 Op. cit. supra at 146.  
 
167 Look at the opening words of AG in this case: “The case in which I am today delivering my opinion is 
the first to call in question a decision of the Commission applying the law of the European Economic 
Community on cartels to an individual case”. Even though the case 56/65, Société Technique Minière 
(L.T.M.) v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (M.B.U.) ECR 235 (1966) was decided earlier, it concerned a 
preliminary ruling over a decision of the French authorities.  
 
168 For a summary of the case, see (Bellamy & Child, 2008) op. cit. page 145 and seq.  
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“for the purpose of applying Article 85 (1), there is no need to take 
account of the concrete effects of an agreement once it appears that it has as its 
object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition”169 
In addition, the Court ruled that an absolute territorial restriction on sales was, 
indeed, a restriction by object, because it had as its purpose to restrict competition. 
Based solely on a literal interpretation of the Treaty, the Court held that: 
 “Neither the wording of Article 85 nor that of Article 86 gives any ground 
for holding that distinct areas of application are to be assigned to each of the 
two Articles according to the level in the economy at which the contracting 
parties operate”.170  
If confronted against the AG opinion, one realizes that the Court’s judgment only 
undertook a literal (and simplistic) interpretation of Article 85 TEC. There was no 
historical analysis of the provision, no study of comparative law, no research on the 
purposes behind the provision, no reference to the preliminary drafts of the Treaty, just 
vague references to the wording of the Treaty and inferences about the legislators’ 
intention not to repeat the same terms in such a short provision.171   
In retrospective, it seems incomprehensible that the Court did not search for any 
of the discussions during the drafting process. If they had done so, they could have 
discussed whether the following quote by the French delegates (during the discussions 
over Article 85) shed some light, or not:  
                                            
169 Consten at page 339.  
 
170 Consten at page 339. See Alfaro, arguing that since Article 101TFEU is an open clause it should be 
interpreted strictly as not to expand its sphere of application disproportionately which in his opinion the 
Court did not do. Alfaro, J. "Delenda est Consten v. Grundig." Blog Derecho Mercantil, July 29, 2013. A 
summary of his views on the case in (Alfaro, El Proceso de Configuración del Derecho de la 
Competencia a la luz de la doctrina del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea, 2014) op. cit.  
 
171 One of the possible explanations for such a succinct analysis might be that even within the 
Commission there were serious doubts about the decision taken. According to (Patel & Schweitzer, 2012) 
op. cit. page 27 “Manfred Caspari, von der Groeben’s deputy chef de cabinet (and DG’s Director 
General in the 1980s), recalled that his pioneering decision was pushed by VerLoren van Themaat, but 
resisted by the Commissioner.”  
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“Aucune entreprise ... ne peut agir de concert avec une autre entreprise, 
conclure aucun accord, dont le but ou le résultat direct ou indirect serait dans 
le marché commun: a) d’empêcher; restreindre ou altérer de quelque manière 
que ce soit le jeu normal de la concurrence et notamment de ﬁxer le prix; b) de 
restreindre ou contrôler la production de quelque manière que ce soit; c) de 
répartir les marchés, produits, clients ou sources d’approvisionnement.”172  
In our opinion, as explained before, this statement confirms that the drafters’ 
intention was to protect competition: (a) in cases where the parties intended to infringe 
competition law voluntarily (“le but”), as well as (b) those where the result 
(independently of the parties’ willingness) of their actions “direct ou indirect” affected 
competition.  
Nonetheless, one thing is what they wanted to prohibit and a very different thing 
what they wanted to punish, and how they wanted to punish it. After all, as we already 
explained, in administrative law not all prohibitions carry out a monetary penalty; in 
fact, many of them just carry out compensatory measures in order to reestablish the 
situation prior to the conduct.173  
In addition, the Court, probably influenced by the American distinction between 
the per se rule and the rule of reason,174 introduced a procedural presumption without 
clearly stating so. Given that the Treaty distinguished between agreements by object or 
effect and this one had an anticompetitive object, the Court concluded that there was no 
need to show the effects on the market.  
To summarize, in Consten, the Court intermingled what should have been three 
very different aspects of the debate, in just two words: “object and effect”.  
                                            
172 (Chirita, 2013) op. cit.  
 
173 (Nieto, Derecho Administrativo Sancionador, 2012) op. cit., García de Enterría, E., and T.R. 
Fernández. Curso de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo II. Pamplona: Thomson-Reuters, 2011.  
 
174 The American influence is clearer in the AG Roemer opinion. See also his opinion in Société 
Technique Minière op. cit.   
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First, that the distinction between object and effect was originally a mechanism to 
prohibit all conducts which, purposely or not, prevented, restricted or distorted 
competition.  
Secondly, that one thing was the scope of the prohibition and a different thing the 
scope of the penalty. In other words, that there could be infringements of Article 85 
which should be prohibited but not sanctioned.175  
Thirdly, that this case concerned a prohibition and not a sanction. Therefore, the 
statements made should not be understood as meaning that the parties intended to 
infringe competition law. Otherwise, the Commission would have fined Grundig.  
This was the result, as explained above, of the forwarding situation created by 
Regulation 17/62. We want to make clear that we do not mean, in any way, that the 
outcome in Consten was legally wrong. In our opinion, what the Court did was to 
undertake a contractual approach to the term “object”, the object of the contract 
(“l’objet du contrat”).176  
Since the contract included territorial restrictions (a prohibition on parallel 
trade),177 it was unlawful by object. In other words, the specific conduct regulated in the 
contract was contrary to public law and, for that reason the contract had an illegitimate 
object. Put it simply, the actions that the contract foresaw were contrary to public law. If 
the parties chose to include a provision against public law, it is because they wanted to 
restrict competition. The parties had infringed competition law because they included 
those clauses in the contract.  
                                            
175 This is something different thing from acknowledging that the fines could be symbolic. The words 
symbolic fines inherently carry the idea that there should always be a fine.  
 
176 Following what the Commission had done in its decision. See Commission Decision OJ 2545/64 L 
161: “ Par conséquent, la constatation que les parties aux contrats ont voulu que Consten soit affranchi 
de la concurrence d'autres importateurs pour l'importation et la distribution en gros des produits 
Grundig en France, suffit pour conclure que le jeu de la concurrence est restreint au sens de l'article 
85 paragraphe 1. “  
 
177 Consten cannot be interpreted in abstract but by reference to the coetaneous decision of the ECJ in 
Société Technique Minière, op. cit. where the Court held that absent evidence of effects on the 
competition on the market, an exclusive dealing agreement should not be deemed as anticompetitive by 
object, particularly when it does not include any prohibitions on parallel trade. The AG Roemer referred 
to this analysis expressly as a “rule of reason” analysis.  
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In fact, despite all the criticisms, one could read Consten as the joint application 
of Articles 101.1 and 101.2 to a specific contract. If Article 101.1 TFEU was a 
prohibitive and imperative norm, its infringement even formally had to carry out a 
consequence: its voidness. In other words, Grundig had infringed Article 101 at least 
formally (antijuridicidad formal) and, therefore, the consequence was the lowest 
sanction possible, voidness.  
It is true that neither the reason why this clause was contrary to public law, nor the 
distinction between exclusive dealing and prohibition on parallel imports, is clearly 
articulated in the judgment.178  Probably, at that stage of the development of the Single 
Market, it was necessary to prevent territorial fragmentations at any cost. 
Nonetheless, we must contend that if the problem was one of burden of proof and 
if the Court needed to give a little help to the Commission, it could have done so in a 
different way. For example, it could have said that even if the contract had a reasonable 
business explanation it could have a potential detrimental effect on competition and 
that, in those circumstances, given the limited knowledge, the prohibition of those 
clauses seem reasonable given that there was no monetary penalty attached to it. In 
other words, a brief but solvent incursion into the effects of the conduct, such as the one 
suggested by the Advocate General Roemer in his opinion on the case, without having 
to walk within the moving sands of the principle of culpability.179  
The Consten decision has been criticized on many aspects and some authors even 
consider it the original sin in most of the problems that affect competition nowadays.180 
Even though we agree that many problems can be traced back to Consten, we believe 
that this is a rather harsh conclusion.  
The problem was not what the Court said in Consten but, rather, how Consten was 
applied later on or more subtlety, how the ECJ forgot that Consten is a prohibition 
decision applying a general clause, not the infringement of an administrative rule.   
                                            
178 Heavily criticizing Consten,  (Alfaro, El Proceso de Configuración del Derecho de la Competencia a la 
luz de la doctrina del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea, 2014) op. cit.  
 
179 See the opinion of the AG Roemer, in particular, pages 358 to 360 of the English version, which was 
more consistent with the Court’s judgment in Société Technique Minière.  
 
180 (Alfaro, Delenda est Consten v. Grundig, 2013) op. cit.  
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In fact, we firmly believe that the Consten decision would not have been a 
problem if the judgment had been applied analytically afterwards. By this, we mean if 
the Courts would have paid more attention to the particular circumstances that 
surrounded Consten, when they used it later on as a guiding precedent.  
This is a problem that can be extrapolated to many ECJ judgments, particularly in 
the field of concerted practices, as we will explain later on. We shall keep in mind that 
the Consten case had three very particular circumstances which are not present in the 
purely horizontal cartel cases that came later on:181  
(a) there was no monetary sanction; the Commission only forbade certain 
clauses of the agreement but it did not fine the Companies; the decision was taken in 
accordance with the system in place prior to Regulation 1/2003;  
(b) the case concerned a written contract (i.e. a written agreement); and  
(c) it was a vertical relationship not a horizontal one.182 
In short, between 1957 and 1966 there was a chain of events that ended up with 
Article 101 TFEU encompassing a procedural rule, a general principle and an 
administrative offence within its wording.  
                                            
181 It is important to notice that the first leniency policy in Europe dates back only to 1996 and it became 
successful after considerable alterations in 2002. Sandhu, J. "The European Commission's Leniency 
Policy: A success?" E.C.L.R., 2007: 148-157.The focus of the European Commission on cartels only 
started after the modernization package in 2003, see the White Paper, (Commission, White Paper on 
Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, 1999) op. cit. para. 45 
“There is today an obvious need to refocus the Commission's implementation of Article 85, allowing it to 
use its resources to combat cartels, particularly in concentrated markets and in markets which are being 
liberalised. Instead of having to adopt a reactive stance in the face of the large number of notifications it 
has to handle, the Commission should be able to be proactive and to pursue own-initiative procedures 
against restrictive practices and abuses of dominant positions that seriously restrict competition and 
threaten market integration”. See also Wils, W. "Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 - A Retrospective." 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2013.  
 
182 See (Lianos, Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law, 2013) op. cit. 
emphasizing that “In the seminal cases of LTM/MBU, Consten & Grundig and Italian Republic v. 
Council, despite the opinions of Advocate General Roemer, the ECJ did not draw any distinction between 
vertical and horizontal agreements with regard to their anticompetitive effect.” 
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Moreover, from there onwards, competition law has consistently focused on a 
literal or grammatical interpretation to Article 101 TFEU,183 and, as result, has remained 
trapped in universe of words that was ambiguously designed on purpose. 
D. Regulation 1/2003: a missed opportunity to conceptualize the 
system and develop adequate rules  
In the beginning of the twenty first century, competition law in the European 
Union undertook a considerable change. The realization that the Commission could not 
employ its resources in the most serious conducts (due to the burden of the notification 
system designed by Regulation 17/62), the upcoming entry of the former soviet 
countries into the Union and the backlashes in Luxembourg in three important decisions 
in a very short period of time,184 were some of the reasons that motivated a shift that 
included moving from: (a) a notification system to an ex-post control system, and (b) a 
legalistic approach to article 101 TFEU to a more “economic” or “effects based” 
approach.185  
During this time the position of the Chief Economist was created, the Leniency 
Policy was given a serious political push, and the legal framework was considerably 
altered with a new regulation (Regulation 1/2003) that superseded Regulation 17/62. 
This chain of events known as the “modernization package” started at the end of 
the nineties when the “groupe de modernisation” was created.186 The meetings of this 
group ended with the publication of a white paper which clearly shows the uncertainties 
that surrounded Article 101 TFEU at the time. The white paper analyzed two broad 
alternatives: (a) improving the authorization system or (b) switching to a directly 
applicable exception system.  
                                            
183 A mere overview of the table of contents of (Bellamy & Child, 2008) op. cit. and (Faull & Nikpay, 
2014) op. cit. clearly shows the fragmented and grammatical approach that has been taken since then to 
Article 101TFEU and which is also present in the opinion of Advocate General Roemer in Société 
Technique Minière.  
 
184 The famous Airtours, Tetra Laval and Schneider which are discussed in almost all competition law 
books. For a good summary (Faull & Nikpay, 2014) op. cit.  
 
185 (Wils, Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 - A Retrospective, 2013) op. cit.  
 
186 (Wils, Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 - A Retrospective, 2013) op. cit.  
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The first option was divided in four alternatives: (a) a new interpretation of 
Article 85 so as to include analysis of the harmful and beneficial effects of an agreement 
in the assessment under Article 85(1);187 (b) the decentralization of the application of 
Article 85(3) sharing the power to apply it and allocating cases between the 
Commission and national competition authorities on the basis of their center of 
gravity;188  (c) broadening the scope of application of Article 4(2) of Regulation nº17, 
extending further the exception to the notification requirement provided for in Article 
4(2) of Regulation No 17;189 or (d) a procedural simplification.190  
At the end, the Commission chose to adopt a directly applicable exception system 
allowing ex post supervision of restrictive practices. The switch to such a system was 
achieved by a Council Regulation (1/2003), based on Article 87 of the Treaty, which 
stipulated that all national authorities or Courts before which the applicability of Article 
the 85(1) of the Treaty was invoked could also consider the applicability of Article 
85(3).191  
                                            
187Application of the exemption provided for in Article 85(3) would then be restricted to those cases in 
which the need to ensure consistency between competition policy and other Community policies took 
precedence over the results of the competition analysis (Commission, White Paper on Modernisation of 
the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, 1999) op. cit. para. 56.  
 
188 The criteria for determining the center of gravity of a case would be not only the effects of the 
agreement or practice, but also the need to safeguard competition effectively. Some cases of Community 
relevance would be reserved to the Commission: these would include cases that raised a new legal issue 
and cases involving application of Article 90 of the Treaty. 
 
189The advantage of such a change for the undertakings concerned would be that, even in the event of late 
notification, the Commission could assess whether the restrictive practices satisfied the conditions of 
Article 85(3) and, if so, could adopt an exemption decision that would be effective from the date on 
which the agreement was concluded. Thus, undertakings’ legal certainty would be enhanced as this would 
prevent agreements falling within the scope of Article 85(1) which have not been notified from being 
automatically void (Commission, White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 
and 86 of the EC Treaty, 1999) op. cit. para. 64 
 
190 The simplifications discussed included abolishing the requirement of translation into all Community 
languages, both in the case of Article 19(3) notices and in the case of decisions, and the simplification of 
Advisory Committee consultation procedures (Commission, White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules 
Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, 1999) op. cit. para. 66 
 
191 (Commission, White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty, 1999) op. cit. para. 69; also (Schaub, 2001) op. cit. and (Wils, Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 - A 
Retrospective, 2013) op. cit.  
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According to the Commission, Article 85 would then become “a unitary norm 
comprising a rule establishing the principle of prohibition”, unless certain conditions 
were met. The whole of Article 85 would then become a “directly applicable provision 
which individuals could invoke in court or before any authority empowered to deal with 
such matters”.192  
Moreover, this interpretation would have the effect of making restrictive practices 
which are prohibited by Article 85(1) - but which meet the tests of Article 85(3) - lawful 
without the need for any prior decision. 
Similarly, restrictive practices that restricted competition would be unlawful once 
the conditions of Article 85(3) were no longer fulfilled. This new framework would 
mean that restrictive practices would no longer have to be notified in order to be 
validated.  
However, despite the careful analysis of the alternatives, there was not, in our 
opinion, a serious study into the consequences of the change of system into the fining 
policy. Indeed, Regulation 1/2003 merely copied the text of Regulation 17/62 with 
regards to fines. This seems, in retrospective, a double mistake:  
First, because as we know this provision had not been carefully discussed as it 
was introduced after the Social and Economic Committee pointed out the need to be 
regulated at the same time as the entry into force of the Regulation,193  thus suggesting 
that they should be the subject of its own Regulation.194  
                                            
192 (Commission, White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty, 1999) op. cit. para. 69.  
 
193 Indeed, the report which is available at the historic archives of the European University Institute 
expressly said in the recitals “CONSIDERANT que les amendes et astreintes prévues au projet de 
Règlement ne sanctionnent que la non-observance de règles administratives” and concluded later on “Il 
importe que les sanctions pour infractions aux articles 85, 1 et 86 du Traité ainsi que les règles et 
garanties de procédure, soient prévues les plus rapidement possible et en principe en même temps que la 
mise en aplication du premier Règlement, sans que ceci ait pour effet d’en retarder l’elaboration.” See 
here http://archives.eui.eu/en/files/inventories/15313?d=inline  
 
194 This conclusión can be extracted from the following paragraph at a previous stage of the opinion: “Il 
serait souhaitable que ces lacunes soient comblées les plus rapidement possible para des règleemnts 
ultérieurs et que que le Comité Economique et Social soit apelé à donner son avis sur une règlamentation 
complète. ”  
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Secondly, because the change from an ex ante notification to an ex-post control, 
changed drastically the importance and the likelihood of companies being sanctioned 
and, therefore, the need for legal certainty and for a more careful application of the 
principles criminal law even if nuanced to a, seemingly, administrative procedure. 
We do not mean by this that the path taken by Regulation 1/2003 was wrong. 
Quite the contrary, it has certainly helped expand a competition law culture and 
considerably helped the Commission to focus its efforts on hard-core cartels. It could 
just have been more carefully designed.  During the drafting of the Regulation, cautions 
were made against the risk of losing legal certainty in the application of competition 
law, respected voices (such as those as those of Wolf,195 Forrester196 or Siragusa197) 
signaled these risks.  
Indeed, Wolf, president of the Bundeskartellant pointed out that the reasons that 
pushed for a notification system in 1962 had not changed in the 2000 and that the main 
disadvantages of a prohibition system were still as valid as back then.198 Forrester 
argued that it was appropriate to think seriously about the problem of incompatibility 
                                            
195 Wolf, D. "Comment on the White Paper on the Reform of EC Competition Law." In EC Competition 
Law Reform, by B. Hawk. New York: Juris Publishing Inc., 2002.  
 
196 Forrester, I. "Modernization of EC Competition Law." 23 Forham International Law Journal 4, 1999, 
available http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1689&context=ilj  
 
197 Siragusa, M. "A Critical Review of the White Paper on the Reform of EC Competition Law." 23 
Fordham International Law Journal 4, 1999.  
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1690&context=ilj  
 
198 He argued that the main problem “was thought to lie in the fact that until a decision was made neither 
the parties to the proceedings nor any third parties involved would know whether an activity was legal or 
not. Furthermore, it would be possible for undesirable restraints of competition to be operated for a long 
time before being examined and prohibited. In the end the Single Market Committee and the European 
Parliament held that these disadvantages predominated (…) I can only endorse this assessment also from 
today’s perspective. Nothing has changed in the legal situation and as far as the expected disadvantages 
are concerned. We will therefore have to deal with the same question that was being asked 30 years ago: 
is a reduction in the Commission’s workload really a sufficient reason for putting up with what were 
already considered serious disadvantages decades ago? The Commission also promises us that the 
directly applicable exception will increase the deterrent effect of fines because immunity from fines 
conferred by notification would be removed. While this is true, it is still not the whole truth. Except for 
naked cartel agreements, it will be difficult in future to prove a firm’s bad faith when it is engaged in 
cooperation arrangements. At present there is the presumption of illegality for anyone engaged in 
horizontal restraints of competition without having sought an exemption. In future there would probably 
be a presumption in favour of the freedom of contract …”. (Wolf, 2002) op. cit.  
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with the Human Rights Convention before Regulation 17/62 was redrafted.199  
Nonetheless, the general view among commentators seemed to be optimistic about the 
future functioning of Regulation 1/2003, even within much respected practitioners such 
as Hawk: 
“we believe that there is today considerable legal certainty under EC law 
as to which agreements will result in fines. Thus, the abolition of the notification 
system will not reduce certainty this respect (…) there is, however, significant 
uncertainty about the amount of fines that will be imposed in a particular 
case”200  
Indeed, the Director General at the time pointed out: 
“Some commentators on the White Paper argue that the Commission’s 
reform proposal increases the risk of unforeseeable fines due to a lack of 
predictability in the new system. It should first be noted that it is a long standing 
practice of the Commission to impose fines only in case where it has been 
clearly established, either in horizontal instruments or in prior case law or 
administrative practice, that certain behavior constitutes an infringement of the 
antitrust rules (…) this policy will not change”.201  
This optimistic perspective was to a large extent embedded into the White 
Paper202 and, probably, explains why Regulation 1/2003 was not designed in such a 
                                            
199 (Forrester, 1999) op. cit. page 1082.  
 
200 Hawk, B. "The Development of Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty: Legal Certainty." In European 
Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy, by C. Ehlermann, & I. 
Atanasiu, 129-145. Portland: Hart Publishing, 2001. 
 
201 (Schaub, 2001) op. cit.  
 
202 (Commission, White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty, 1999) op. cit. para. 70: “The adoption of such a system in Community law is now possible because 
of the changes and developments that have occurred in Community competition law since 1962. The 
legislative framework in the competition policy area has been considerably strengthened, and the reforms 
currently under way on vertical restrictions and horizontal cooperation agreements will help to simplify 
and clarify it further. While there were legitimate doubts in 1960 as to the scope of the conditions for 
exemption under Article 85, the Commission's decision-making practice, the case-law of the Court of 
Justice and the Court of First Instance and the various block exemption regulations and general notices 
have made the conditions governing exemption much clearer.” 
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way, as to develop in further detail the prohibitions entrenched within Article 101 
TFEU, as it should have done.  
In retrospective, the Commission’s views – even though naïve - might be partially 
justified. It is true that some fault should lay on the Commission, who had not been 
confronted with sufficient number of hardcore cartels to develop a clear concept of the 
meaning of infringement by object.203 However, in fairness, it was impossible to foresee 
that the European Courts would be so lenient in their review of the concepts of 
willingness and negligence, particularly, with regards to the concept of infringement by 
object. In fact, the literature at the time, could not foresee the evolution that would take 
place in the Commission’s practice.204   
As some commentators have cleverly pointed out,205 the Commission’s practice in 
recent years has shown an increasing reliance on the “by object” analysis when applying 
Article 101(1) TFEU, which was often done in a rather simplistic and formalistic way. 
In the last 10 years the Commission has issued 12 Article 101(1) TFEU (non-cartel) 
infringement decisions, in 10 of which competition was considered restricted “by 
object”.206   
                                            
203 Between 1990 and 1999, only 20 cartel decisions had been taken. Between 2000 and 2009, 63 
decisions had been taken. Presentation by Professor Alfaro, “La Lucha Contra los Cárteles: Crisis o 
Éxito” on file with author.  
 
204 See (Wolf, 2002) op. cit. and Wils, W. "Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice." 29 World 
Competition 2, 2006, op. cit. and (Schwarze & Bechtold, 2008) op. cit. “It is probably not an 
exaggeration to state that at the time Art. 15 of Reg. 17 was adopted, it was by no means conceivable that 
the fines would reach such (exorbitant) levels under one and the same regime.” 
 
205 Latham & Waltkins Client Alert. "By Object Restrictions of Competition Revisited: European Court of 
Justice Endorses Narrow Interpretation." Client Alert News Flash 1741, 2014. 
 
206 In the period from 01/01/2004 to 31/06/2014, the Commission found anticompetitive practices to 
restrict competition “by object” in the following cases: case COMP/39685 – Fentanyl [2013]; case 
COMP/39226 – Lundbeck [2013]; case COMP/39839 -Telefónica and Portugal Telecom [2013]; case 
COMP/39510 – Ordre National des Pharmaciens en France (ONP) [2010]; case  COMP/38606 – 
Groupement des cartes bancaires “CB” [2007]; case COMP/38698 – CISAC [2008]; case COMP/38662 - 
GDF/ENEL [2004]; cases COMP/36623, COMP/36820, COMP/37275 – SEP et autres/Peugeot SA 
[2005]; case COMP/38549 -Barême d'honoraires de l'Ordre des Architectes belges [2004]; case 
COMP/37980 - Souris – Topps [2004]. The only decision in which the Commission judged the practice 
anticompetitive by its effects on competition was adopted in case COMP/37860 –Morgan Stanley/Visa 
International and Visa Europe [2007]. In case COMP/34579 – Mastercard I [2007], Commission admitted  
that it cannot reach a ‘definite conclusion’ as to whether the alleged practice concerns a restriction by 
object (see recital 407 of  the decision). Extracted from (Latham & Waltkins Client Alert, 2014) op. cit.  
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According to these practitioners, this record suggests that the Commission — 
probably prompted by the desire to achieve procedural economies — opts for the “by 
object” box whenever possible to avoid the need to perform a full effects analysis before 
considering efficiency benefits under Article 101(3) TFEU. To avoid such analysis the 
Commission has sought to create new categories of “by object” infringements that in the 
past would most likely have been treated as restrictions “by effect”.207 
Nonetheless, the time might be ripe for change again, as identified by 
Commission Officials, such as Mr. Italianer (DG Comp, director General) “[A]part 
from cases like price-fixing, output limitations and the like, the line between restrictions 
by object and those by effect is not always bright.”  
It might be, therefore, the adequate moment to start drawing the line or at the very 
least providing the Authorities with the right pencils.  
PART TWO - INFORMATION EXCHANGES: A GREY ZONE 
OF ARTICLE 101 TFEU 
Having laid out our theoretical understanding of Article 101 TFEU and the duality 
between the general clause and the administrative offence and sanction, it is time to 
confront our dogmatic interpretation of Article 101 TFEU, against self-standing 
information exchanges. There are several motives that, in our opinion, justify the choice 
for this particular infringement as a test of the boundaries and the strength of Article 
101 TFEU. 
First, information exchanges are at the heart of most European and national 
investigations nowadays. In fact, they cover a substantive part of the Commission’s 
Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation.208 In bureaucratic terms, they are a “policy 
priority”.  
                                            
207 (Latham & Waltkins Client Alert, 2014) op. cit. 
 
208 European Commission, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 TFEU to Horizontal 
Cooperation Agreements. Official Journal of January 14, 2011 (2011/C 11/01). 
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It is not hard to see why. In the age of telecommunications, confidential 
information is a very precious commodity, in fact, probably “the most valuable 
commodity”.209 The European Union has matured and so have the market players. 
Today, the “smoked filled” rooms have disappeared and the traces of any 
anticompetitive behavior are harder to find. Thus, it comes to no surprise that 
information exchanges (preventing and punishing them) has become so important for 
Public Authorities.210  
Secondly, it is very difficult to label them as competitive or anticompetitive ex 
ante.  Information exchanges were seen, many years ago, just as a way to put in place a 
cartel or a mechanism to enforce the functioning of cartel, by checking if everyone was 
complying. Later on, they were labelled a facilitating practice or a plus factor (a very 
useful piece of evidence for the Commission when lacking a smoking gun). As the years 
passed, the facilitating practice became a self-standing infringement and more recently, 
surprisingly, even an infringement by object.   
The economic literature has made a substantial contribution in this regard by 
explaining under which circumstances decreases in uncertainty as to certain 
parameters can have pro-competitive effects and/or anti-competitive effects. 
Nonetheless, there are so many parameters and variables that clear-cut rules are 
difficult to make.  
In fact, even today, the European Commission is reluctant to acknowledge any 
type of safe harbors for information exchanges. All we know is – by looking at the 
Guidelines and the Commission’s practice – that private information exchanges about 
                                            
209 From Francis Ford Coppola’s movie, Wall Street.  
 
210Information exchanges have always been looked with suspicion by Competition Authorities. The 
reason is obvious. As Adam Smith pointed out centuries ago, people of the trade seldom meet together if 
it is not to conspire to collude in some way or another. Smith, A. An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of the Nations. London: Metheuen & Co., 1904, available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN4.html When Adam Smith wrote his famous work, he was 
probably thinking more in cartels, than in the problems associated with decreases in uncertainty in tight 
oligopolies with homogenous products. Nevertheless, the intuition is the same: competitors rarely 
disclose information to their counterparts unless it is to reach a result that it is beneficial to them, so 
beware of their intentions.  
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future individualized prices and quantities are absolutely do-nots,211 the rest remains 
in a grey area subject to a case by case review. 
Thirdly, they anticipate the frontier of protection to an extent that raises serious 
issues about their compatibility with the basic principles of harm and culpability that 
should guide any (quasi) criminal law system.  
From a theoretical perspective, exchanging information is not a crime, the crime 
is to collude. Information exchanges without actually fixing prices or quotes are 
indirect evidence of that intention to collude. The problem is that, in some cases, they 
might be the only evidence supporting the existence of collusion. Then, the facilitating 
practice becomes a self-standing infringement, with the conceptual problems that this 
encompasses.  
This makes this infringement very interesting, particularly, when dealing with 
unilateral exchanges of information since the current understanding of Article 101 
TFEU only allows Competition Agencies to categorize them either as a hard core 
cartel or a completely harmless practice, but nowhere in between.  
Fourthly, given the circumstances explained above, the Competition Authorities 
crusade against information exchanges has come at the expense of legal certainty. As 
we will demonstrate, the willingness to avoid any preparatory acts that might result in a 
hard core cartel, has resulted in an extremely obtuse and counter-intuitive definition of 
concertation and concerted practices. 
This is not a novel pattern in EU Competition law. In fact, it resembles to some 
extent the ambiance in the 1960’s, when the ECJ ruled on the seminal Consten case.212 
By this, we mean a time where the ultimate goal - ensuring competition in the single 
market - clashes with the logical limits, that any (quasi) criminal law sanctioning system 
requires under the rule of law.  
                                            
211 And even some (few) economists challenge this, see Padilla, J. The elusive challenge of assessing 
information sharing among competitors under the competition law. OECD Policy Round Tables, 2010.  
 
212 Op. cit. supra at 146. 
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In Consten, the issue concerned the meaning of a cartel, in T-Mobile, the meaning 
of concertation. Consten was a vertical case that paradoxically, set out the 
underpinnings of the ECJ’s understanding on cartels.213 The same way that T-Mobile214 
is nowadays the seminal information exchange case, even though there was not actually 
an exchange between competitors, but just a mere unilateral disclosure.  
We firmly believe that in order to better understand what Article 101 TFEU 
forbids, and how Article 101 TFEU works, we need to explore its limits and nothing 
better for that, that information exchanges, where Authorities sanction not collusion on 
itself, but behavior that may end up in collusion and even so, only under some (not very 
clear) circumstances.  
Understanding how this (controversial) facilitating practice is encapsulated within 
Article 101 TFEU, we will able to understand exactly the confines of this flexible and 
elusive norm and test the merits of our theory.  
IV. THE ECONOMIC THEORY ON INFORMATION 
EXCHANGES: A PANOPLY OF POSSIBILITIES 
Before embarking in the legal analysis of information exchanges, it is 
indispensable to understand their impact on competition from a purely economic 
perspective.215 Otherwise, we will lack the necessary elements to assess, later on, the 
                                            
213 Id.  
 
214 C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v Raad van Bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit 
[2009] ECR I-4529 (“T-Mobile”).  
 
215 (Padilla, 2010) op. cit. As Professor Padilla indicates, “the competitive assessment of information 
sharing among competitors is one of the more complex issues, if not the most difficult issue, in 
competition economics and law”. According to this author, the vast literature on the topic can be divided 
into four main branches: “First, a pro-competitive effects strand which has identified circumstances when 
information sharing among competitors may facilitate the efficient functioning of markets and enhance 
competition. Second, an anti-competitive effects strand that has found that the exchange of commercially 
sensitive information may, under certain circumstances, facilitate tacit collusion and thus harm 
consumers. Thirdly, a unilateral effect strand which has focused on the impact of those exchanges of 
information on the strength of competition absent any tacit or explicit co-ordination. This literature has 
found that those exchanges may relax or strengthen competition depending on the nature of the 
uncertainty that they contribute to reduce (demand uncertainty or uncertainty over costs) and the mode of 
competition (prices or quantities). Fourthly, the “cheap talk” strand of the literature that has discussed 
whether a mere exchange of information involving no commitment to adopt any particular course of 
action can have a real effect on competition. This literature has not reached a consensus and some authors 
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reasonability of the legal rules applied, and the adequacy of the actions taken by 
Competition Authorities.  
Moreover, the review of the economic theory will help us understand why 
information exchanges lay exactly at the frontier between the general clause and 
the administrative offence. In other words, we will show how the panoply of 
economic effects of information exchanges justifies many different solutions which 
move along a very broad spectrum - from the positive information exchanges to 
those which just hide a cartel. This finding will help us understand much better 
the, otherwise seemingly inconsistent, case law of the ECJ, particularly when 
compared with the decisional practice of some national authorities, which will be 
the subject of study of second limp of this Part Two of the dissertation.   
We shall start by making two caveats.  
First, information exchanges do not harm competition, they endanger it. They 
are a “facilitating” practice in taking other actions that harm competition.216 In other 
words, information exchanges are not an end but a tool, a tool towards collusion.217  
Secondly, self-standing information exchanges are no different from an 
economic perspective from information exchanges as facilitating practices. The 
theories of harm are equally applicable and, to our knowledge, there are no specific 
theories of harm which result exclusively from self-standing information exchanges.   
It might seem strange at first for a lawyer that the same “theory of harm” can 
amount to two very different legal categories, a facilitating practice (i.e. a plus factor) 
or a self-standing infringement. This might be explained by the fact that the concept of 
                                                                                                                                
conclude “cheap talk” cannot condition the behavior of rational, profit-maximizing agents, while others 
maintain the exact opposite conclusion”.  
 
216 Kaplow, L. "An Economic Approach to Price Fixing." John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and 
Business, 2011. Caffara, C., and K.U. Kuhn. "The Cost of Simplistic Rules for Assesing Information 
Exchange: the Italian jet fuel decision." The Pros and Cons of Information Sharing, 2006. Kühn, K.U. 
"Designing Competition Policy Towards Information Exchanges - Looking Beyond The Possibility 
Results." OECD Report, 2010.  
 
217Werden, G. "Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law with 
Oligopoly Theory." 71 Antitrust L. J. 719, 2004. Kovacic, W., R. Marshall, L. Marx, and H. White. "Plus 
Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law." 110 Michigan Law Review, 393, 2011.  
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collusion for an economist is quite different from the concept of a cartel for a lawyer 
and, also, because even if certain exchanges can facilitate a collusive result, some 
might more “facilitating” than others since, like any other process, there is a moment 
where the ultimate conduct is completed.  
 
A. Understanding collusion and what information exchanges tell 
us (hypothetically) about its possible existence218 
For any lawyer the classic example of collusion is a cartel, that is an agreement 
among otherwise competing firms to sell at a price which has been previously agreed 
or at level of output, previously agreed upon, which is above the competitive price or 
output.219  
If we ask the same question to an economist, he will say that our definition is an 
example of a collusive equilibrium and argue that collusive equilibriums have the 
characteristics described, save for the need to reach an “agreement”.220 He will tell us 
                                            
218 We do not attempt to review the literature on collusion systematically which will take an entire book 
on itself but rather to provide some basic notions. Good summaries can be found in Kaplow, L., and C. 
Shapiro. "Antitrust." NBER Working Paper Series, 2007. Shapiro, C. "Theories of Oligopoly Behavior." 
In Handbook of Industrial Organization, by R. Schmalensee, & R. Willig, 329-414. Noth-Holland 
Amsterdam, 1989, (Motta, 2004) op. cit., Ivaldi, M., B. Jullien, P. Rey, P. Seabright, and J. Tirole. "The 
Economics of Unilateral Effects." European Commission, 2003. and Ivaldi, M., P. Rey, P. Seabright, J. 
Tirole, and B. Jullien. “The Economics of Tacit Collusion” European Commission, 2003. (Ivaldi, Rey, 
Seabright, Tirole, & Jullien, 2003) and (Bishop & Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: 
Concepts, Applicaction and Measurement, 2010) op. cit.  
 
219 Hovenkamp, H. Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice. West Group, 
1999. It is submitted that six conditions must exist for a cartel to succeed for any length of time: First, the 
product or service to be cartelized must define a relevant market with sufficient high barriers to entry that 
newcomers cannot undermine the cartel’s pricing decisions. Second, the cartel members must produce a 
sufficiently large share of the product or service in order for their decisions not to be undermined by 
producers who are not a member of the cartel. Third, the cartel members must be able to reach an 
agreement about the output or the price. Fourth, the cartel must be able to detect cheating by cartel 
members. Fifth, the cartel must be able to punish cheating effectively. Sixth, the cartel must be able to do 
all this without being detected from the outside.  
  
220 There is a wealth of literature on collusion, starting with the basic works on industrial organization. 
However, for more a concise explanation on both sides of the Atlantic, see (Kaplow & Shapiro, Antitrust, 
2007) op. cit. and (Ivaldi, Rey, Seabright, Tirole, & Jullien, 2003) op. cit. (Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust 
Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice, 1999) op. cit. pages 164 and 165.  
 
As Hovenkamp points out -  when talking about US competition policy - one reason antitrust law has had 
so little success with oligopoly is its continued adherence to a common law (i.e. contractual) concept of 
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that even though a cartel is an example of collusion, not all collusive equilibriums are 
cartels; a subtle but very important aspect.  
The essence of collusion for an economist is that firms stop behaving like 
competitors and start adopting a behavior similar to that of a single dominant firm.221 
What puzzles economists is that, under certain circumstances, competitors might 
choose a course of action which, if observed only the perspective of a single firm is 
not the most profitable one, but when looked from the perspective of the entire  
industry (or a substantial portion of it) yields better results, even though it might leave 
consumers worse off.222  
Thus, whether this outcome is the result of an explicit agreement between the 
parties or the result of some looser form of interaction is of secondary relevance.223  
                                                                                                                                
“agreement” that makes little sense in the context of strategic behavior among competing firms. In his 
view, non-cooperative oligopoly situations are often more stable, and thus more easily sustained, than 
cooperative ones. (Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust 
Law with Oligopoly Theory, 2004), op. cit. page 735 distinguishing between “spoken”, “unspoken” 
agreements and interdependence, instead of express and tacit collusion.  
 
221 In other words, in order to obtain supra-competitive profits in an otherwise competitive market, firms 
must reach a certain degree of market power that allows them to price their products over their marginal 
cost, without fear of losing sales to other competitors, either actual or potential. Thus, they need to 
concentrate a proportion of the market’s share of supply significant enough to allow them to reduce 
output and increase prices collectively as one single monopolist would do. See Ortiz Blanco, L. Market 
Power in EU Antitrust Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011.  
 
 
222 (Ivaldi, Jullien, Rey, Seabright, & Tirole, 2003) op. cit. “Tacit collusion, in contrast, requires that a 
firm make a choice which would not be in its interest if it assumed that other firms would be uninfluenced 
by its choice. For instance, under tacit collusion a firm can choose to set an output which, when added to 
the output produced by other firms, yields the monopoly output in the market as a whole. This could not 
be a short-term profit-maximising choice for all firms in the market if each were able to increase output 
without other firms’ reacting, since in the absence of such reactions at least one firm and possibly all 
firms would find it profitable to deviate from the monopoly level.” 
 
223 (Wish, Competition Law, 2012) op. cit. page 562 “Economists have no particular interest in whether 
collusion is “tacit” or “explicit”: it is the effects of the collusion that matter”. The concept of explicit 
collusion is, therefore, simple: any express price fixing, quota distribution, market sharing, or client 
allocation agreement between competitors. The meaning of tacit collusion on the contrary is harder to 
grasp: oligopolistic behavior (contrasting with monopoly and perfect competition), in markets with high 
barriers to entry, by firms that interact strategically with the intention of influencing the future actions of 
their competitors. (Ivaldi, Rey, Seabright, Tirole, & Jullien, 2003) op. cit. Other authors prefer a different 
terminology such as (Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust 
Law with Oligopoly Theory, 2004), op. cit. page 735 distinguishing between “spoken” and “unspoken” 
agreements. 
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Professor Motta phrases the problem more clearly when he argues that, whereas 
in economic theory collusion is defined as market outcome (i.e., “high prices”), 
antitrust authorities and judges should consider as illegal only practices where firms 
explicitly coordinate their actions to achieve a collusive outcome.224  
The reason for such a distinction is the importance of interdependence 225 and the 
so-called “folk theorem”. According to economic theory, in infinite games there exists 
a plethora of equilibriums, including equilibriums that correspond to full cooperation, 
as long as the players are sufficiently patient.226  
In other words, once competitors have the chance to repeat a game – with the 
knowledge gained in the previous game – the border between coordinated and non-
coordinated behavior soon fades to become, ultimately, a very fuzzy line.227 So, 
distinguishing legal from illegal behavior in oligopolistic markets228 is a very hard job 
                                            
224 (Motta, 2004) op. cit. page 138.  
 
225 The path opened by Stigler, G. "The Economics of Information." The Journal of Political Economy, 
1961: 213 - 225 and continued by Green, E., and R. Porter. "Noncooperative Collusive under Imperfect 
Price Information." 52 Econometrica no.1, 1984: 87 to 100, soon was overflown by an amount of 
literature which is difficult to summarize. In the particular field of game theory an information sharing, 
the following articles provide a good summary of the literature, Carlton, D., R. Gertner, and A. 
Rosenfield. "Communication Among Competitors: Game Theory and Antitrust." George Mason Law 
Review, 1997, Gärtner, D., and C. Roux. "Banning Information Exchange to Fight Collusion? Bananas 
and Beyond." 2011. Mollgaard, P., and P. Overgaard. "Transparency and Competition Policy" The Pros 
and Cons of Information Sharing, 2006.  
 
226 (Kaplow & Shapiro, Antitrust, 2007) op. cit., (Motta, 2004) op. cit. page 140 “The folk theorem says 
that in games with infinite horizon if the discount factor is large enough, firms can have any profit 
between zero and the fully collusive profit at the “collusive” equilibrium” or (Werden, Economic 
Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 2004) op. cit. 
pages 730 and 731 “The Folk Theorem teaches that the equilibrium of the stage game – in this case, the 
set of Cournot quantities – also is an equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game (…) The Folk Theorem is 
sometimes very loosely paraphrased as “anything can happen””.  
 
227 (Motta, 2004) op. cit. page 140. (Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: 
Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 2004) op. cit. pages 779 and 780, for that reason he 
argues that Competition Authorities should focus in actions against self-interest as “the critical plus 
factor”.  
 
228One caution should be made even if it is too obvious: we are talking about oligopolies.  As it is well-
known, the opposite of a perfectly competitive market is a monopoly. In the ideal collusive scenario, the 
members will behave and determine the profit maximizing price just as monopolist would do. In order to 
do so, the perfect cartel would contain relatively few members who collectively account for 100% of the 
production in a relevant market. (Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its 
Practice, 1999) op. cit. page 145.  
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to do for Competition Authorities if all they have is market performance and market 
data. 229  Particularly, knowing that there are markets (those similar to a Cournot 
model) where pricing above the industries marginal cost is not necessarily prove of 
collusion.230 
Information exchanges serve as mechanism to bridge the gap between the legal 
and the economic approach to collusion. Because, economists believe that they can 
make predictions as to the possible uses of an information exchange and their impact 
on the market, they tell lawyers that they can make predictions as to the intentions 
behind their actions. 231  So if they spot an information exchange, they contend that the 
Authority should not wait for the result, because they can predict it. The uncertainty is 
evident.  
In the following pages, we will explore how information exchanges facilitate 
collusion, what type of information exchanges can facilitate collusion and, lastly, 
when (under which circumstances) can these information exchanges do so?  
B. The cons: how do information exchanges “facilitate” collusion?  
Once we understand the concept of collusion, we can begin to understand how 
information exchanges facilitate reaching or sustaining a collusive outcome.232  The 
answer throughout the literature is consistent: the primary way in which information 
sharing can harm consumers is by increasing transparency233  which, in turn, allows 
                                            
229 This is explained very clearly by (Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: 
Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 2004) op. cit. pages 779 and 780. He posits four main 
conclusions: (1) Something more than interdependence must be shown before an agreement (spoken or 
unspoken) can be inferred; (2) The existence of an agreement cannot be inferred from actions consistent 
with Nash, non-cooperative equilibrium in a one-shot game oligopoly model; (3) the existence of an 
agreement can be inferred from actions inconsistent with Nash, non-cooperative equilibrium in a one-shot 
game oligopoly model. Action contrary to self-interest is the critical “plus factor”. (4) The existence of an 
agreement should not be inferred absent some evidence of communication of some kind among the 
defendants through which an agreement could have been negotiated. 
  
230 This is very clearly explained by (Bishop & Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: 
Concepts, Applicaction and Measurement, 2010) op. cit.  
 
231 (Motta, 2004) op. cit. page 153.  
 
232 (Kaplow, An Economic Approach to Price Fixing, 2011) op. cit. 
 
233 For a short but very insightful explanation, see OECD. "Unilateral Disclosure on Information with 
Anticompetitive Effects." Working Party No.3 on Co-operation and Enforcement, 2012, particularly, the 
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firms to (a) engage, and/or (b) sustain and effectively punish,234 and (c) and/or prevent 
potential competition to destabilize the equilibrium.235  
In what follows, we explain how information exchanges facilitate collusion 
(coordinated behavior) in these three instances.  
1. Focal point of coordination236  
In order to maximize profits, cartel members need to behave as close as possible 
as a monopolist would do. The obvious difference is that a monopolist decides by 
himself what prices and outputs to sell, whereas cartel members must reach some type 
of consensus among the members. This might be very difficult depending on the 
members’ cost structures, variety of products, etc. Information sharing can facilitate 
competitors reaching a point or points for coordination.  
For example, by sharing of future (pricing or output) intentions directly and 
privately between themselves, competitors can point each other the level at which they 
want to be in the future, without much risk, because if they do not see their 
competitors following them they can change their strategy. 237    
                                                                                                                                
background paper by Antonio Capobianco: “On the one hand, market transparency is perceived as a 
factor to be encouraged; after all, the  ideal model of perfect competition is premised on demand-side and 
supply-side perfect  information about the market. Increased knowledge of market conditions mostly 
benefits consumers, who can choose between competing products with a better understanding of the 
product characteristics; customers can also compare terms and conditions of the various offerings and 
freely choose the most suitable one for their needs. Enhanced transparency benefits consumers by 
lowering search costs (…)Increased transparency, on the other hand, is one of the factors required to 
reach a collusive understanding and make sure that it is sustainable over time. Transparency generally 
contributes to the ease of reaching an “agreement”, and decreases incentives to cheat by reducing the 
time before cheating is detected. In order to reach terms of co-ordination, to monitor compliance with 
such terms and to effectively punish deviations, companies need to acquire detailed knowledge of 
competitors’ pricing and/or output strategies. The artificial removal of the uncertainty about competitors’ 
actions, which is at the basis of the competitive process, can in itself eliminate the normal competitive 
rivalry.” 
 
234 (Motta, 2004) op. cit. pages 150 to 156.  
 
235 Bennet, M., and P. Collins. "The Law and Economics of Information Sharing: The Good, The Bad and 
The Ugly." European Competition Journal, 2010, page 320.  
 
236 (Faull & Nikpay, 2014) op. cit.  
 
237 (Bennet & Collins, 2010) op. cit. page 321. Also (Motta, 2004) op. cit. page 154. However, in our 
view, for this reasoning to be true, firms should have enough time to maneuver and change prices if they 
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As we will see later on, economists seem to argue that generally there will be no 
reasonable business explanation for such behavior other than collusion.238 Some 
economists and lawyers refer to it in broader terms as “strategic” information.239 
These arguments are, nonetheless, controversial. In fact, a whole trend of the 
economic academic discussion on information exchanges has focused on this theory, 
labelled as the “cheap talk” doctrine or “cheap talk” critique.240   
The general criticism towards this theory has been that, if firms could change 
their strategy at any time and the exchanges were made prior to any conduct on the 
market, those exchanges amounted to nothing else than “cheap talk”, absent any 
commitment by the firms.241  
The views on this debate are mixed.242 For example, not even 10 years ago, 
some economists were of the opinion that the basic factors influencing the “ability to 
reach a collusive agreement” were, then, extremely poorly understood both 
theoretically and empirically so as to be able to provide solid evidence to support the 
                                                                                                                                
are not followed, which requires the tools to ascertain their competitors’ prices. That is not to say that 
sharing information does not lead to coordination but that it comes with certain risks for companies.  
 
238 (Motta, 2004) op. cit. page 156 “To conclude, whereas announcements directed only to rivals should 
be forbidden, announcements about current and future prices which carry commitment value vis-à-vis 
consumers should be regarded as welfare enhancing”.  
 
239 (Ghezzi & Maggiolino, 2014) op. cit. 
 
240 As (Motta, 2004) op. cit. page 153 explains: “Announcement of future prices (or production plans) 
might help collusion, in that it might allow firms to better coordinate on a particular equilibrium among 
all the possible ones. Farell (1987) was the first to show the role of non-binding and non-verifiable 
communication (known as “cheap talk”) in achieving coordination among players in games with multiple 
equilibria. Since then, both theory and experimental evidence seem to indicate that announcements about 
price intentions might help firms to coordinate, although not under all circumstances. However, not all 
announcements about future actions should be treated in the same way”. 
 
241 Pepperkorn, L. "Competition Policy Implications from Game Theory." Workshop on Recent 
Developments in the Design and Implementation of Competition Policy. Florence, 1996. 1-18. arguing 
that the second implication arising from game theory as applied to competition law is that Competition 
Authorities should not worry about communication on future behavior. (Caffara & Kuhn, 2006) op. cit. 
 
242 See a very good explanation of the different views on cheap talk on (OECD, Unilateral Disclosure on 
Information with Anticompetitive Effects, 2012) op. cit. particularly, within the background paper by 
Antonio Capobianco, its para 2.3.2. “How valuable is “cheap talk”?” 
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idea that information exchanges facilitated the reaching of an agreement (as opposed 
to facilitate monitoring).243  
However, in recent years, there has been a shift in academia. Former DG Comp, 
Chief Economist, professor Kühn has recently affirmed that: “since then, the idea that 
cheap talk communication about planned future conduct could be essential to 
achieving cooperation in coordination games has been strongly supported by 
experimental work on coordination games”.244  
The classic text book example is he US case in the Airline Tariff Publishing 
Company (“ATP”).245 In December 1992, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) sued 
several U.S. airline companies and the ATP for a price fixing violation of Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act. The particularity of this case resided in the fact that carriers 
communicated price information but did not commit to a course of action. They could 
announce a future price increase but they left themselves open the option to change it 
before it took effect. 246  Ultimately, the case was settled through consent decrees.247  
                                            
243 (Caffara & Kuhn, 2006) op. cit. 
 
244 (Kühn K. , Designing Competition Policy Towards Information Exchanges - Looking Beyond The 
Possibility Results, 2010) op. cit. (Overgaard & Mollgaard, 2007) op. cit. 
 
245 United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co., 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶70,687 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 
1994). Summarized very clearly in (OECD, Unilateral Disclosure on Information with Anticompetitive 
Effects, 2012) op. cit. background paper. For more details on the case, see US submission to the OECD 
Report on Oligopoly, 1999, Paris. 
 
246 (Overgaard & Mollgaard, 2007) op. cit. page 15 “A suggestion to halt an unwanted discount fare could 
be made unilaterally by a firm by announcing a Last Ticket Day (LTD) for that fare. If other firms follow 
suit, they go ahead and implement it; if not, the LTD could be changed to a later date or eliminated. Since 
no trade is made based on the information, no sales are lost before coordination has been achieved. It is 
in this sense that “talk is cheap.” In addition, airlines could use a First Ticket Date (FTD) to signal that 
they suggest a new and higher price or they could threaten a cheater with a punishment strategy of low 
prices to take effect in the future, if the cheater does not bring prices back in line”. (OECD, Unilateral 
Disclosure on Information with Anticompetitive Effects, 2012) op. cit. background paper. 
 
247 (Overgaard & Mollgaard, 2007) op. cit. page 15, the consent decrees stipulated the end of cheap talk: 
"By limiting the ability of the airlines to engage in extensive price negotiations, the government contends 
that the airlines will find it more difficult to co-ordinate on more collusive outcomes in the future. 
Whether the decree actually will have this effect remains to be seen, but as co-ordination becomes more 
costly, it seems unlikely that the airlines will be able to engage in extensive negotiations that link together 
dozens or hundreds of markets. Multimarket contact may still be present, but without the ability to easily 
define the terms of an agreement, firms may not be able to exploit their cross-market linkages as fully as 
before the entry of the consent decree." 
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2. Internal stability of coordination248  
Nevertheless, even if the companies can reach a consensus through information 
sharing, it would be still necessary that the industry meets certain conditions that 
ensure that the collusive equilibrium can be sustained. After all, there is no sense in 
reaching an agreement, if this cannot be enforced later on.  
Stigler was one of the pioneers in analyzing collusion under this perspective.249 
The idea behind his work was that the factors that deter collusion are those factors that 
make cheating (i.e. deviating from the collusive explicit or tacit meeting of the minds) 
worthwhile.250  
a) The economics of cheating in cartels 
To identify them, it is necessary to understand the economics of cheating in 
these collusive equilibriums. Even though a cartel wishes to behave like a single 
monopolist, there is a crucial element that differentiates them: the diffused effect of 
their actions.  
In plain words, a cartel member obtains gains as a member of the cartel, but his 
gains are even higher, if he cheats while the cartel is in place.251 Thus, the question is: 
when will a cartel member cheat?  
                                            
248 (Faull & Nikpay, 2014) op. cit. 
 
249 Stigler, G. "The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws." In The Organization of Industry, by G. 
Stiegler. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983, page 268. “when the event we wish to study is 
clandestine, we cannot rely upon direct observation. I believe that my theory of oligopoly is a useful tool 
for this study precisely because it seeks to isolate (…) the determinants of successful cheating and hence 
unsuccessful collusion”. 
 
250 As (Motta, 2004) op. cit. page 150 puts it “detection of deviation is a crucial ingredient for collusion”. 
 
251 Note that these incentives to cheat are observed in a perfect cartel with identical cost structures for all 
firms, intuition tells us that the incentives to cheat may increase if we add differentiation in the firm’s 
marginal cost and marginal revenue structures.  If firms set a collusive equilibrium, their marginal 
revenue will exceed their marginal cost, thus obtaining, supra-competitive profits. For the monopolist this 
is a stable situation, however, for each single cartel member there is an incentive to increase his output 
and decrease his prices (an incentive to cheat), as he will receive all the profits of the cheating behavior 
while the negative consequences will be borne by all the firms in the market. 
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Well, only when there is limited risk that he will be detected and punished. In 
other words, his behavior is only beneficial to him for as long as the other cartel 
members do not react. The moment the other members increase output, prices will 
decrease for all members; losing, therefore, their supra-competitive profits. 252 
b) Monitoring adherence to the collusive agreement 
or practice  
As a result, we can see how information sharing can be a very useful mechanism 
for firms to monitor adherence to the collusive equilibrium.253  
Precise individualized information might allow coordinating firms to identify 
which exact firm has deviated, on which particular product, and for how long.254 This 
makes it easier to tailor the punishment for any deviating behavior.255  
In other words, even if competitors can reach an agreement and develop the 
tools to monitor compliance, it is undisputed that the incentive to cheat will be, 
ultimately, affected by the “punishment” that the cheater faces. In particular, there are 
two elements of the punishment which will normally determine the likelihood of 
                                            
252  This was Stigler’s intuition in 1964 when he argued that the likelihood of collusion could be 
determined by the ability of the members of the cartel to detect deviating behavior. Since then, it has been 
supported and expanded by a wealth of economic literature. Stigler, G. "A Theory of Oligopoly." In The 
Organization of Industry, by G. Stiegler. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983. Stigler 
suggested three empirical predictions: First, that oligopolistic collusion was more likely in markets with 
small buyers rather in markets with large buyers. The reason being that while the later are price takers, the 
former can negotiate prices.  Second, that collusion will be always more effective against buyers who 
report correctly and fully the prices tendered to them (such as the Government) as this would allow the 
cartelist to monitor prices and thus deviation. Third, and following the previous prediction, collusion is 
severely limited (excluding market sharing) when the significant buyers change identity continuously. 
Summarizing it (Motta, 2004) op. cit. pages 150 to 156, fn 32. Particularly relevant are the conclusions of 
(Green & Porter, 1984) op. cit. that since observation and punishment are key to sustain the stability of a 
cartel, the observation of some period with low prices is not sufficient to exclude that the industry is at a 
collusive equilibrium. Rather, price wars simply are the indispensable element of a collusive strategy. 
 
253  (Bennet & Collins, 2010) op. cit. page 322. (OECD, Unilateral Disclosure on Information with 
Anticompetitive Effects, 2012) op. cit. background paper, (Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence 
of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 2004) op. cit. 
 
254  (Bennet & Collins, 2010) op. cit. page 323.  
 
255 (Motta, 2004) op. cit. page 151 “exchange of information on past prices and quantities (or of 
verifiable information on prices and quantities set in the current period) of individual facilitates 
collusion, as it allows to identify deviators and better target market punishments, which then become 
more effective and less costly for the punishing firms”.  
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cheating: (i) the response time it takes the cartelists to observe and react to the 
deviation and (ii) the severity and accuracy of the punishment.   
The response time is critical, the longer it takes the cartelists to react, the more 
profits that the deviating firm will make.256 The severity of the punishment is also 
crucial and raises an interesting aspect of game theory. The other members of the 
cartel will want to send a clear message that any deviating behavior will be penalized 
and they want to ensure that the penalty is higher than the benefits obtained.  
However, the cartel members will also “suffer” the consequences of any penalty 
unless they can take targeted punishments. In the absence of clearly targeted 
punishments, an interesting trade-off will take place between the willingness of the 
firms to penalize the cheater, on the one hand, and their own interests in reversing to 
the collusive equilibrium as soon as possible, on the other.257 
An example that is often cited by economists is the Fatty Acids case.258 
According to the Commission decision, the market leader initiated contacts with the 
                                            
256In order for the punishment to take effect expeditiously, the cartelist need: (a) to detect the deviating 
behavior expeditiously; and (b) possess the necessary spare capacity or financial muscle to reduce prices 
and penalize the cheater quickly. (Bishop & Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, 
Applicaction and Measurement, 2010) op. cit. (Nitsche & Von Hinten-Reed, 2004) op. cit. explain that 
“Information exchange about future and past prices and quantities may affect the ability and  the cost of 
punishment. For example, if in a scheduled transport service collusion builds on a market sharing 
agreement, the announcement of a new schedule that would not be in line with the collusive arrangement 
could trigger a punishment response even before market entry (e.g. a price cut), this can make 
punishment very effective and therefore help stabilising a collusive arrangement. Information exchange 
may also help targeting the punishment schemes. In localised markets punishment can be targeted 
against the cheating party if sufficient information exists to determine who has cheated. This reduces the 
cost of punishing a “cheater” and so makes the threat of punishment more credible.” 
 
257 (Bishop & Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Applicaction and 
Measurement, 2010) op. cit. (Nitsche & Von Hinten-Reed, 2004) op. cit.  
 
258 Fatty Acids [1987] OJ L3/17. See Stroux, S. US and EC Oligopoly Control. The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2004, for a summary of the discussion, page 149. Bissocoli, E. "Trade Associations and 
Information Exchange under US Antitrust Laws and EC Competition Law." 23 World Competition 1, 
2000. According to Capobianco, A. "Information Exchange ." Common Market Law Review, 2004 the 
first Commission decision on information exchanges. See  (Pepperkorn, 1996) op. cit. arguing that “a 
number of elements indicate that the Commission did not base itself on or was not aware of the apparent 
underlying non-cooperative prisoner's dilemma game setting of the case. The decision does not make 
clear that the main effect of up to date monitoring is that punishment becomes more effective while the 
incentive to free ride is reduced. The Commission also indicates that it considers it of importance whether 
the companies actually communicated on sharing the market or not, making it clear that such would not 
be considered as 'cheap talk'.” 
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other two large producers which led to an information exchange agreement among 
these producers which covered firm data on yearly sales and future four-monthly 
reports about total sales.259 This information was used to discriminate the competitive 
strategies. In fact, customer switches between the three main competitors were 
labelled “stolen sales”, whereas gains of new customers were considered “legitimate 
gains”.260 
3. External stability of coordinated outcomes261 
Moreover, information sharing may also be used to detect new entrants in the 
market and react coordinately against them.262  
Information exchanges might increase transparency in such a way to deter new 
entrants in the market, if the firms which are present in the market can take actions to 
deter their entry. That could be the case for example in industries that require high 
investments for entry. If incumbent firms can decrease prices for a sufficiently long 
period of time to deter entry, then the potential company might be deterred from 
entering the market.  
This was the theory of harm raised by the European Commission in the UK 
Tractor case.263 In this case, the European Commission forbade an information 
exchange agreement that, in its opinion, impeded any “hidden competition” to occur 
in the UK tractor market.264 
                                            
259  (Stroux, 2004) op. cit.,  (Faull & Nikpay, 2014) op. cit.,  (Capobianco, 2004) op. cit..  
 
260 Nitsche, R., and N. Von Hinten-Reed. "Competitive Impacts of Information Exchange." CRA, 2004. 
 
261 (Faull & Nikpay, 2014) op. cit.  
 
262 (Faull & Nikpay, 2014) op. cit. 
 
263 92/157/EEC: Commission Decision of 17 February 1992 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 
85 of the EEC Treaty IV/31.370 and 31.446 - (“UK Tractors”) Official Journal L 068, 19-33.  
 
264 UK Tractors at 37. The Commission stated at the time: “The Exchange restricts competition because it 
creates a degree of market transparency between the suppliers in a highly concentrated market which is 
likely to destroy what hidden competition there remains between the suppliers in that market on account 
of the risk and ease of exposure of independent competitive action. In this highly concentrated market, 
'hidden competition' is essentially that element of uncertainty and secrecy between the main suppliers 
regarding market conditions without which none of them has the necessary scope of action to compete 
efficiently. Uncertainly and secrecy between suppliers is a vital element of competition in this kind of 
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This case nicely illustrates one of the main legal concerns regarding information 
exchanges: there is a difference between forbidding collusion and forbidding those 
factors which might make a market more prone to coordinated behavior,265 even if that 
coordination might not necessarily be the direct result. Moreover, it already articulates 
what will be explained next: that the information exchanges can have procompetitive 
effects.  
Phrasing it differently, it is very difficult to envision a functioning cartel without 
an information exchange between competitors; this does not mean, however, that all 
exchanges should form a cartel or that all exchanges or disclosures are done with this 
purpose. Sometimes, there might a legitimate business interest in disclosing or 
exchanging the information.  
C. The pros: How can information exchanges improve the 
market?  
So far, we have become acquainted with the concept of collusion. By now we 
understand how information exchanges, in markets with limited firms, can increase 
transparency and facilitate coordinated behavior. So the obvious question arises, why 
do not prohibit information exchanges among competitors once from all? The answer: 
not all information exchanges are dangerous, in fact, many are beneficial.   
In a series of studies that started in the mid-nineties, the economists Kühn and 
Vives studied in depth the effects of information sharing in static markets (i.e. the 
                                                                                                                                
market. Indeed active competition in these market conditions becomes possible only if each competitor 
can keep its actions secret or even succeeds in misleading its rivals This reasoning, however, in no way 
undermines the positive competitive benefits of transparency in a competitive market characterized by 
many buyers and sellers. Where there is a low degree of concentration, market transparency can increase 
competition in so far as consumers benefit from choices made in full knowledge of what is on offer. It is 
emphasized that the United Kingdom tractor market is neither a low concentration market nor is the 
transparency in question in any way directed towards, or of benefit to, consumers.” 
 
265 (Pepperkorn, 1996) op. cit. page “In this decision the Commission more profoundly understood the 
apparent non-cooperative prisoner's dilemma game setting of the case. The emphasis on hidden 
competition and uncertainty about competitors actions, a shortened reaction lag, eliminating the 
advantage of a company that tries to undercut, making targeted punishment possible etc. all fit very well 
in such a game theoretical explanation. The analysis within the context of a concentrated market and the 
Commission conceding that information would only truly become historical when older than one year add 
to this.” 
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Bertrand and Cournot models).266 Although the conclusions could not be fully 
extrapolated to the real world, their studies provided very helpful insight for 
understanding the unilateral firms’ incentives to share information.  
As it is well-known, Competition Authorities act ex post and have to infer the 
existence collusion from indirect evidence and past behavior. Understanding the 
situations where firms have an incentive to share information unilaterally was already 
a step forward for Competition Authorities to differentiate competitive from 
anticompetitive behavior. 267   
These economists concluded, by looking at static models, such as the Cournot 
model, that in many circumstances firms might have a unilateral incentive to provide 
information to their competitors. In other words, there might be instances where 
supplying the information “legitimately” benefits the discloser.268  
The economic literature has identified at least four scenarios in which firms can 
derive pro-competitive benefits from information sharing.269  
First, information sharing can allow companies to compare themselves against 
other firms (benckmarking). This can be beneficial if it promotes innovation or, for 
example, if competitors mirror each other’s’ best practices and enhance efficiency.  
                                            
266 See the seminal study for the European Commission, Kühn, K., and X. Vives. Information Exchanges 
among Firms and Their Impact on Competition. Luxembourg: Office of the Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 1995. 
 
267 (Kühn & Vives, 1995) op. cit. page 35.  
 
268 By this we mean, that not necessarily because he expects that this could be interpreted by the 
competitor in such a way that he will react to coordinate tacitly with him. (Motta, 2004) op. cit. page 151, 
summarizes it in the following way “the incentives for firms to exchange private information, and more 
importantly the welfare effects of such exchange are not robust, as they crucially depend on whether the 
firms compete on prices or quantities, or whether the uncertainty concerns costs or demand”. In other 
words, since firms may have incentives to share information for efficiency reasons, the welfare impact of 
information sharing practices is, in general, ambiguous. Vives, X. "Information Sharing: Economics and 
Antitrust." IESE Occasional Paper, 2007. According to Vives to reveal information unilaterally is a 
dominant strategy with either: (i) private values or (ii) common values with strategic complements, with 
the exception of Bertrand (price) competition with cost uncertainty; whereas not revealing is the dominant 
strategy with common values and strategic substitutes. He argues there is a large range of circumstances 
where pooling does raise profits, the exceptions being: (i) Bertrand (price) competition with cost 
uncertainty and (ii) Cournot (quantity) competition with a low degree of product differentiation or slowly 
rising marginal costs.   
 
269 (Bennet & Collins, 2010) op. cit.  
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Some authors describe this benefit as “organizational learning” as information 
exchanges may lead to an improved distribution system and other improvements in 
productive efficiency, which ultimately benefit customers and consumers.270 
This means, for instance, understanding how bottles can be designed with less 
plastic and still contain the same liquid, can homogenize a strategic cost but it 
certainly decreases it as well for our bottled water companies. 271 
Second, information sharing can allow companies to understand better the 
market evolution and be better prepared for shifts in demand or supply. This might be 
particularly useful in markets where demand fluctuates significantly, where there is 
undergoing a significant technological change or where consumer tastes and 
preferences change rapidly. By pooling their information together, firms may be able 
to draft better business and investment plans for the future.272  
Pooling information allows firms to better adjust to demand and cost shocks. 273 
Moreover, information exchange improves product positioning. In industries with 
product differentiation or spatial competition, coordination regarding the choice of 
location often is beneficial to consumers, who benefit from reduce transport cost, and 
increases total welfare. In addition, an information exchange may reduce sub-optimal 
production or pricing choices and, hence, reduce costs associated with excess 
inventories.274 
                                            
270 (Nitsche & Von Hinten-Reed, 2004) op. cit. page 4.  
 
271 (Bennet & Collins, 2010) op. cit.  
 
272 (Nitsche & Von Hinten-Reed, 2004) op. cit. page 4. (Bennet & Collins, 2010) op. cit. 
 
273 (Vives, 2007) op. cit. page 3. This will tend to improve welfare except in the case of a monopolist. 
Under cost uncertainty, more information may soften price competition. Moreover, information sharing 
can induce output uniformity across varieties. This effect is positive given the existence of consumer 
preference for variety. According to Vives, the output adjustment effect tends to dominate, and with 
monopolisitic competition and demand uncertainty, information sharing increases (decreases) expected 
total surplus under Cournot (Bertrand) competition 
 
274 (Nitsche & Von Hinten-Reed, 2004) op. cit. page 4.  
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Some economists are, even of the view, that an exchange of information on 
expected future demand (directly or indirectly) can rationalize production and thus 
lead to cost advantages.275 The Indian fishermen case is the classic example.276  
As a result of the introduction of cell-phones in India, Jensen observed that 
instead of selling their fish at beach auctions, the fishermen would call around to find 
the best price. He found out that the fishermen who “risked” going beyond their local 
markets to sell their catches jumped from zero to around 35% as soon as coverage 
became available in a specific region. The result, according to his study, no fish were 
wasted and the variation in prices fell dramatically.277  
Third, information sharing can also be important in choosing the right 
consumers and avoiding unnecessary costs for making the wrong choices.   
For example, in the Asnef-Equifax case, financial institutions in Spain created a 
central organization for the exchange of information the creditworthiness of potential 
borrowers. According to the Authorities, this reduced the risk of lending because it 
abridges the asymmetry of information between the information available to the 
lenders and the information held by the potential borrowers. The theoretical benefit 
was that the information exchange would reduce the number of borrowers who 
defaulted on repayments, and hence improved the functioning of the credit supply 
system as a whole: solvent creditors would not have to bear the sins of insolvent 
ones.278 
Fourth, information sharing may also be necessary as part of innovation 
agreements to develop “next generation” products. For example, in order to enable 
suppliers to design standard components and enable finished products to interconnect.   
                                            
275Doyle, M., and C. Snyder. "Information sharing and competition in the motor vehicle industry." 
Journal of Political Economy, 1999: 1326-64; (Caffara & Kuhn, 2006) op. cit. page 138.  
 
276 Jensen, R. "The Digital Provide: Information (Technology), Market Performance, and Welfare in the 
South Indian Fisheries Sector." The Quarterly Jorunal of Economics, 2007, (Padilla, 2010) op. cit.  
 
277 (To do with the price of fish: how do mobile phones promote economic growth, 2007) op. cit.  
 
278 (Bennet & Collins, 2010) op. cit., see ECJ preliminary reference in C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax, Servicios 
de Información sobre Solvencia y Crédito, S.L. v. Ausbanc [2006] ECR I-11125.   
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For example, in an information industry where customers have a strong desire to 
avoid becoming locked-in and certain devices only allow buying the information from 
specific platforms,279 the competing suppliers of information may have an incentive to 
go beyond sharing their future R&D plans in order to respond to their customers’ 
lock-in concerns. 280  
Think of the charging devices for cell-phones. As Padilla observes: “Competing 
suppliers will have an incentive to exchange their future R&D plans to ensure that 
their new products can mix and match. If that communication were limited by law, the 
innovation process would be thwarted and, to the extent that interoperability is made 
more difficult or imperfect, customers may have to pay higher prices over time”.281 
D. The general conclusion: no conclusion beyond general 
guidelines as to their likely danger 
So far into the study of the economics of information sharing, the reader will 
still have the impression that no conclusions have been reached: “it seems that almost 
under any circumstances information exchange could be good or bad”.282  
Precisely because of this reason - information exchanges among competitors 
may have both positive and negative effects - some economists have argued that the 
right approach should be assessing them always on a case by case basis.283 In other 
words, it should be advisable not to make any presumptions as to their positive or 
negative effects on competition ex-ante.  
Others, on the contrary, argue this would place a high burden on firms, who may 
not be in a position to perform the complex economic analyses required, and on 
                                            
279 (Padilla, 2010) op. cit., see Commission Decision in the E-books case AT.39847 – E-BOOKS, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39847  
 
280 (Padilla, 2010) op. cit.. 
 
281 (Padilla, 2010) op. cit.. 
 
282 (Kühn K. , Designing Competition Policy Towards Information Exchanges - Looking Beyond The 
Possibility Results, 2010) op. cit.  
 
283 (Padilla, 2010) op. cit.  
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Competition Authorities and private claimants bringing cases.284 That is why they 
believe it is sensitive to develop such presumptions. 285  
The economic literature is consistent in underscoring at least seven relevant 
parameters as helpful in designing policies on antitrust enforcement regarding 
information exchanges while, supposedly, ensuring an efficient allocation of 
resources.286  
Those are: (i) type of behavior (future or past behavior), (ii) dissemination 
(public or private information), (iii) degree of commitment (hard information or 
cheap talk), (iv) nature of the information (aggregated information or private 
information); (v) age of the information (new or old);287 and (vi)  frequency and 
trustiness (many reliable contacts or just one “out of the blue” contact) .288  
The following categorization summarizes, in our opinion, the mainstream views 
in the economic competition policy literature.289  
                                            
284 (Bennet & Collins, 2010) op. cit. (Padilla, 2010) op. cit.. 
 
285Kühn, K.U. "Fighting Collusion: Regulation of Communication Between Firms." Economic Policy, 
2001. (Padilla, 2010) op. cit.  
 
286 (Faull & Nikpay, 2014) op. cit.   
 
287 (Mollgaard & Overgaard, 2006) op. cit.  page 123.  
 
288 In their view, in many settings, repeated communication may be necessary to achieve credibility of the 
information or to make the information useful in facilitating cooperative pricing. (Carlton, Gertner, & 
Rosenfield, 1997) op. cit.  page 432. These authors argue that in the absence of direct evidence of a naked 
cartel, the appropriate standard to judge information exchanges should be a rule of reason analysis. 
Following this literature, the European Commission on its Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation 
Agreements distinguishes the following categories: strategic information, market coverage, aggregated or 
individualized data, age of data, frequency, public or non-public information and public or non-public 
information exchanges. (Commission, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 TFEU to Horizontal 
Cooperation Agreements, 2011) op. cit.  paras. 86 to 94. 
 
289 Following (Pepperkorn, 1996) (except for his views on cheap talk), (Vives, 2007) op. cit.  and 
(Mollgaard & Overgaard, 2006) op. cit.  page 124. A similar categorization (although more nuanced) can 
be found in (Kühn K. , Designing Competition Policy Towards Information Exchanges - Looking Beyond 
The Possibility Results, 2010) op. cit.   including information on investments and information on 
deliveries, pages 422 to 430. On the other hand, a more lenient position is taken by (Nitsche & Von 
Hinten-Reed, 2004) op. cit.  , (Gärtner & Roux, 2011) op. cit.  and, as explained above, (Padilla, 2010) 
op. cit.  .  
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1. High risk 
Private communications about future prices or production plans  
 
There is strong consensus in the literature (save for some minor but very 
distinguished voices) that private strategic communications should always be 
interpreted as direct evidence for collusion.290 The reason is that there was no good 
efficiency argument to justify firms talking about their planned pricing conduct, while 
communication about future conduct is crucial in coordinating on a collusive 
outcome.291  
 
That is the case, particularly, for individualized future pricing or quantity 
intentions shared in private. In fact, economists do not shy away from labelling this 
type of information exchanges as object infringements (a legal concept we will 
explore later on in section J.5.c)).292 
 
In the Cobelpa decision,293 the European Commission took the view that the 
only possible explanation for the exchange of private exchange of information 
concerning prices, discounts, price increases and reductions, rebates and general terms 
of sale, supply and payment was “the desire to coordinate market strategies and to 
create conditions of competition diverging from normal market conditions, by 
replacing the risks of pricing competition by practical cooperation.”294 
 
According to the economic literature, exchanges on future prices significantly 
help firms coordinate on finding the right collusive agreement. In fact, from their 
                                            
290 (Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law with 
Oligopoly Theory, 2004) op. cit.; (Ghezzi & Maggiolino, 2014) op. cit.    
 
291 (Caffara & Kuhn, 2006) op. cit.  page 139 and 140. 
 
292 (Kühn K. , Designing Competition Policy Towards Information Exchanges - Looking Beyond The 
Possibility Results, 2010) op. cit.  (Bennet & Collins, 2010) op. cit.   
 
293 Commission Decision, Cobelpa/VNP, in O.J. 1977, l 242/10 see paras 27 to 30. 
 
294 Id. at 29.  
 
105 
perspective it is, basically, the closest form to explicit collusion.295 They argue that 
since customers do not have access to such information, it involves little commitment 
so it is hard to see the “efficiency defence” for this type of information exchange.296 
 
Some commentators argue that the same happens, for production information. In 
fact, they posit that it can actually be much more effective in achieving collusive 
outcomes since quantities are often easier to monitor.297 
 
The European Commission Guidelines,298 following the mainstream economics, 
point out that: “exchanging information on companies’ individualized intentions 
concerning future conduct regarding prices or quantities is particularly likely to lead 
to a collusive outcome.  
 
Independent Schools299 is a good example of this type of exchanges. In this case, 
the OFT held that the exchange among schools about their changes in their future fees 
                                            
295 The following sentence by Kühn is quite telling “But in legal terms it may be useful to categorize them 
as illegal information exchanges because there may not be explicit agreements on behavior involved.” In 
this regard, see already in 1974, the Glass Containers Decision, in O.J. 1974 l 160/1 at para. 43 “It is 
contrary to the provisions of Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty for a producer to communicate to his 
competitors the essential elements of his price policy such as price lists, the discounts and terms of 
trade he applies, the rates and date of any change to them and the special exceptions he grants to 
specific customers. An undertaking which informs its competitors of such elements of its price policy will 
only do so when certain that, in accordance with the agreement entered into with such competitors in 
pursuance of the IFTRA rules, they will pursue a similar price policy for deliveries to the market where 
the undertaking is a price-leader. By such means the possibility of unforeseen or unforeseeable reactions 
by competitors is sought to be eliminated, thus removing a large element of the risk normally attaching to 
any individual action in the market.”  
 
296 (Kühn K. , Designing Competition Policy Towards Information Exchanges - Looking Beyond The 
Possibility Results, 2010) op. cit. page 422.  
 
297 (Kühn K. , Designing Competition Policy Towards Information Exchanges - Looking Beyond The 
Possibility Results, 2010) op. cit. page 423. This is, however, controversial see (Padilla, 2010) op. cit.   
298  (Commission, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 TFEU to Horizontal Cooperation 
Agreements, 2011) op. cit.   
 
299 Office of Fair Trading, 20 November 2006, Decision n° CA98/05/2006, Exchange of information on 
future fees by certain independent fee-paying schools, Case CE/2890-03. This case is also analyzed by 
Reindl, A. "Resale Price Maintenance and Article 101: Developing a More Sensible Analyticial 
Approach." 33 Fordham International Law Journal 4, 2011, who argues although the Office of Fair 
Trading’s (“OFT”) decision made no findings concerning the effects of the arrangement, there was 
apparently some evidence that the arrangement had resulted in higher tuition fees. 
 
106 
(privately and regularly) was anticompetitive. However, despite the evidence of an 
anticompetitive behavior,300 the OFT chose to pursue a "structured settlement".301  
 
Exchange of (private or public) disaggregated information about past prices 
and quantities  
 
According to the economic theory, these exchanges also have a very significant 
potential to improve oligopolistic coordination and should be prohibited, especially if 
the information is hard and new. The ultimate reason is that this type of information 
can eliminate uncertainty about rival’s conduct and allow punishment for deviation 
from the collusive outcome.302  
 
In our view, Competition Authorities must undertake an overall assessment of 
all market circumstances in order to conclude whether there has been tacit collusion or 
not. Therefore, the concern towards past disaggregated information seems to have 
merit as long as we limit it to highly concentrated markets with few firms. That is 
tight oligopolies. 
 
 
2. Medium risk  
It seems that almost all scenarios would fall under this middle ground category 
which would require an application of the rule of reason analysis. The variety of 
                                            
300 (Bennet & Collins, 2010) op. cit.  According to them there were a number of features relevant to the 
assessment of the infringement as object: “First, the information that was exchanged related to future 
intentions, and was confidential and not publicly available. Second, it was done on a regular and 
highly systematic basis, and for a number of years. Finally, the timing of the exchange corresponded 
with the timing in which school fees for the following year were set.” 
 
301 Giles, M. "The OFT finds than an exchange of information on independant school fees violates 
national competition provisions." e-Competitions , 2007, (Bennet & Collins, 2010) op. cit. Under this 
settlement, the schools agreed to an admission of liability in return for each receiving a nominal financial 
penalty (no more than £10,000 in any one case) and collectively contributing to an independently 
monitored educational trust for students who might have been affected by the arrangements in question 
 
302 (Caffara & Kuhn, 2006) op. cit. page 142. As Kühn points out there are two main reasons to expect 
disaggregation of information to help the firms in sustaining collusive agreements. First, it may be easier 
to detect defections from the collusive outcomes. Second, it may be easier to design punishment schemes 
that single out deviators. (Kühn K. , Fighting Collusion: Regulation of Communication Between Firms, 
2001) op. cit. page 188.  
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different scenarios makes it almost impossible to provide a list. The following are just 
a few: sporadic information exchanges, information exchanges on delivery data, cost 
data or swap trades among competitors.303 
 
Investments and market entry  
 
Investment decisions are generally decisions with greater irreversibility than 
cheap talk communications. As a result, the general understanding is that the risk is 
therefore much lower because companies cannot back up in case of not being 
followed. 304  
 
At the same time, as we have seen, there are many potential efficiency effects. 
The South Indian Fisheries case discussed above is a good example. As Kühn 
summarizes it, on that case, entry into different local markets had a coordination 
benefit by avoiding excess supply in one market and insufficient supply in another.305 
 
Public communications about future prices or production plans  
 
According to economists, information about current demand can reduce demand 
uncertainty but it can never fully eliminate uncertainty about the rivals’ past conduct. 
306 This, coupled with the output adjustment beneficial effect, also justifies a more 
lenient approach. 307 
 
                                            
303 (Kühn K. , Designing Competition Policy Towards Information Exchanges - Looking Beyond The 
Possibility Results, 2010) op. cit. 
 
304 (Kühn K. , Designing Competition Policy Towards Information Exchanges - Looking Beyond The 
Possibility Results, 2010) op. cit. he argues that the case of South Indian Fisheries discussed by Jensen 
(2007) op. cit.  is a case in point in which entry into different local markets has a coordination benefit by 
avoiding excess supply in one market and insufficient supply in another. In his opinion, this shows that in 
case of investment and entry decisions the collusion is much less of a concern while avoidance costs can 
be quite large.  
 
305 (Kühn K. , Designing Competition Policy Towards Information Exchanges - Looking Beyond The 
Possibility Results, 2010) op. cit.   
 
306 (Overgaard & Mollgaard, 2007) op. cit.   
 
307 (Caffara & Kuhn, 2006) op. cit.  page 142.  
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However, this is not always the case.308 A classic example is the one provided by 
Overgaard and Mollgaard about the cement industry in Denmark. In the early 1990s, the 
Danish Competition Authority found evidence of a lack of competition in the ready-
mixed concrete industry. In particular, it was concerned that some buyers were paying 
too high prices because it was rumored that other customers received significant 
confidential discounts. Because at that time the Danish Competition Act emphasized the 
role of price transparency in promoting competition, the authority decided to gather and 
publish firm-specific transactions prices for two grades of ready-mixed concrete in three 
regions of Denmark. The intention was to inform buyers of bargain deals in the hope 
that this would lead buyers to exert stronger downward pressure on prices. Following 
the initial publication, however, average prices went up by 15 to 20 percent in less than 
six months. This compares with inflation of 1-2 percent per year and stable or 
decreasing costs of inputs.309 
 
3. Low risk  
Exchange of aggregated data 
 
There seems to be an agreement that exchange of aggregated and/or old data 
is largely innocent, but care should be made to check the effective level of 
aggregation.  
 
Following the three theories of harm underlined before, the understanding is that 
exchange of disaggregated information can facilitate punishments that are better 
targeted at deviators.310 The logic behind this presumption is that highly disaggregated 
                                            
308 (Kühn K. , Designing Competition Policy Towards Information Exchanges - Looking Beyond The 
Possibility Results, 2010) op. cit. See, the following example, borrowed from Kühn: “Suppose the CEO of 
a firm makes the following public statement at a news conference: “We believe that a price increase of 
5% next year is realistic if the industry behaves more responsibly”. This is a statement that is about the 
behavior of the industry as a whole and how it should behave. There is no reason for a CEO to talk 
publicly about what the pricing behavior of other firms should be. Note that a rule that says that a CEO 
should not talk publicly about what competitors should do or what the “industry” should do would be the 
type of rule that would have strong incentive effects because it is clearly interpretable by firms. It is also 
hard to see why avoiding such statements would ever lead to inefficiencies.” 
 
309 (Overgaard & Mollgaard, 2007) op. cit.   
 
310 (Caffara & Kuhn, 2006) op. cit.  page 143.  
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exchanges are routinely adopted (when a cartel is set up) and that normally efficiency 
benefits can be obtained with aggregated data.  
 
For example, in order to adequately deseing an investment plan, it might be 
useful for firm to gain information of current and expected demand in the industry. 
However, it is harder to see why it would need a breakdown by competitor to design 
its investment plan. Similarly, manager incentive schemes, that benchmark on changes 
in market share or performance relative to the market, do not require disaggregation 
by firm. 311  
 
This means that information exchanges about aggregated past information on 
non-strategic variables such as cost, which are shared in public should almost 
invariably be seen as not troubling. Indeed, some commentators have argued that 
“there is absolutely no evidence that exchanges of yearly demand and production data, 
aggregated over the whole industry, have any material impact on the ability to tacitly 
or explicitly collude”. 312 Nonetheless, there are no clear safe harbors about them yet. 
313   
 
In this regard, the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines point out that exchanges 
of genuinely aggregated data, that is to say, where the recognition of individualised 
company level information is sufficiently difficult, are much less likely to lead to 
restrictive effects on competition than exchanges of company level data. However, 
they caution that the possibility cannot be excluded that even the exchange of 
aggregated data may facilitate a collusive outcome in markets with specific 
characteristics. Namely, members of a very tight and stable oligopoly exchanging 
aggregated data who detect a market price below a certain level could automatically 
assume that someone has deviated from the collusive outcome and take market-wide 
retaliatory steps. In other words, in order to keep collusion stable, companies may not 
                                            
311 (Kühn K. , Designing Competition Policy Towards Information Exchanges - Looking Beyond The 
Possibility Results, 2010) op. cit.  . 
 
312 (Kühn K. , Designing Competition Policy Towards Information Exchanges - Looking Beyond The 
Possibility Results, 2010) op. cit.  . 
 
313 (Bennet & Collins, 2010) op. cit.  page 332.  
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always need to know who deviated, it may be enough to learn that ‘someone’ 
deviated.314 This comes back to the issue of the market structure already discussed.  
 
From the case law of the European Courts, one could argue that exchanges of 
aggregated data should never fall under object category box.315 In Sarrió SA v. 
European Commission,316 the CFI annulled the part of the Commission’s decision 
prohibiting future exchanges of statistical data317 between the companies involved 
arguing that the mere fact that a system “might be used” for anticompetitive purposes 
did not make it contrary to Article 85(1) of the Treaty, according to the Court, it was 
necessary to establish its actual anti-competitive effect.318    
 
 Nonetheless, when the Commission reviewed the application for a negative 
clearance of the new exchange system, the Commission requested the system to be 
modifying because it took the view that in in particular cases the parties could identify 
individual participants from the analysis of the aggregated data. 319 That seems logical, 
for instance, when there were only two competitors in a particular market.  
 
 Exchange of old data 
 
With regards to the age of data, economists agree that sharing information about 
current or past behavior is not as useful as information on future intentions, in order to 
reach a focal point of coordination in advance.  
 
                                            
314 (Commission, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 TFEU to Horizontal Cooperation 
Agreements, 2011) op. cit.  para. 89.  
 
315 (Capobianco, 2004) op. cit.  pages 1253 and seq.  
 
316 T-334/94, Sarrió SA v. Commission [1998] ECR II-1439.  
 
317 Cartonboard decision, O.J. 1994, l 243/1.  
 
318 T-334/94, Sarrió SA v. Commission [1998] ECR II-1439 paras. 278 to 280.  
 
319 (Capobianco, 2004) op. cit.  page 1254 and Commission’s Notice pursuant to Art.19(3) of Regulation 
17 (case No. IV/34.936/E1 – CEPI-Cartonboard), in O.J. 1996, C310/3.  
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However, they do not rule out that information sharing about current or past 
behavior might cause anticompetitive results when the company sharing the 
information is the price leader. 320 In any event, it is not entirely clear if these could be 
considered collusive equilibriums.321 Obviously, on intuition is evident: the older the 
data is, the harder it can be used to monitor the behavior of the companies in the 
market.  
 
The Commission’s Guidelines caution, however, that here is no predetermined 
threshold when data becomes historic, that is to say, old enough not to pose risks to 
competition. Whether data is genuinely historic depends on the specific characteristics 
of the relevant market and in particular the frequency of price re-negotiations in the 
industry.322 
 
E. When are information exchanges dangerous? The structural 
elements 
Even if information sharing can have negative effects, the literature is consistent 
that these potential anti-competitive effects do not need to arise necessarily in all 
circumstances where there is an exchange of confidential information between firms. 
There are other factors that should be taken into account.  
After all, there are many different factors that make a particular market more or 
less prone to collusion, transparency just being one of them.323  
We do believe that the key one – the structure of the market - is somehow 
forgotten often in this mixed economic & policy literature concerning policy choices, 
as Professor Padilla brilliantly notes.324  
                                            
320  (Bennet & Collins, 2010) page 322, op. cit. (Ivaldi, Jullien, Rey, Seabright, & Tirole, 2003) op. cit. 
and (Ivaldi, Rey, Seabright, Tirole, & Jullien, 2003) op. cit.                                                                                                                               
 
322 (Commission, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 TFEU to Horizontal Cooperation 
Agreements, 2011) op. cit. para. 90.  
 
323 Among others (Bronckers & Vallery, No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of Fundamental Rights 
on Certain Dogmas of EU Competition Law, 2011) op. cit. “As far as information exchange on prices is 
concerned, we would think that factors meriting analysis would include market power, market 
(in)stability (evolution of market shares of suppliers exchanging information), maturity of the market, and 
customer bargaining power.” 
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Going against the grain, this economist has been clearly outspoken about this 
issue. In his view, sharing information on future behavior will not cause any harm if 
the affected market does not otherwise exhibit characteristics which make it amenable 
to collusion. He submits that the increase in market transparency may facilitate 
reaching a focal point and may also facilitate monitoring compliance with the tacitly 
co-ordinate outcome, but it does not guarantee in itself that such an outcome is 
internally and externally stable.325  
The number of firms and market concentration is, therefore, probably the most 
important one when discussing tacit collusion and the utility of information 
exchanges.326 When the number of firms is large, coordinating on a common price and 
punishment strategy tends to be more difficult, cheating may be harder to detect and 
smaller firms may find cheating more attractive because they have more to gain 
relative to what they lose from punishment.327 Thus, in these cases, the modern recent 
economic theory is embracing the idea that only through an express agreement firms 
might be able to coordinate themselves, even though stability may be still hard to 
sustain. Obviously, the more firms the more difficult it is to monitor the market. 
When there are only a few firms in the industry, however, the members of the 
cartel can more easily monitor each other’s behavior. Thus, as the number of firms 
increase, so thus the number of two-way informational flows and it is harder to know 
who is cheating, even if it is clear that someone is cheating.328 That is why, as some 
authors argue, in most prosecuted cases the number of firms in the industry was low 
and concentration was high.329  
                                                                                                                                
324 (Padilla, 2010) op. cit. Explaining the importance of the structure see also (Wish, Information 
Agreements, 2006) op. cit. 
 
325 (Padilla, 2010) op. cit. 
 
326 Thus, as (Capobianco, 2004) op. cit. explains if there is not a concentrated structure, the burden of 
proof for the competition authorities is certainly high. “If the market is fragmented, the authorities have to 
provide persuasive and credible evidence that despite the un-concentrated nature of the market there are 
other factors that are likely to give rise to tacit collusion”.   
 
327 (Kaplow & Shapiro, Antitrust, 2007) op. cit.. 
 
328 (Bishop & Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Applicaction and 
Measurement, 2010) op. cit.. 
 
329 (Kaplow, An Economic Approach to Price Fixing, 2011) op. cit. 
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Beyond the issue raised by the difficulty of reaching a consensus, there is 
another reason that makes it difficult to collude with too many competitors. Since 
firms must share the collusive profit, as the number of firms increases each firm gets a 
lower share of the pie. This has two implications. First, the gain from deviating 
increases for each firm since, by undercutting the collusive price, a firm can steal 
market shares from all its competitors; that is, having a smaller share each firm would 
gain more from capturing the entire market. Second, for each firm the long-term 
benefit of maintaining collusion is reduced, precisely because it gets a smaller share of 
the collusive profit. Thus the short-run gain from deviation increases, while at the 
same time the long-run benefit of maintaining collusion is reduced.330 
 
Thus, for an information exchange to raise concerns, the market must be 
amenable to co-ordination in the first place.331 The economic literature has pointed out 
                                                                                                                                
 
330 (Ivaldi, Rey, Seabright, Tirole, & Jullien, 2003) op. cit. 
 
331 The following are just an example of other relevant factors which have been identified by the general 
literature on collusion (that are, to some extent, dubious as to their impact on collusion) and that should 
be taken into account, in order to determine whether an information exchange is likely to result in 
collusion. See (Kaplow, An Economic Approach to Price Fixing, 2011) op. cit. (Motta, 2004) op. cit., 
(Bishop & Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Applicaction and Measurement, 
2010) op. cit. 
 
Capacity. As explained in the literature, capacity is a two-edge sword: a cheater may be able to grab 
more of the market if its capacity is larger but other firms may have greater ability to punish, assuming 
that the industry price can only be driven down if firms supply a sufficient quantity.   
Asymmetries in capacity make collusion more difficult: a firm with substantially more excess capacity 
may gain much from cheating, whereas the others with limited additional capacity may find it difficult to 
impose punishment.   As Motta puts it, generally speaking the role played by the presence of large levels 
of inventories and large excess capacity is ambiguous. On the one hand, large excess capacity implies that 
there is a stronger incentive to deviate (a price reduction would help fill capacity). On the other hand, if 
rivals are also endowed with large capacities, the punishment is more likely to be strong.   
 
Product differentiation. Intuitively, the more different the products are, the harder to reach a consensus 
on quantities or prices. That is why some authors argue that most prosecuted cases involve homogenous 
products rather than differentiated products.    According to them, when there is significant potential for 
differentiation, cheating is more likely because it may be more difficult to police product quality, subtle 
terms of sale, or other features. Moreover, when products are heterogeneous changes in market shares 
may reflect changes in consumer tastes or preferences rather than cheating.  Nonetheless, some 
economists argue that product homogeneity does not unambiguously raise scope for collusion, given that 
the incentive to cheat in differentiated markets is smaller and even homogenous products can be seen as 
different by consumers thanks to marketing campaigns.   
 
Symmetry. It can concern different dimensions (such as market shares, number of varieties in the product 
portfolio, costs and technological knowledge, capacities) whose importance will clearly differ across 
industries. Nonetheless, it is intuitive to think that people who are in a similar position would find it easier 
to arrive at an agreement that suits all of them.  
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that markets which are concentrated, stable and symmetric, and which involve 
homogeneous products are the most amenable to co-ordination.332  
F. Information exchanges and market foreclosure 
Finally, we believe we should pay a short visit to the other theory of harm aside 
from collusion: market foreclosure. The economic literature on information exchanges 
clearly shows that the traditional concern has been whether information exchanges 
might enable tacit collusion in markets whose “natural transparency” would not 
otherwise be sufficient to sustain collusion.333   
In addition to this traditional approach, the Commission has warned about the 
possibility of additional theory harm: competitive foreclosure.  The Guidelines 
differentiate two forms of foreclosure: (a) a competitive disadvantage if competitors 
                                                                                                                                
 
Symmetry in cost similarities. The economic logic dictates that if production costs are similar, the firms 
will reach more easily a coordinated price or output.  In fact, greater similarity on virtually any dimension 
is helpful to oligopolistic firms seeking to sustain elevated prices as it facilitates reaching a collusive 
equilibrium that is equally or similarly beneficial to all of them.  
 
Symmetry in temporal horizons. Similarly, the more similar the time horizons of the different firms are, 
the less chances that there will be any defections from the coordinated behavior. Firms with a shorter 
time-horizon might be less concern about future penalties or price wars and more interested in obtaining 
the profit associated with defecting from the collusive equilibrium.  
 
Elasticity of demand. The ease with which a consumer switches to outside producers as prices rises, is 
relevant in measuring the changes of coordinated behavior. In the extreme, if there is little or no ability 
for even a hypothetical monopolist to increase price, then an oligopoly will fare no better. However if 
there is some industry-wide market power, firms may well choose to elevate price.   Where an industry is 
subject to unpredictable fluctuations in demand, it becomes more difficult for firms to determine, whether 
changes in the demand for their products reflect cheating on the part of one or more cartel members, or 
whether it simply represents a change in the overall level of industry demand. The requirement for firms 
to be able to monitor each other in a timely and efficient fashion has led economists to predict that 
coordination is likely to be much more difficult where demand is more volatile.  Therefore, as the level of 
volatility increases, the level of prices which can be sustained under coordination, all other things being 
equal, decreases.  
Moreover, the more chances that other firms have to supply the market, through entry or expansion by 
fringe firms, the less likely that coordination will be profitable in the first place.  
However, some authors have pointed out that although elasticity of market demand is a factor that it is 
sometimes mentioned as facilitating collusion, it is not clear why it should affect the likelihood of 
collusion. If demand is very elastic, then a given price cut will determine a large increase in the quantity 
demanded, but this true both for the price cut in a deviation and for the price cut in the punishment period. 
In other words, elasticity of demand will in general affect both sides of the incentive constraint for 
collusion, and its net effect on sustainability of collusion is ambiguous.   
 
332 (Ivaldi, Rey, Seabright, Tirole, & Jullien, 2003) op. cit. (Padilla, 2010) op. cit. 
 
333  (Wagner-von Papp, 2012) 
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do not have access to information that others share and (b) the harm caused by 
competitors raising a price supplied to an undertaking competing downstream 
(increasing its costs).  
However, these theories seem to have little backing in the economic literature. 
That is why we concur with Wagner-von Papp’s opinion that these are not true 
information sharing theories of harm.334  
Indeed, the first scenario is in reality a question of whether there is an anti-
competitive refusal to deal rather than an issue of information exchange.335  Whereas, 
the second one focuses more on the specific result of the collusion – increase in prices 
for downstream competitors and its subsequent consequences– rather than in the fact 
that the exchange of information has decreased the uncertainty in the market and 
favored coordination.336 
In our opinion, the Commission’s theory of harm might make sense if it refers to 
the third theory of harm explained above, that is the maintenance of equilibriums 
which are infra-competitive, for example, by deterring entrance. Probably, the 
examples chosen by the Commission were not the most accurate ones.  
G. Summary 
After this incursion into the economics of information exchanges is time to make 
some final conclusions as to the lessons that we should take from a legal perspective.  
First, information exchanges are a tool towards collusion. They are not an end but 
a means towards collusion. They facilitate collusion in three ways: (i) by helping 
competitors reach a point of coordination; (ii) by helping competitors monitor and 
                                            
334 We believe that these theories of harm should be differentiated from those where the behavior allows 
monitoring maverick firms and increases barrier to entry (UK Tractors) which is a different theory of 
harm as we have seen above: sustaining external stability.  
 
335  (Wagner-von Papp, 2012) op. cit. 
 
336  (Wagner-von Papp, 2012) op. cit.  “It is a secondary consideration what the object of this collusion is. 
Whether it be raising prices for consumers generally, raising prices only towards competitors on 
downstream markets, reducing output, abolishing or reducing rebates, coordinating marketing strategies 
or store hours, the list of parameters on which collusion is possible is as open-ended as the list of 
parameters on which competition is possible.” 
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punish quickly and efficiently those firms that separate from the collusive equilibrium; 
(iii) by ensuring the external stability of the infra-competitive equilibrium.337  
Second, from an economic perspective there is a difference between explicit 
collusion (the classic cartel agreement) and tacit collusion (coordinated behavior 
through strategic actions without an express previous agreement). However, the exact 
frontier between tacit collusion, conscious parallelism and unilateral strategic behavior 
in tight oligopolies is very difficult to be drawn.338   
Third, information exchanges can take place both in cases of explicit collusion 
and in cases of tacit collusion. In the first type of cases, the information exchange will 
be a tool in order to implement the agreement, in the second one, information exchanges 
will help reach, sustain or punish tacitly coordinated behavior, but, most importantly, 
will help authorities make inferences about the reasons why the market is not working 
as competitively as it would be expected. Indeed, if the Authorities can reach the 
conclusion that there is no legitimate business rationale for the disclosure of the 
information, they might have a link between the market situation and a possible 
(anticompetitive) behavior of the firms.339  
Fourth, economists have tried to bring their theories into practical use by 
providing guidance as to policy guidelines for the Competition Authorities to use when 
investigating information exchanges among competitors. The key idea is that only 
information exchanges between competitors regarding future prices or output should 
always considered, ex ante and absent proof on the contrary, as anticompetitive.340  
The rest of possible information exchanges should be looked with suspicion but 
subject to a case by case analysis. These policy prescriptions, in our opinion, sometimes 
forget the relevance of other exogenous factors that might make a market prone to 
                                            
337 Flochel, L. "Les échanges d'informations point de vue de l'economiste." Concurrences, 2011. 
 
338 (Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law with 
Oligopoly Theory, 2004) op. cit.  
 
339 (Capobianco, 2004) op. cit. 
 
340 (Kühn K. , Designing Competition Policy Towards Information Exchanges - Looking Beyond The 
Possibility Results, 2010) op. cit. 
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collusion: such as market structures, demand stability, firms’ and products’ similarities, 
etc.341  
In other words, sometimes they lose focus by paying too much attention to the 
competitors’ intentions rather than on suitability of the behavior to harm competition. 
One important to thing to bear in mind, from a legal practitioner’s perspective, is that 
economist models, games, theories always rest on the assumption of rational behavior. 
However, lawyers know that their clients sometimes are, to put it simply, foolish in their 
actions (even if that is very hard for economists to believe). 
Fifth, economists are concerned with market equilibriums and the causes behind 
them. Their concept of collusion gives less importance to the subjective intent behind 
the firms’ actions and more to the mechanism to improve their functioning. However, as 
lawyers we firmly believe that one can only (and should only) be sanctioned for those 
actions that are committed willfully or, at the very least, grossly negligently. The 
contrary will bring us to a system of objective responsibility.342  
Sixth, the economic literature is not concerned, therefore, with key legal concepts 
such as the nature of values which are protected through legal norms, the different 
degrees to commit a sanction (i.e. the difference between committing a crime and 
attempting to do so) or the dissimilarity between prohibiting a behavior and sanctioning 
it, we should keep that in mind.  
 
  
                                            
341 (Padilla, 2010) op. cit. 
 
342 (Bronckers & Vallery, No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of Fundamental Rights on Certain 
Dogmas of EU Competition Law, 2011) op. cit. 
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V. INFORMATION EXCHANGES: ITS DIFFICULT 
FITTING WITHIN THE TRADITIONAL CATEGORIES OF 
ARTICLE 101 TFEU  
Now it is time to bend the amalgam of economic papers and theories into the 
legal functioning of Article 101 TFEU.  
As it is well-known, even though the list of infringements contained in Article 
101 TFEU is non-exhaustive343 [i.e. not every conduct needs to fall within the five 
categories provided in subparagraphs a) to e)], according to the ECJ case law, the 
European Commission is – nonetheless –bound by the linguistic limits of Treaty.  
This means, in turn, that before finding an infringement of competition law, the 
European Commission (or any Competition Authority applying this Article) needs to 
undertake a three-prong test. 344   
First, any non-listed infringement needs to be conceptualized either as an 
agreement, a decision or a concerted practice. 345   
Thus, in principle, the general view is that under the logic of Article 101 TFEU, 
unilateral behavior cannot be sanctioned since there can be no collusion arising of the 
conduct of only one competitor.346 
                                            
343 Article 101.1 TFEU reads:  “The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market and in particular those 
which: (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; (b) limit or 
control production, markets, technical development, or investment; (c) share markets or sources of 
supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance 
by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.” 
 
344This linguistic deconstruction of Article 101 TFEU has been the traditional approach used by scholars 
to disentangle this provision, see (Bellamy & Child, 2008) op. cit., (Wish, Competition Law, 2012) op. 
cit. or (Faull & Nikpay, 2014) op. cit. among others.  
 
345 (Wish, Competition Law, 2012) op. cit. page 82 and seq.  
 
346 In the sense that one cannot agree with itself, for concertation there needs to be two concerting, there 
will be no association if there is only one member. See (Faull & Nikpay, 2014) op. cit..  
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Secondly, once the conduct has been defined as an agreement, concerted 
practice or a decision (or a mix of them), the Competition Authority must look at its 
effects (real or potential) or at its object, to determine whether it infringed competition 
law. This is an alternative test, an Authority will only need to prove one or the 
other.347  
Thirdly, the conduct must “prevent, restrict or distort” competition in order to 
infringe Article 101 TFEU.348  We submit that the distinction between the second and 
the third limbs of the analysis is more theoretical than practical, but it helps us 
illustrate an important aspect of Article 101 TFEU: its scope of application.349  
As we will see this method of interpretation is very flawed, when applying 
Article 101 TFEU as a sanctioning provision, as it forces the interpreter of Article 101 
TFEU, to extract from a dispersed system of sources (mostly soft law) a body of clear 
                                                                                                                                
 
347 Following the Consten ruling.  
 
348 On this regard, see (Reindl, 2011) op. cit. “Article 101 TFEU has only one concept of “restriction of 
competition,” regardless of whether the analysis is built around a “restriction by object” theory or its 
regulatory equivalent, the categorization as a “hardcore” restraint, or a “restriction by effect” theory. A 
“restriction by object” analysis or “hardcore” categorization must reflect the same economic concepts 
as a fuller analysis of the facts of a specific case. Firms can anticompetitively increase market power 
either directly, through an arrangement that facilitates coordination and reduces competition among 
rivals, or indirectly, by foreclosing rivals from the market. There are no other alternatives; explanations 
of why a restraint violates article 101(1) TFEU must fit into one of the two theories” 
 
349 See (Kühn & Vives, 1995) op. cit. “An information agreement between firms violates Art 85(1) only if 
it can be shown that the object or effect of the agreement is to significantly "restrict competition". The 
term "restriction of competition" is not a well-defined economic (or legal) concept and therefore it has to 
be given meaning in practice with a view to the purpose of the underlying legal norm. There are two ways 
of filling this concept with meaning from an economic point of view. A natural definition of "restriction of 
competition" would be "any action that would have as an effect the reduction of social welfare (or 
consumer welfare)". Unfortunately, for the reasons expounded in the report, the full welfare analysis 
required in every case for the industry in question is generally infeasible. Such a definition would 
therefore remain of a purely theoretical nature, a mere reference point, that would rarely be applicable. 
A more practical definition of "restriction of competition" would be "any activity that significally 
increases the scope for collusive behaviour". This would be based on the implicit belief that collusive 
behaviour would be likely to occur whenever there is significant scope for it. Such a definition would still 
allow us to think of "restriction of competition" as actions that are likely to reduce welfare. Such a 
definition also appears to virtually coincide with the recent European Court of Justice interpretation of 
Article 85(1) as explained in the Tractor Exchange case. There the Court stated: "...Article 85(1) of the 
Treaty prohibits both actual anticompetitive effects and purely potential effects, provided that they are 
sufficiently appreciable...". Note that this statement, even though it nicely illustrates the issue of the 
frontiers of protection, was made prior of the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003, therefore, under a 
very different legal regime.  
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rules which it has to incorporate, afterwards, into the supposed categories of Article 
101 TFEU, which is nothing more than a carefully open provision.  
These limitations become particularly evident when one confronts Article 101 
TFEU to a borderline infringement such as information exchanges. In fact, it is the 
major reason why the Commission (with the ECJ’s blessing) has developed such an 
obtuse definition of concertation.350   
H. The historical evolution of information exchanges under the 
Commission’s Notices and Guidelines 
Article 101 TFEU does not include information exchanges between competitors 
among the (non-exhaustive) list contained in its first paragraph, the law, therefore, on 
this infringement must be found therefore in the Commission’s decision and its review 
by the European Courts.351 
In 1968, in its Notice on Cooperation Agreements, the European Commission 
described various types of agreement which could be regarded as beneficial and 
unlikely to infringe Article 101(1).352  
The list included, among others, those whose sole object was an exchange of 
opinion or experience, joint market research, the joint carrying out of comparative 
studies of enterprises or industries and the joint preparation of statistics and 
calculation models. The Commission considered that these exchanges were not 
objectionable, if they simply enabled firms to determine their future marketing 
behavior freely.353 
                                            
350 In Canaris’s terms, we could say that this chapter demonstrates the teleological contradictions that 
exist in the competition law universe, that result from confusing the principle and the general clause with 
the detailed rules and the topics of its application to possible lacunae. (Canaris, 1999) op. cit.  
 
351 (Capobianco, 2004) op. cit. for an outstanding analysis of the Commission’s practice up to 2004. 
 
352 Notice on Cooperation Agreements, O.J. 1968, C 75/3 (29.07.1968) « Communication relative aux 
accords, décisions et pratiques concertées concernant la coopération entre entreprises ».  
353 (Wish, Information Agreements, 2006) op. cit. (Capobianco, 2004) op. cit.. According to the Notice: 
“agreements whose sole purpose is the joint procurement of information which the various enterprises 
need to determine their future market behavior freely and independently, or the use by each of the 
enterprises of a joint advisory body, do not have as their object or effect the restriction of competition”. 
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Nonetheless, the Notice did warn that it would watch to ensure that these types 
of agreements did not lead to a restraint of competition. For the first time, the 
Commission specifically remarked that competition could be restrained by exchanges 
of information in an oligopolistic market for homogeneous products.354  
The Commission further detailed its policy on information exchanges in 1977,355 
after a series of decisions on individual cases, and along the lines of the ECJ judgment 
in the Suiker Unie case356 which will be discussed later on.   
In its 1977 policy statement, the Commission listed three key criteria it would 
follow when reviewing such exchanges: (i) the structure of the market, (ii) the nature 
and scope of the information exchanged, and (iii) whether the exchange of 
information was of a private or public nature.357  
However, it was not until the early 1990s, in the UK Agricultural Tractor 
case,358 as we will see later on, that the Commission made a comprehensive analysis 
of the potential restrictive effects of information exchange systems.359  
The 1968 Notice was not replaced until 2001 with Commission’s Guidelines on 
Horizontal Cooperation Agreements. Since these Guidelines did not deal with 
information agreements at all, the majority view was that the policy indications of the 
1968 Notice, regarding information exchanges, remained valid.360  
                                            
354 (Wish, Information Agreements, 2006) op. cit. 
 
355 European Commission, 7TH Report on Competition Policy (1977) para. 5 and seq. available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/ar_1977_en.pdf  
 
356 (Capobianco, 2004) op. cit.. C 40/73, Suiker Unie and others v. Commission [1975] ECR 1663 
(“Suiker Unie”).   
 
357 7TH Report on Competition Policy, op. cit. (Capobianco, 2004) op. cit. 
 
358Commission decision, UK Agricultural Tractor Exchange, O.J. 1992 L 68/19.   
 
359 (Capobianco, 2004) op. cit. 
 
360 (Wish, Information Agreements, 2006) op. cit., (Bellamy & Child, 2008) op. cit., Ortega, A. "Object 
Analysis in Information Exchange Among Competitors." Global Antitrust Review, 2012. 
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The first more elaborate guidance on black letter law came surprisingly in 2008 
in the Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to 
maritime transport service.361  
The Maritime Guidelines set out that an exchange of information, in its own 
right, might constitute an infringement of Article 81 of the Treaty by reason of its 
effect. This situation arises when the information exchange reduces or removes the 
degree of uncertainty as to the operation of the market in question with the result that 
competition between undertakings is restricted.362  According to the Guidelines, the 
review should be done on a case by case basis and two key elements should be taken 
into account, the nature of the market and the information exchanges.363 
However, around the same time, in its submission to the OECD on the 
Roundtable on facilitating practices, the European Commission stated that in EC 
competition law enforcement the evaluation of facilitating practices" took place 
mainly in the context of cases involving hard core infringements, even though 
interventions against “stand alone” practices of similar nature were “also possible”.364  
Thus, in 2008, the Commission seemed to be of the view that self-standing 
information exchanges were relative minor in comparison with information exchanges 
as plus factors in cartel cases. The European Commission was differentiating, 
therefore, between two broad categories of facilitating practices: (a) those which are 
                                            
361 [2008] OJ C 245/2 [38] – [59].  
 
362Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to maritime transport services Official 
Journal of September 26, 2008 (2008/C 245/02), para. 41 and seq.  
 
363 (Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services, 2008): “It follows that the actual or potential effects of an information exchange must be 
considered on a case-by-case basis as the results of the assessment depend on a combination of factors, 
each specific to an individual case. The structure of the market where the exchange takes place and the 
characteristics of the information exchange, are two key elements that the Commission examines when 
assessing an information exchange. The assessment must consider the actual or potential effects of the 
information exchange compared to the competitive situation that would result in the absence of the 
information exchange agreement.” 
 
364 European Commission, "Facilitating Practices in Oligopolies." OECD DAF/COMP(2008)24, 2008. 
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infringements on themselves (“self-standing” or “pure”), and (b) those which are plus 
factors in proving the existence of hard-core infringement.365 
Moreover, the Commission clarified that only the latter could fall under the 
object category.366 The Commission seemed to rule out, therefore, that information 
exchanges as self-standing infringements could amount to infringements by object. 367  
According to the Commission’s submission, information exchanges as 
infringements by object seemed to be left only for those cases where they were plus 
factors in a cartel case. 368 As we will see later on this trend shifted with T-Mobile369 
and the 2011 Guidelines.  
                                            
365 See the explanation provided by (Wish, Competition Law, 2012) op. cit. page 540 who differentiates 
between information exchange in support of a horizontal cooperation agreement and provides the 
Gas Insulated Switchgear [Commission decision of 24 January 2007, substantially upheld on appeal 
Cases T-117/07 Areva v. Commission [2001] ECR II-000]  and agreement and/or concerted practice to 
exchange information and refers to the Asnef-Equifax case as an example, see supra note 278.  
 
366 (OECD, Roundtable on Facilitating Practices in Oligopolies (DAF/COMP/2008(24)), 2008) op. cit. 
According to the Commission: “In the Commission's enforcement practice pure facilitating practices 
such as information sharing (which do not have as their object to restrict or eliminate competition) are 
not regarded as “per se” type of infringements.” 
 
367 (OECD, Roundtable on Facilitating Practices in Oligopolies (DAF/COMP/2008(24)), 2008) op. cit. 
page 128. “EC law requires thus an examination of the effects of information sharing practices. This 
assessment is not limited to actual effects alone, but must also take account of the potential effects of the 
agreement or practice in question on competition within the common market.” 
 
 Note that the UK made a different reading of John Deere considering it almost as an infringement by 
object. “it should not be thought that facilitating practices should always be subject to rule of reason 
analysis and detailed examination should be done in relation to the restrictive effect on competition in 
every case. For instance, if there are factors such as transparency, entry barriers, stagnant demand, and 
stagnancy in technology in an oligopolistic market that witnessed cartels in the past, information 
exchange agreements may not be allowed without a detailed analysis in terms of restrictive effects on 
competition. In this framework, the approach in the UK Tractors Decision of the European Commission, 
which was approved by CFI and ECJ, is thought to be correct.” 
 
368 Id. “Indeed, in most cases, exchanges of information are used either to make the cartel possible 
(exchange of planned price increases, exchange of production or sales volumes in order to put in place a 
market sharing arrangement, exchange of information on the identity of customers in order to put in 
place a customer sharing arrangement) or to monitor the cartel (information exchanged in order to check 
the proper implementation of a commonly agreed price increase or production/sales quotas). It 
concretely means that such exchanges of information will be seen as an infringement of Article 81(1) 
EC by object, along with the other practices that form the cartel.” 
 
369 T-Mobile, op. cit. supra at footnote 214.  
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Given the absence of a clear general approach, on 14 January 2011, the 
Commission published its Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 TFEU to 
horizontal co-operation agreements which included a separate chapter on information 
exchanges.370 
Commission officials justified this separate chapter on several grounds: a large 
demand from stakeholders, the fact that most cases take place at the national level and 
there was a need to ensure consistency among National Competition Authorities, the 
sense that the case law of the ECJ was not providing enough signals and, ultimately, 
the policy choice - given the difficulty to prove collusion in Court - to prevent it ex 
ante.371   
The Commission Guidelines changed slightly the discourse. According to the 
Commission, information exchanges can - on themselves - constitute a cartel372 
depending on the type of information exchanged, without the need to provide further 
evidence.373 
                                            
370 (Ortega, 2012) op. cit. 
 
371 Ossowska, A. "Chapter on Information Exchange in the EC guidelines." Cyprus Conference, 2010. 
The last goal seems difficult to believe as it would have required setting up clear-cut safe harbors which 
has not happened.   
 
372 (Commission, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 TFEU to Horizontal Cooperation 
Agreements, 2011) op. cit. “information among competitors may constitute an agreement, a concerted 
practice, or a decision by an association of undertakings with the object of fixing, in particular, prices or 
quantities. Those types of information exchanges will normally be considered and fined as cartels. 
Information exchange may also facilitate the implementation of a cartel by enabling companies to 
monitor whether the participants comply with the agreed terms. Those types of exchanges of information 
will be assessed as part of the cartel.” 
 
Particularly critical with this development see (Bronckers & Vallery, No Longer Presumed Guilty? The 
Impact of Fundamental Rights on Certain Dogmas of EU Competition Law, 2011) op. cit. “In its 
Guidelines on Maritime Transport of 2008,166 the Commission noted that an information exchange, in its 
own rights, might constitute an infringement of Article 81 of the Treaty by reason of its effects. Nowhere 
did the Commission refer to any infringement ‘by object’. Given that presumptions are to be based on 
common experience, it is legitimate to ask what experience the Commission gained between 2008 and 
2010, which allows it to presume now that any exchange of future prices is anticompetitive ‘by object’. In 
the Horizontal Guidelines, the Commission has not called attention to any relevant developments, and we 
can only note that disagreements on the effects of information exchanges among.” 
 
373 (Commission, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 TFEU to Horizontal Cooperation 
Agreements, 2011) op. cit. para. 74. “Information exchanges between competitors of individualised data 
regarding intended future prices or quantities should therefore be considered a restriction of competition 
by object. In addition, private exchanges between competitors of their individualised intentions regarding 
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The Commission’s Guidelines essentially argue that information exchanges can 
adopt all the possible categories of Article 101 TFEU but do not clarify whether and, 
under what circumstances, a line can be drawn between information exchanges on 
future prices which are part of the cartel and information exchanges that constitute the 
cartel on themselves, or whether information exchanges can constitute an 
infringement by object without being cartel, or, for the same matter, whether 
information exchanges on future prices can be a cartel and a concerted practice 374 
In what follows, we will analyze information exchanges under this traditional 
approach to Article 101 TFEU. This means as “agreements or concerted practices” 
and as “infringements by object or by effect”. We will soon see the evident problems 
with trying to encapsulate the complex economic reality within this system.   
I. Information exchanges as self-standing agreements: a “rara 
avis”  
1. The meaning of agreement under the case law of the 
European Courts: why should it be quite rare that self-standing 
information exchange agreements amount to a finable 
anticompetitive infringement  
According to the Commission’s Guidelines, theoretically, information 
exchanges can be categorized as a concerted practice or as an agreement. Even though 
it is true that there have been cases such as UK Tractors375 or Asnef-Equifax376 where 
                                                                                                                                
future prices or quantities would normally be considered and fined as cartels because they generally have 
the object of fixing prices or quantities. Information exchanges that constitute cartels not only infringe 
Article 101(1), but, in addition, are very unlikely to fulfill the conditions of Article 101(3).” 
 
374 This evolution might be explained by the importance that indirect evidence has gained in showing 
hard-core cartels. As the Commission acknowledged in its submission to the OECD, given the increased 
awareness in the European business circles of the scope of EU competition law, jointly with the increased 
use of modern communications, it has become more difficult to discover direct documentary evidence and 
the use of indirect evidence has become indispensable. European Commission, “Prosecuting Cartels 
without Direct Evidence”, OECD DAF/COMP/GF (2006) 7. 2006, page 117. Of course, the optimists 
could say the opposite; there is less evidence because there are fewer cartels, due to the Authorities’ good 
work. 
 
375 Case C-7/95 P John Deere v Commission [1998] ECR I-3111, hereinafter “UK Tractors Judgment”.  
 
376 C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax, Servicios de Información sobre Solvencia y Crédito, S.L. v. Ausbanc [2006] 
ECR I-11125, hereinafter “Asnef-Equifax”.  
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the information exchange took place within an agreement between competitors, in our 
opinion, it seems quite difficult that Competition Authorities  will fine an information 
exchange agreement - as a self-standing infringement – unless it is a cartel case.377 
There are three reasons that justify our approach.  
The first one relates to the relevance of the psychological element in the 
definition of agreement under the case law of the ECJ. As it is well-known, for an 
agreement to exist it is sufficient if the undertakings in questions should have 
expressed their joint intention to conduct themselves on the market in a specific 
way.378  
In Bayer, the General Court reviewed the case law on the meaning of agreement 
and stated that the concept in a slightly different between positing that an agreement 
“centers around the existence of a concurrence of wills between at least two parties, 
the form in which it is manifested being unimportant so long as it constitutes the 
faithful expression of the parties’ intention”.379   
Following this definition, it becomes evident that the intention or “purpose”380 
of the parties is an important element in determining the concurrence of wills,381 
which is something different from the fact that infringements can be committed both 
negligently and willfully.   
In our opinion, given the state of competition awareness nowadays, it seems 
very unlikely to have a self-standing information exchange agreement that is 
anticompetitive by object which it is not a secret hard-core cartel case.  
                                                                                                                                
 
377Similarly, (Ortega, 2012) op. cit. and Meyring, B. "T-Mobile: Further confusion on information 
exchanges between competitors." Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2010: 30 - 32. 
378 T-7/89, SA Hercules Chemicals v. Commission [1991] ECR II-1711, para. 2 and (Faull & Nikpay, 
2014), op. cit. 
 
379Case T-41/96, Bayer v. Commission, [2000] ECR II-3383.   
 
380 We prefer not employing the term “object”, even though the Court uses this term, to avoid any 
confusion between the concepts of infringements by object or by effect.     
 
381 Unless one can argue that the concept of agreement for vertical relationships (such as the Bayer case) 
differs from the concept for horizontal relationships. In this regard, Lianos, I. "Collusion in Vertical 
Relations Under Article 81 EC." 45 Common Market Law Review, 2008.  
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In other words, competitors will not manifest their joint intentions in the clear 
way that an “agreement” requires unless they are convinced of the procompetitive 
effects of their conduct, which, in turn, means that if declared anticompetitive the 
agreement will be declared so under an “effects based” approach.382  
The second one relates to the fact that after Regulation 1/2003, firms can not 
submit, any longer, their agreements for clearance by the European Commission, so 
the ex-ante analysis by firms (or their advisors) will (and should) normally be very 
cautious. Therefore, unless the procompetitive effects are quite clear, competitors will 
not embark in any agreements that can be any close of a cartel, which reinforces the 
first conclusion.  
The third one has to do with the very wide meaning and considerably lower 
burden of proof attached to the term concerted practices. As we will see, the flexible 
boundaries of this concept will make a much more attractive category than the more 
rigid “agreement” box, as the T-Mobile and Bananas case illustrate. This provides a 
prosecutorial bias in favor of this labelling.383  
2. Information exchange agreements as anticompetitive 
infringements: UK Tractors, Asnef-Equifax and some recent 
national decisions   
To our knowledge, the UK Tractor Exchange case is the only case - challenged 
before the European Courts - where the Commission banned an agreement to 
exchange information as a self-standing infringement (and not a cartel),384 on the basis 
that it was likely to hinder hidden competition and increase barriers to the entry.385  
                                            
382 One can broadly divide controversial cases on pure information exchanges into two categories. In the 
first category, it is often uncontroversial that there is an agreement to exchange information, but the 
undertakings claim that the information exchanged is not capable of restricting competition, or that any 
restriction of competition is outweighed by efficiencies under Article 101(3) TFEU. The prototypes for 
this category are cases such as John Deere and Asnef-Equifax.  (Wagner-von Papp, 2012) op. cit. 
 
383 Gebrandy, A. "Cases Note on Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands." 47 Common Market Law Review, 
2010: 1199-1220, pointing out that the ECJ placed more emphasis on the nature of the concerted practice, 
as relating to an exchange of information than the referring court does.  
 
384 In the remaining cases the Commission has concluded that the behavior constituted a concerted 
practice.  Earlier Commission Decisions which were not challenged before the Courts are dealt in 
(Capobianco, 2004) op. cit.  
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The UK Agricultural Tractor Registration case386 was considered during a long 
time the leading case on the exchange of information between competitors. The 
decision condemned as an incompatible with Article 101 a complex system for the 
exchange of information between tractor manufacturers in the UK that had been 
submitted for clearance under the pre-regulation 1/2003 system. The commission’s 
decisions was appealed to the CFI and the ECJ and upheld by the Courts in full.  
The Commission’s decision concerned the exchange of information on 
individualized sales and market shares which the Commission found to amount to a 
restriction by effect. The Commission’s conclusion relied in the following 4 main 
findings387: 
First, the market was very concentrated with absence of competitive pressure 
from competitors outside the exchange (national market, absence of countervailing 
buyer power on the demand side, multimarket contacts and high barriers to entry. 
Second, the fact that the information was “commercially sensitive”388 and it was 
barely aggregated. Thirdly, the direct and frequents contacts between competitors. 
                                                                                                                                
 
385 In Spain, the Spanish Competition Tribunal did ban a similar fact scenario in beer suppliers case 
(Expte. A. 329/02, Estadísticas Cerveceros). Both cases dealt with notifications to the Competition 
Authorities rather than ex post investigations.  
 
386 92/157/EEC: Commission Decision of 17 February 1992 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 
85 of the EEC Treaty IV/31.370 and 31.446 - (UK Agricultural Tractor Registration Exchange) OJ L 68, 
13.3.1992 (“UK Tractors Decision”).  
 
387 Other analysis at (Capobianco, 2004) op. cit. (Ossowska, 2010) op. cit..  
388 “ - the exact volume of the retail sales and market shares of each member-competitor on the United 
Kingdom market at national, regional, county, dealer territory and postcode sector level: this makes it 
possible to compare the market penetration and performance of each supplier down to the smallest 
geographical level; it is possible to compare the performances not only of the manufacturers but also of 
their dealers in each dealer territory, - the exact volume of the retail sales and the exact market shares of 
every specific model sold by each member: this permits comparison of the performance of specific models 
of each member-competitor; the comparison is equally done at the level of geographic zones which can 
be determined by each member, - the exact volume of the retail sales and the market shares of specific 
horsepower groups for each member: this permits comparison of the performance and market 
penetration of each member-competitor in specific horsepower bands which are usually categories of 10 
horsepower grouping; there are also breakdowns by driveline (two-wheel four-wheel / articulated), - the 
daily and monthly retail sales and market shares at United Kingdom level for each member: this permits 
comparison of the latest most up-to-date sales performance of each participating supplier on the United 
Kingdom market and their evaluation during the current month.” UK Tractors Decision para. 18.  
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Fourthly, the ability and easiness of the players involved in the scheme to find 
deviation and to punish it well as their ability to monitor parallel imports.389  
 
The Commission concluded that the exchange restricted competition and put 
forward two main theories of harm. According to the Commission, the exchange 
would: (a) destroy hidden competition (meaning that in an already oligopolistic 
market, if it becomes more transparent the limited competition remaining will be lost) 
and (b) increase barriers to entry.390   
The Commission pointed out that in this highly concentrated market, 'hidden 
competition' was essentially that element of uncertainty and secrecy between the main 
suppliers regarding market conditions without which none of them had the necessary 
scope of action to compete efficiently.391  
In sum, the Commission took a look at the characteristics of the market and 
concluded that there was a de facto oligopoly with high barriers of entry and strong 
brand loyalty. In this scenario, the market conditions had created a stable situation that 
the oligopolists wanted to protect by being able to spot any “mavericks” or hidden 
competition and thus having the capability to react quickly.  
As to the application of Article 101.3, the Commission concluded that the 
parties had not proved the requirement of the indispensability of information which 
                                            
389 “On the contrary, the high market transparency between suppliers on the United Kingdom tractor 
market which is created by the Exchange takes the surprise effect out of a competitor's action thus 
resulting in a shorter space of time for reactions with the effect that temporary advantages are greatly 
reduced. Because all competitive actions can immediately be noticed by an increase in sales, the 
consequences are that in the case of a price reduction or any other marketing incentives by one company 
the other can react immediately, thus eliminating any advantage of the initiator. This effect of 
neutralizing and thus stabilizing the market positions of the oligopolists is in this case likely to occur 
because there are no external competitive pressures on the members of the Exchange except parallel 
imports which are however also monitored as has been explained above.” UK Tractors Decision para. 37. 
 
390 “In addition, account must be taken not only of the immediate visible effects on an agreement but also 
of its potential effects and of the fact that an agreement can create a structure likely to be used for 
anticompetitive purposes. Article 85 (1) must be interpreted as including potential anticompetitive effects 
because the objective of that provision is the maintenance of an effective competitive structure within the 
meaning of Article 3 (f). This objective is particularly material in a highly concentrated market where an 
information exchange creates a structure of transparency which prevents hidden competition and 
increases barriers to entry for non-members”. UK Tractors Decision para. 51.  
 
391 See UK Tractors Decision para. 37.  
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identifies the performance of individual manufacturers and individual dealers to 
achieve the alleged benefit. According to the Commission, these benefits could have 
also been derived from own company and aggregate industry information.392 
The possibility of having more cases such as UK Tractors at the EU level seems 
highly unlikely given that this case occurred prior to Regulation 1/2003,393 therefore, 
under the previous notification regime. Thus the agreement was prohibited but the 
companies were not sanctioned.  
In our view, the true purpose for all the parties involved in the agreement in UK 
Tractors was to decrease uncertainty as to the behavior of all competitors (incumbents 
and potential) but there was no specific agreement tacit or explicit as to the use that 
each oligopolist would give to this information. There was neither any evidence on 
collective retaliation nor any sign that competitors would expect others to retaliate to 
any aggression to their shares by potential competitors. Therefore, the most sensible 
alternative was prohibiting the conduct without fining it monetarily.  
In other words, UK Tractors is a prohibiting decision, therefore, there was not 
truly an “infringement” of Article 101 TFEU, understood as an administrative offence, 
instead, it would be more adequate to say that the behavior contradict the principle 
and purposes of the general prohibition contained within Article 101 TFEU. 
Unfortunately, the ECJ did not find necessary to nuance the opinion so much.  
3. Self-standing information exchange agreements: 
prohibition rather than punishment 
In this sense, the UK Tractor decision would be consistent with the recent 
ASCOPA decision of the Swiss Competition Authority or the Whatif decision of the 
OFT (as opposed to the RBS/Barclays case).  
In ASCOPA, the Swiss Competition Authority concluded that - despite the 
sharing of consistently detailed product information - no monetary sanction should be 
                                            
392 UK Tractors Decision op. cit. 
 
393 Nonetheless, it seems a useful theoretical exercise to hypothesize whether a sanction would or should 
have been imposed to the members of the agreement if it had taken place after Regulation 1/2003. As we 
will see later on, some national decisions provide an interesting background of comparison. 
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imposed since the agreement to exchange information was not aimed to fix prices or 
quotes even though it concluded that it was anticompetitive.394   
This conclusion fits again very nicely with our theoretical understanding of 
competition as a principle embedded into an open provision, which can be infringed, 
but only clear rules that emanate from this principles – such as the prohibition against 
hard core cartels – can be properly infringed in the sense of requiring a monetary 
sanction as a result.  
As a result, the lack of clear rules, affects the legality of the sanction, but almost 
inevitably also the culpability of the conduct, given the lack of knowledge of the rule, 
and, therefore, the willingness of the parties to infringe the rule.395  
Under this perspective, the intentionality element (determined by circumstantial 
evidence) provides a very helpful explanation for the otherwise difficult distinction 
between information exchanges which end up in a commitment decision or in a very 
high fine, as the recent OFT investigations regarding the car industry ("Whatif? 
Private Motor") and the Libor industry (RBS/Barclays) illustrate.  
                                            
394Favre, P., and S. Venturi. "Competition Commission prohibits information exchange in luxury 
cosmetics industry." International Law Office, 2012 “The commission found that the information on gross 
sell-in prices allowed the ASCOPA members to adapt their own gross prices to accord with those of their 
competitors and, by doing so, to restrict competition on net sell-in prices (ie, the prices after discounts). 
The commission further found that, with respect to turnovers, the exchanged data was so detailed that 
each participant was in a position to calculate the volume of products supplied by the others and, as a 
result, to control the evolution of its own market share in relation to those of its competitors. As far as 
marketing expenses were concerned, the commission considered that the information was sufficiently 
detailed to provide information on the budget allocated by each participant for the promotion of its 
specific product lines, thereby allowing the other participants to compare such budget with the relevant 
undertaking's turnover. The ASCOPA members could then integrate this data into their cost analyses 
when assessing the opportunity to launch a new product; they were also in a position to adjust their 
pricing policies in response to the other members' strategies. (…)The commission did not fine the 
undertakings involved, considering that their conduct did not fall within the category of behaviour for 
which fines may be imposed under Swiss competition law. In particular, the commission found that the 
information exchange on gross sell-in prices could not be deemed as a price-fixing agreement within the 
meaning of Article 5(3) of the Competition Act, because: the exchanged information allowed the 
undertakings to compare only certain referenced products against each other; and the investigation did 
not show that the undertakings had agreed on the gross prices of certain products.” See also, (Alfaro, 
Como se analiza un intercambio de información o qué bien legislan los suizos: Caso suizo de cosmética 
de lujo, 2012) op. cit.  
 
395 On the connection between these two principles and culpability as a justification for the existence of 
the legality principle see (Roxin, Derecho Penal. Parte General. Tomo I, 2008) op. cit.  
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As it is well-known, whereas in the first case, the OFT reached a commitment 
decision with the IT developers and the car insurance companies to develop a software 
that would allow insurance companies to gather useful but not strategic information on 
insurance premiums, thus, not sanctioning the companies. In the second one, however, 
the OFT fined RBS with 28 million pounds for disclosing unilaterally and through 
junior employees to Barclays is intention to raise prices of its loans.396 
In other words, in RBS/Barclays the information exchange facilitated a cartel 
and, therefore, the conduct had to be prohibited and sanctioned. In the Whatif? Case, 
the exchange contradicted the objectives of Article 101 TFEU and the conduct needed 
to be modified, but not sanctioned.  
The other main information exchange agreement discussed at the ECJ level is 
the Spanish Asnef-Equifax case. In this case, the defendants argued that the purpose of 
the agreement397 was to reduce uncertainty as to the solvency of the clients and 
improve business decisions, whereas the claimants reasoned that the exchange of 
information regarding the credit history of the borrowers facilitated tacit collusion.  
                                            
396 In our opinion, the RBS case is very interesting since even though it is technically the result of a 
leniency application and therefore a cartel, the OFT does not clearly define it as such. See for example, its 
conclusion as to the object of the concerted practice. Paragraphs 322 to 325 of the Decision “The 
agreement and/or concerted practice in this case took the form of the provision of confidential, 
commercially sensitive pricing information, by RBS to Barclays, during the course of a number of 
contacts over a period of months. The information provided related to RBS's general pricing for loan 
products to Large Professional Services Firms and to at least two customer-specific proposed loans, 
namely those to Savills and to Knight Frank. The information was useful and of practical value to 
Barclays and at least sufficient to highlight to Barclays that there would be less downward pressure on its 
prices than Barclays might otherwise have expected. As such, the provision by RBS to Barclays of this 
information can be regarded, by its very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal 
competition. Moreover, the background to these contacts (for example, the implementation of the Basel II 
accord in the UK and the resulting pressure on pricing and margin) clearly suggests that the purpose of 
these disclosures was to influence Barclays’ pricing.”  
 
397 In this case the Court considered that it was not necessary to determine whether the scheme constituted 
a concerted practice or an agreement “It follows that Article 81(1) EC may apply to the conception and 
the implementation of the register, without there being any need to characterise precisely the form of the 
cooperation thus established between those institutions” Asnef-Equifax paragraph 31. Nonetheless, 
looking at the terms of the judgment, it seems clear that in reality there was an agreement among the 
Spanish credit institutions to create a registry of credit rating that would aid financial institutions when 
granting loans. In our opinion, the fact that an institution had been created, with its own facilities and 
legal personality supports the conclusions that there was an agreement. Similarly, (Wagner-von Papp, 
2012) op. cit. 
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The ECJ, on response to a preliminary reference asked by the Spanish Courts, 
concluded that the agreement was pro-competitive provided that access was not 
discriminatory since it benefitted consumers as a whole by ensuring better allocation 
of financial resources.  
The Court did not rule under a 101.3 analysis but under a 101.1 analysis.398 
Therefore, despite there was a reduction in uncertainty, it did not rule that there was 
an infringement by object, which is what T-Mobile, read broadly, seems to suggest as 
we will see in section C.399  
The facts of the Asnef-Equifax suggest that there could be room for these facts 
to be labelled as anticompetitive. For example, if access to the register was limited to 
certain financial institutions. However, if that were the case in our view, we would be 
talking about a collective refusal to supply (“boycott”) rather than a pure information 
exchange infringement/agreement.400  
However, the most interesting aspect of the debate is that the conduct did not 
infringe Article 101.1 TFEU, why? In our opinion, because there was no contradiction 
                                            
398 This is our reading of the judgment and seems to be as well the reading that the Spanish Supreme 
Court (STS 6317/2007) made when it ruled after the preliminary reference that there had not been an 
infringement of article 1 of the Spanish Defence of Competition Act. “En consecuencia, no puede 
incluirse el indicado fichero entre las prácticas prohibidas por el artículo 1º de la LDC , lo que es 
suficiente para estimar la casación, sin necesidad de entrar a examinar si se dan los requisitos para la 
autorización de conductas prohibidas establecidos en el artículo 3 de la LDC. A partir de la anterior 
conclusión, debe también estimarse el recurso contencioso-administrativo, y acceder a las peticiones de 
la demanda, declarando la nulidad del acto recurrido y el derecho de la recurrente a poner en 
funcionamiento el fichero controvertido”.  
Available here 
http://www.cncompetencia.es/Inicio/Expedientes/tabid/116/Default.aspx?numero=A+209/97&ambito=Co
nductas 
 
399 Obviously, there are several key differences between Asnef-Equifax and T-Mobile. First, in Asnef-
Equifax transparency in the market was increased (more information about credit history) but not with 
regards to the future behavior of the companies (there was no disclosure on what banks considered a bad 
credit history or the interests they would attach to it). Secondly, as a result there was freedom on the 
parties on how to use that information in the market. 
 
400 Please note, in relation with the above, that one could argue that the Asnef-Equifax case supports the 
opinion of some scholars who argue that Article 101.3 TFEU should only be applied to cartel 
infringements whereas the remaining infringements should be dealt under Article 101.1 TFEU. (Alfaro, 
El Proceso de Configuración del Derecho de la Competencia a la luz de la doctrina del Tribunal de 
Justicia de la Unión Europea, 2014), op. cit., this was an option that was, in fact, debated during the 
modernization process prior to Regulation 1/2003. 
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with the general principle and even less, with any clear rules, there was no cartel, and 
there was no evidence that the exchange of the credit history could have an impact on 
prices or quotas.401  
J. The evolution of the concept of concerted practices jointly with 
that of information exchanges and why they have become almost 
synonyms  
Before we have seen how our theory provides an explanation for the seemingly 
schizophrenia of competition authorities regarding their reactions towards information 
exchange agreements. Now, it is time to dig into a more difficult issue, the fitting of 
information exchanges as concerted practices.  
We should warn our reader that in the next pages we will dwell into many 
incongruities, starting with the fact that the “Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation 
Agreements” devote most of the discussion to analyze information exchanges as 
“concerted practices”.402  
This contradiction403 reflects one of the key features of information exchanges 
today, their confusion with the concept of concerted practices.  
As we will see next, information exchanges, as a self-standing infringement, 
have developed in parallel and thanks to the expansion of the meaning of concerted 
practices, to such an extent that, nowadays, one cannot be understood without the 
other.404  
                                            
401 For an analysis of prior decisions of the Spanish Competition Tribunal regarding this type of schemes, 
see (Marcos, Registros de Morosos y Defensa de la Competencia, 2007).  
 
402 (Commission, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 TFEU to Horizontal Cooperation 
Agreements, 2011) whereas information exchanges as agreements are briefly mentioned, information 
exchanges as concerted paragraphs are treated in its subsection in paragraphs 60 to 64.  
 
403 Also pointed out to some extent by (Ghezzi & Maggiolino, 2014) op. cit.  
 
404 A mere look at the AG Kokott’s opinion in T-Mobile op. cit., delivered on 19 February 2009, will 
convince the reader how they were used in that case as practical synonyms. See for example the first 
paragraph of the opinion “the present reference for a preliminary ruling presents the Court with the 
opportunity to clarify the requirements which must be satisfied to establish a concerted practice with an 
anti-competitive object for the purposes of Article 81(1) EC.” See also paras. 35 to 41 of the Opinion.   
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After this explanation of the concept of concerted practices today,405 we will 
better understand why it is hard to believe that pure information exchanges could be 
framed jointly as (a) self-standing infringement and (b) an agreement, unless they are 
a facilitating practice in a cartel case or a cartel on themselves.406 Or in other words, 
by only information exchanges that clearly infringe pre-established rules should be 
(and normally are) sanctioned.  
In addition, we will explain why it is so tempting for Competition Authorities to 
frame information exchanges as concerted practices, even if it is clear to them that 
reaching a commitment decision (negotiating) is a reasonable mecanism to solve the 
problem.407 
1. The original meaning of concerted practices: 
Dyestuffs 
Originally, the term concerted practice was coined by the founding Member 
States as a mechanism to capture collusive behavior absent a clear smoking gun. The 
term “practice” is quite telling on this regard. Absent a meeting in a “smoke-filled” 
room, the Commission could look at the actual behavior of the companies in the 
market - “their practices” - to ascertain whether there had been some type of 
concertation (coordination/cooperation) which could explain the behavior of the 
market.408  
Thus, the Commission could qualify that parallel behavior in the market as a 
concerted practice. In other words, a concerted practice was the legal mechanism by 
                                            
405This might be due to the fact, as Professor Albors-Llorens has pointed out, that the notion of concerted 
practice has centered around the existence of an act of communication between undertakings, aimed at 
lessening uncertainty concerning their future market behavior Albors-Llorens, A. "Horizontal Agreements 
and Concerted Practices in EC Competitoin Law; Unlawful and Legitimate Contacts between 
Competitors." Antitrust Bulletin, 2006: 837-876, page 858.  
 
406 Unless one can argue that the concept of agreement for vertical relationships (such as the Bayer case) 
differs from the concept for horizontal relationships.  
 
407 For a shorter description see (Ghezzi & Maggiolino, 2014) op. cit.  
 
408 (Ghezzi & Maggiolino, 2014) op. cit. 
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which the Commission could find an infringement of article 101 TFEU through 
indirect/circumstantial evidence after observing suspicious behavior in the market.409  
Put it differently, originally concerted practices (similarly to the US definition) 
where just the flip side of a cartel. If the Authorities could not show the existence of 
an agreement, they could show the parallel behavior and infer its existence.  
That is why, in our opinion, the Advocate General in Dyestuffs410 considered 
that one cannot dissociate the idea of a concerted practice from the real effect that it 
has on the competitive situation within the Common Market.411 
This conclusion – that a concerted practice referred to parallel behavior 
observed on the market without a rational business explanation - is supported by 
Article 101.2 TFEU which deprives any anti-competitive “agreement or decision” 
from its legal effects.412  
Logically, Article 101.2 TFEU did not mention concerted practices as they 
cannot be deprived of legal effects since by their own nature they could not be 
                                            
409 (Bellamy & Child, 2008) op. cit., (Albors-Llorens, 2006) op. cit.  
 
410 Case 48/69, ICI v Commission [1972] ECR 619, opinion of AG of May 2, 1972. See also Flint, D. 
"Comportement parallèles conscients et pratiques concertées." 33 Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé 
1, 1981: 33-53.  
 
411 Case 48/69, ICI v Commission [1972] ECR 619, opinion of AG of May 2, 1972 page 671: “Even if it 
is accepted that a concerted practice in fact conceals an agreement and at the same time reveals it 
through the appearance of some co­ordinated conduct, there is to my mind no doubt that in making a 
separate 'category' for concerted practices, the authors of the Treaty intended to forestall the possibility 
of undertakings' evading the prohibitions of Article 85 on activities inimical to competition by so 
conducting their affairs as not to leave any written document which might be called an agreement, even 
while conducting a common policy in accordance with an established plan. Such an interpretation, which 
takes practical account of the distinction made in Article 85, is of obvious interest as regards evidence for 
the existence of a concerted practice which, even though it implies that the will of the participating 
undertakings is somehow apparent, nevertheless cannot be sought using the same methods as for proof of 
an express agreement. However, an objective criterion, which is basic to the concept of a concerted 
practice, must also be met. This is that the participating undertakings must in fact have acted in the same 
way. This is the first difference of principle from the concept of an agreement in that, according to your 
case-law, an agreement, provided that its existence is established and that it has as its object an adverse 
effect on competition within the Common Market, is prohibited under Article 85 without its being 
necessary to consider the real effect of the said agreement on competition.” Also (Albors-Llorens, 2006) 
op. cit.   
 
412 Rivas, J., and G. Van de Walle De Ghelcke. "Concerted Practices and Exchange of Information: An 
Overview of EU and national case law." E-Competitions, 2012. 
 
137 
incorporated into a legal contract.413 This was the interpretation of the term concerted 
practices applied by the ECJ in Dyestuffs.  
a) The meaning of concerted practices in Dyestuffs 
In 1972, in Dyestuffs,414 the ECJ was confronted for the first time with the task 
of providing a definition of the term “concerted practices”. The Court was asked to 
explain, within the context of an oligopoly, the criteria that helped distinguishing 
conscious parallelism from anticompetitive behavior.415  
The Court coined the famous definition of concerted practices by pointing out 
that: 
 “Article 85 [101] draws a distinction between the concept of 'concerted 
practices' and that of 'agreements between undertakings' or of 'decisions by 
associations of undertakings'; the object is to bring within the prohibition of 
that article a form of coordination between undertakings which, without 
having reached the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been 
concluded, knowingly substitutes practical cooperation between them for the 
risks of competition.”416 
The element of coordination was crucial in the Court’s understanding of a 
concerted practice. As the Court explained, by its very nature, a concerted practice 
does not have all the elements of a contract “but may, inter alia, arise out of 
coordination which becomes apparent from the behavior of the participants.” 
                                            
413 This point is nicely illustrated by the Advocate General in Consten.  
 
414 Case 48/69, ICI v Commission [1972] ECR 619, hereinafter “Dyestuffs”.  
 
415 For a thorough analysis of the case, see Korah, V. "Concerted Practices, The EEC Dyestuffs case." 
Modern Law Review, 1973. Brief commentaries are also available at (Wish, Competition Law, 2012) op. 
cit. and (Faull & Nikpay, 2014) op. cit.  
 
416 Dyestuffs at 64. The Court intended to articulate a concept of concerted practices as a legal concept 
which was different from the term agreement. The distinction, even though it made sense from a purely 
legalistic and linguistic perspective, was doomed to fail, given the grey zone dividing express 
coordination, tacit collusion and mere interdependence that we have seen in the review of the economic 
literature. In this regard, see page (Joshua & Jordan, 2004) page 659  
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This statement is quite telling in two regards. First, by pointing out the 
coordination was a crucial element the Court was making clear that unilateral behavior 
should fall outside Article 101 TFEU. Secondly, by focusing on the behavior of the 
participants, the Court was opening the door to using indirect factual evidence as 
proof of the subjective element (the mental state).417  
Concerted practices captured, therefore, anticompetitive behavior where there 
was no clear evidence of an agreement. In other words, they were a mechanism for the 
Commission to police market behavior which seemed to respond to competitors’ 
concertation but where there was no smoking gun, (i.e. no factual evidence of the 
competitors deciding to take that action: no meetings, no trade association, no joint 
venture, etc.).418  
b) The relevance of the transparency in Dyestuffs 
In Dyestuffs, the Court was asked to analyze the price increases that had taken 
place at the same time, on the same products, by the same percentages by competitors 
in different national oligopolistic markets. The Court pointed that even though clear 
parallel behavior (from a factual point of view) was not in itself anticompetitive, it 
could be evidence of anticompetitive behavior when analyzed in the overall context of 
the functioning of the market.419  
As we have seen in the analysis of the economic literature on information 
exchanges, under certain circumstances, it might be very difficult to distinguish 
parallel behavior (both companies adopting individually the same decisions in the 
market) from coordinated behavior.420  
                                            
417 (Korah, 1973) Korah, V. "Concerted Practices, The EEC Dyestuffs case." Modern Law Review, 1973, 
(Ris, 1990) (Albors-Llorens, 2006).  
 
418 Ris, M. "The European Community Rules on Competition." Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review, 1990: 466-481. 
 
419 Dyestuffs at 66.  
 
420 (Kaplow & Shapiro, Antitrust, 2007) op. cit. As Kaplow and Shapiro put it:  
“at one extreme, if competitors meet in the proverbial smoke-filled room, negotiate a detailed cartel 
arrangement, sign it, and implement it—and, importantly, this all can be proved in a legal proceeding –
an agreement and hence a legal violation will undoubtedly be found to exist. At the other extreme, no 
agreement would presumably exist and no violation would be found due to the mere fact that competitors’ 
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The conclusions on this debate on where to draw the line - also known as the 
Turner-Posner debate - can be summarized as follows: information exchanges which 
are not justified by dominant strategies in equilibriums complying with competition 
laws, can provide inferences that the market behavior is the result of some sort of 
coordination (collusion) and not the similar individual reaction of the competitors to a 
change in the market circumstances, provided that the market structure would allow 
such collusion to arise out from an information exchange.421  
The Court took the view that parallel behavior, on the one hand, and an infra-
competitive market situation, on the other, where particular evidence that could lead 
to the conclusion that there was a concerted practice.422  
In Dyestuffs, the Court paid attention to the fact that the price increases had not 
been directly applied but instead they had been announced in advance.423 
The increased transparency in the market was, therefore, an element that the 
Court took into consideration to conclude that there had been a concertation. 
                                                                                                                                
prices are equal—as one expects with homogeneous products and perfect competition, for example—or 
that they sometimes move together—as tends to occur when there are shocks to input prices (think of 
retail gasoline stations changing sale prices when prices from refineries change). The difficult cases fall 
at various points in between, in terms of what transpired and what can be proven before a Tribunal” 
 
421 (Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice, 1999) op. cit. and 
(Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly 
Theory, 2004) op. cit. According to the Court: “Although parallel behavior may not by itself be identified 
with a concerted practice, it may however amount to strong evidence of such a practice if it leads to 
conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market, having regard 
to the nature of the products, the size and number of the undertakings, and the volume of the said 
market.” Dyestuffs at 66. 
 
422In the words of the Court: “This is especially the case [anticompetitive behavior] if the parallel 
conduct is such as to enable those concerned to attempt to stabilize prices at a level different from that to 
which competition would have led, and to consolidate established positions to the detriment of effective 
freedom of movement of the products in the Common Market and of the freedom of consumers to choose 
their suppliers.” Dyestuffs at 67. 
 
423 (Korah, 1973) op. cit. The Court pointed out that: “By means of these advance announcements the 
various undertakings eliminated all uncertainty between them as to their future conduct and, in doing so, 
also eliminated a large part of the risk usually inherent in any independent change of conduct on one or 
several markets. This was all the more the case since these announcements, which led to the fixing of 
general and equal increases in prices for the markets in dyestuffs, rendered the market transparent as 
regard the percentage rates of increase. Therefore, by the way in which they acted, the undertakings in 
question temporarily eliminated with respect to prices some of the preconditions for competition on the 
market which stood in the way of the achievement of parallel uniformity of conduct.” Dyestuffs at 101. 
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However, it was not the element on which the entire case gravitated.424 The individual 
announcements constituted a facilitating practice (a plus factor) towards the 
commission of the infringement.425  
The Court took also particular attention to the circumstances of the market and 
studied whether those announcements had been spontaneous or some kind of 
anticompetitive willingness could be derived from them.426 Moreover, the Court 
focused more on the content of the announcement, the type of commitment the 
companies were making and whether there was a business rationale behind them, 
rather than the fact that those announcements on themselves decreased the 
transparency in the market.427 
In Dyestuffs the Court implicitly concluded that there had been a cartel in the 
Dyestuffs market whose objective was to raise prices in the common market.428 This 
                                            
424 (Ghezzi & Maggiolino, 2014) op. cit. 
 
425 Similarly, although drawing a distinction between plus factors and facilitating practices, see Joshua, J., 
and S. Jordan. "Combinations, Concerted Practices and Cartels: Adopting the Concept of Conspiracy in 
European Community Competition Law." 24 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 3, 
2004: 647 - 682.page 663 “This dilemma has been grappled with in European cases. The Dyestuffs case 
was in fact the first occasion on which the Commission and Courts had to test the validity of "economic" 
evidence and argument. The characterization of the infringement in that case as a "concerted practice" 
was somewhat puzzling given the facts. While it is true that advance price announcements figured 
strongly-on three occasions the ten or so producers all announced identical price increases across the 
Community within a day or so of one another-the Commission's decision revealed that meetings had 
taken place in Basel and London to discuss prices just before the simultaneous announcements.60 There 
was also other circumstantial evidence of pre-arrangement. This surely sounds like an open and shut 
"plus factors" case, inferring an actual agreement from circumstantial evidence”. 
 
426 (Kühn & Vives, 1995) op. cit.  
 
427 Criticizing that the Court forgot to mention other factors take into account by the Commission on its 
decision which also suggested the collusive behavior of the firms. (Korah, 1973) op. cit. In this regard, 
the Court held:  “The fact that this conduct [the announcements and their content] was not spontaneous is 
corroborated by an examination of other aspects of the market. In fact, from the number of producers 
concerned it is not possible to say that the European market in dyestuffs is, in the strict sense, an 
oligopoly in which price competition could no longer play a substantial role.” Dyestuffs at 104-105. 
 
428 The Court concluded that: “Although every producer is free to change his prices, taking into account 
in so doing the present or foreseeable conduct of his competitors, nevertheless it is contrary to the rules 
on competition contained in the Treaty for a producer to cooperate with his competitors, in any way 
whatsoever, in order to determine a coordinated course of action relating to a price increase and to 
ensure its success by prior elimination of all uncertainty as to each other's conduct regarding the 
essential elements of that action, such as the amount, subject-matter, date and place of the increases. In 
these circumstances and taking into account the nature of the market in the products in question, the 
conduct of the applicant, in conjunction with other undertakings against which proceedings have been 
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cartel had been articulated through a concerted practice, instead through a gentleman’s 
agreement in “smoke filled room”, and the unilateral announcements constituted 
circumstantial evidence of such concertation since they acted as a facilitating 
mechanism to reach the mental state of cooperation.429  
c) The lack of an alternative unilateral business 
explanation  
The state of the law after Dyestuffs was that when there was (i) factual evidence 
in the market of a possible anticompetitive behavior (all companies raising prices at 
the same time) and (ii) there was no smoking gun (no documents showing an 
agreement, no meetings between the parties, etc.), the Commission could reach the 
conclusion that the parties had tacitly decided to pursue an anticompetitive goal 
provided that: (a) the conditions of the market suggested that it could not have reached 
that situation on itself, (b) there was evidence of facilitating practices supporting the 
idea that there was a tacit meeting of the minds (public announcements) and (c) there 
was no alternative unilateral business rationale for those facilitating practices other 
than the willingness to reach a collusive outcome.430  
                                                                                                                                
taken, was designed to replace the risks of competition and the hazards of competitors' spontaneous 
reactions by cooperation constituting a concerted practice prohibited by Article 85(1) of the Treaty”.   
 
See the interesting remarks made by (Joshua & Jordan, 2004) op. cit. page 665 “Some academic writers 
attacked the Court's judgment in the Dyestuffs case on the ground that it declared conscious parallelism 
presumptively unlawful on the basis of economic evidence alone. However, the Court's broad dictum has 
to be read in context: the judgment made it clear that standing on its own conscious parallelism could not 
be found unlawful. Whether or not there was actual collusion could be correctly determined only if all the 
evidence on which the contested evidence was based was treated not. in isolation but as a whole-echoes 
here again of the constant U.S. antitrust case law on evidence in a conspiracy case. There was in fact a 
good deal of collusion evidence, even if the Court's analysis was based more on the adoption of 
"facilitating practices" rather than on "plus factors" pointing to a conspiracy. It is also important to 
appreciate that the Court in its judgment relied on the so-called "structural factors" not as circumstantial 
evidence to prove collusion but in order to assess whether the advance price announcements could act as 
a facilitating device” 
 
429 The Commission decision suggests this reading, see in particular: “les infractions dont les entreprises 
intéressés sont responsables revêtent un caractère de gravité certain parce que, par les pratiques 
concertées de hausse des prix auxquelles elles se sont livrées, ces entreprises ont restreint d’une manière 
très importante le jeu de la concurrence”. OJ 1969 L 195. 
 
430 On the importance of this factor see (Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: 
Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 2004) op. cit., also joined cases C-89/85, Ahlstrom v. 
Commission, [1993] ECR I-1307 para. 71 “In determining the probative value of those different factors, it 
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Nonetheless, some authors intelligently warned about the risks this assumption, 
given that it is not always possible to assume that there is a "normal" set of conditions 
attributed to a particular market, deviation from which would indicate that collusion 
had taken place.431 
2. Blurring the meaning of concertation and the 
distinction between agreements and concerted practices: Suiker 
and Hüls 
After Dyestuffs, the meaning of concerted practices undertook a considerable 
evolution.432 The case law of the ECJ witnessed two parallel developments which 
intertwined over the years. On the one hand, information exchanges became self-
standing infringements and were incorporated into Article 101 TFEU as concerted 
practices. On the other hand, the interest in prosecuting long and complex cartels 
ended up by softening the distinction between cartels and concerted practices.  
                                                                                                                                
must be noted that parallel conduct cannot be regarded as furnishing proof of concertation unless 
concertation constitutes the only plausible explanation for such conduct. It is necessary to bear in mind 
that, although Article 85 of the Treaty prohibits any form of collusion which distorts competition, it does 
not deprive economic operators of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing and 
anticipated conduct of their competitors (see the judgment in Suiker Unie, cited above, paragraph 174). 
Nuanced later on in T-48/98, Acerinox v Commission [2001] ECR II-03859 “The applicant's claim that 
the alignment of its alloy surcharges with those applied by the other producers operating on those 
markets derived from mere parallelism of conduct attributable to the oligopolistic structure of the market 
in stainless steel flat products and to the transparency rules in Article 60 of the ECSC Treaty is 
unconvincing. Whilst it may follow from the case-law that parallel conduct cannot be regarded as 
furnishing proof of concertation unless concertation constitutes the only plausible explanation for such 
conduct (Ahlström Osakehtiö and Others, cited above, paragraph 71), the fact nevertheless remains, in 
this case, that the Commission has produced proof of prior concertation between the undertakings 
concerned, which involved the use and application of identical reference values in the formula for 
calculating the alloy surcharge. 
 
431 Alese, F. "The Economic Theory of Non-Collusive Oligopoly and the Concept of a Concerted Practice 
under Article 81." European Competition Law Review, 1999: 379, 381, (Albors-Llorens, 2006) op. cit.  
 
432 Similarly, (Ghezzi & Maggiolino, 2014) op. cit. Explaining the evolution as an “elaboration” rather 
than a change see (Wish, Competition Law, 2012) op. cit. 
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a) From the absence of a unilateral business 
explanation to the independent economic policy doctrine 
The first development can be traced back to the Suiker Unie case.433 In this case, 
when analyzing the concerted practices relating to the restriction of sugar exports to 
the Netherlands by SU, CSM, RT and Pfeifer & Langen, the Court established the 
principle that companies should make their business decisions individually (an idea 
somehow implicit in the Dyestuffs reasoning). According to the Court:  
“The criteria of coordination and cooperation laid down by the case-law 
of the Court, which in no way require the working out of an actual plan, must 
be understood in the light of the concept inherent in the provisions of the 
Treaty relating to competition that each economic operator must determine 
independently the policy which he intends to adopt on the common market 
including the choice of the persons and undertakings to which he makes 
offers or sells.”434  
However, by focusing on the individual behavior of the firms, the Court was 
changing the angle of the analysis of a concerted practice. 435 Particularly, when we 
realize that the Court was not limiting its analysis to “competitors” but to a broader 
concept: “economic operators”.436 
Instead of focusing on the parallel behavior and the casual link with the 
competitors’ actions (Dyestuffs), the Court was focusing on showing concertation by 
looking at the indirect evidence of collaborative evidence and setting out a 
                                            
433 C 40/73, Suiker Unie and others v. Commission [1975] ECR 1663, hereinafter “Suiker Unie”.   
 
434 Suiker Unie at 173.  
 
435 (Joshua & Jordan, 2004) op. cit. page 665 “In the later Suiker case, the Court of Justice expanded on 
its earlier dictum regarding concerted practice and emphasized that the coordination in question did not 
in any way require the working out of an actual plan agreed in advance” 
 
436 (Ghezzi & Maggiolino, 2014) op. cit.. As it has been brilliantly explained by Ghezzi and Maggiolino, 
up to that time parallelism (market behavior) had still a chief function within the boundaries of the notion 
of concerted practices. Not only, in practice, it was the starting point of any prosecuting strategy, 
adjudicating and reviewing activity, but also, on the theoretical level, parallelism distinguished concerted 
practices from agreements. 
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presumption of absence of justification for information exchanges that it is for the 
companies to rebut.437  
The Courts’ reasoning in Suiker Unie transformed an idea which was secondary 
in Dyestuffs - the fact that the announcements did not seem to be spontaneous – to a 
key element in the legal analysis. The Court incorporated the ideas laid down in 
Dyestuffs acknowledging the right of market participants to react and adapt to their 
competitors behavior. Nonetheless, it expanded the concept of “concerted practices” 
by laying out a general policy principle against direct or indirect contacts between 
competitors which was not present in Dyestuffs.438  
According to some commentators, Suiker Unie demonstrates that businesses 
violate article 101 TFEU prohibitions on concerted practices, basically, when they 
maintain direct or indirect contact with competitors.439 In fact, some have argued that 
the Court made it plain that practical cooperation was to be understood broadly, and 
that the net of collusive practices would catch any contact between undertakings 
aimed to remove uncertainty as to future market behavior.440 In other words, 
communicating had become on itself a “practice”.441  
The Court was setting out, therefore, the iuris tantum presumption that 
there is no business rationale for disclosing future market conduct, other than 
                                            
437 This approach became consistently applied after the Commission’s backlash in, C-89/85, Ahlström 
Osakeyhtiö and others v. Commission [1993] I-01307, hereinafter “WoodPulp”. Aftter this, previous 
contacts would taint all parallel behavior. See supra note 430.  
 
438 According to (Wish, Competition Law, 2012) op. cit. page 113 “These two cases provide the legal test 
of what constitutes a concerted practice for the purpose of Article 101: there must be a mental consensus 
whereby practical cooperation is knowingly substituted for competition; however, the consensus need not 
to be achieved verbally, and can come about by direct or indirect contact between the parties”.  
 
439 (Ris, 1990) op. cit. page 472.  
 
440 (Albors-Llorens, 2006) op. cit.. 
 
441 According to the Court: “it [principle of individual business decision making]  does however strictly 
preclude any direct or indirect contact between such operators, the object or effect whereof is either to 
influence the conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor or to disclose to such a 
competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting 
on the market. The documents quoted show that the applicants contacted each other and that they in fact 
pursued the aim of removing in advance any uncertainty as to the future conduct of their competitors.” 
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achieving an anticompetitive behavior, and moving away from the “competitor” 
rationale to the “economic operator” one.442  
This statement marks the beginning of the legal construction of information 
exchanges as self-standing infringement  - it is strictly precluded (…) to disclose to 
such a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt 
– therefore, moving away from the more traditional facilitating practice approach.  
However, the ECJ’s findings in Suiker Unie should - despite its compelling 
language – have been read in the context of the particular circumstances at stake: a 
cartel case.443  
Indeed, the facts of the case suggested that the Commission had factual evidence 
of: (a) anticompetitive behavior (market allocation and refusal to supply), (b) in an 
industry where there was sufficient surplus for effective competition within the single 
market, where (c) there was evidence of the producers imposing conditions to its 
exporters - which did not seem justified by individual competitive business rationales, 
and where (d) communications between them which acted as a facilitating practice 
towards the implementation of the agreement, as the exporters were confirming their 
course of action, to ensure that they would not re-sell the sugar outside the terms of 
the tacit agreement.444  
                                            
442 A presumption that, over time, has proven very difficult to be rebutted. See Bailey, D. ""Publicly 
Distancing" Oneself from a Cartel." 31 World Competition 2, 2008: 177-203. Moreover, as we will see 
later on, a presumption that seems hardly to comply with the presumption of innocence contained in 
Article 6 ECHR. (Bronckers & Vallery, No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of Fundamental Rights 
on Certain Dogmas of EU Competition Law, 2011) op. cit. page 559 “The presumption that information 
exchange leads to a concurrence of wills on the market cannot be a foregone conclusion. That would 
conflict with the requirements of Article 6 ECHR, assuming of course that the presumption of innocence 
is relevant.” 
 
443 (Ris, 1990) op. cit.  
 
444 The Court’s statements were made when analyzing the concerted practice between the Belgian and the 
Dutch producers of sugar whereby RT (the Belgian producer) had refused to supply sugar to middlemen 
in the Netherlands or sell directly to customers there (save for some specific industries), alleging that its 
production was destined to the national market and there were no surpluses.   Nonetheless, the 
Commission’s data clearly showed an evident case of over production of sugar in Belgium. The 
Commission was able to show, moreover, that RT was channeling almost all its sales in the Netherlands, 
through the Dutch producers, who bought it and then sold it as if they had manufactured it themselves. 
This overproduction, coupled with the evidence of a meeting in the context of an association of sugar 
manufacturers for the apportionment of quantities, jointly with the letters written by RT, expressing that 
producers should work “chacun chez soi” was strong circumstantial evidence suggesting a concerted 
146 
The Court was sanctioning a conduct that it considered highly facilitating of 
a cartel visibly articulated through a concerted practice.445 However, its 
admonishing language446 (and the lack of a critical analysis of this case law later on), 
opened the door for the expansion of the concept of information exchanges by adding 
an additional presumption [the iuris tantum anticompetitive nature of any exchange of 
information between competitors] to a concept - “concerted practices” – which by its 
own nature already relied on circumstantial/indirect evidence.  
b) Concerted practices and agreements a continuum of 
conducts rather than the two sides of the same conduct: 
Hüls 
The second development can be traced back to the Propylene saga which heavily 
contributed to the expansion of the concept of concerted practices by blurring its 
frontier with the concept of agreement447 and, indirectly, expanding the factual 
scenarios comprehended within the meaning of punishable information exchanges.448  
                                                                                                                                
practice to avoid selling to customers, who could resell in other territories.  The Court found moreover 
(direct evidence) that there had been several telex messages between RT and its main intermediary for 
sale in the Netherlands (Export), where Export was making clear that it agreed with “your [RT’s] plan, 
that is to say deliveries between sugar producers through traditional Belgo-Netherlands trading 
organizations, on terms satisfactory to export”.   
 
445 Suiker Unie at 192 “The applicants have in fact engaged in concerted practices having as their object 
and effect the protection of the Netherlands market”.  
 
446 One could say that is a general risk in enforcing the principle of precedent without the detailed factual 
analysis and comparison study normally undertaken in the common law systems which might cause the 
Court to use only the general principle in subsequent cases without taking into sufficient consideration the 
particular facts where the principle arose. 
 
447 The frontier was already very blurred for economists but less so for lawyers. On the merits of mixing 
these concepts see (Joshua & Jordan, 2004) op. cit. page 675 “This approach-made possible only by the 
Commission's full use of its investigative powers to make a historical reconstruction of the cartel's 
activities despite all efforts at concealment-neatly moves the debate away from the semantics of whether 
the behavior complained of is an "agreement" or a "concerted practice." The concepts are fluid and may 
overlap.” 
 
448 We believe that the Commission followed the path set in the Vegetable Parchment decision, which 
was not challenged before the Courts. In Vegetable Parchment, virtually all the manufacturers were 
members of the international trade association Genuine Vegetable Parchment Association. Through 
GVPA, the parchment manufacturers convened several meetings each year to set the rate of increase of 
vegetable parchment prices in the Benelux and Danish markets. At those meetings, the manufacturers 
generally set the rate and date of the next price increase. Subsequently, the price leader in each market 
sent the new price schedules via the GVPA Secretariat to all members for implementation In Vegetable 
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Rhône-Poulenc marks the beginning of the confusion of the legal concepts of 
agreement and concerted practices. In Rhône-Poulenc the Commission found that 
Polypropylene manufacturers had agreed to a system of price fixing and quota 
allocation supported by regular meetings.449  
The Commission - confronted with a complex cartel whose intensity had varied 
over the years and where evidence of an agreement to fix prices was dubious as to 
some periods and markets - decided to characterize the infringement as a single 
infringement and defined the infringement as an agreement and/or a concerted 
practice depending on the specific period and behavior.450 Nonetheless, the CFI had 
no problem in blessing the Commission’s heterodox (at the time) approach.451 
The CFI’s views were confirmed and expanded by the ECJ in Hüls.452 Hüls (also 
an addressee of the Propylene decision) had appealed before the ECJ the CFI’s 
conclusions as to the merits of the Commission findings. The Court not only agreed 
                                                                                                                                
Parchment, the Commission held that this practice clearly constituted a concerted practice of price-fixing 
in violation of article 101 (Ris, 1990).  
 
We submit that the distinction between the practices that implement a cartel and the practices that 
facilitate a cartel is a very difficult one to make and it is debatable whether it is only useful from a legal 
point but not from an economic perspective. One of the main problems is that there are many behaviors 
that can be labelled “a practice”.   
 
449 T-1/89, Rhône-Poulenc v Commission [1991] ECR II-867, hereinafter “Rhône-Poulenc”  
 
450 Rhône-Poulenc at 117. As the CFI correctly pointed out, the reality was that, de facto, the Commission 
envisioned the entire infringement as a cartel: “It must be stated first of all that the question whether the 
Commission was obliged to characterize each factual element found against the applicant either as an 
agreement or a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty is irrelevant. It 
is apparent from the second paragraph of point 80, the third paragraph of point 81 and the first 
paragraph of point 82 of the Decision, read together, that the Commission characterized each of those 
different elements primarily as an 'agreement'.” 
 
451 “The Commission in the alternative characterized the elements of the infringement as 'concerted 
practices' where those elements either did not enable the conclusion to be drawn that the parties had 
reached agreement in advance on a common plan defining their action on the market but had adopted or 
adhered to collusive devices which facilitated the coordination of their commercial behaviour, or did not, 
owing to the complexity of the cartel, make it possible to establish that some producers had expressed 
their definite assent to a particular course of action agreed by the others, although they had indicated 
their general support for the scheme in question and conducted themselves accordingly. The Decision 
thus concludes that in certain respects the continuing cooperation and collusion of the producers in the 
implementation of an overall agreement may display the characteristics of a concerted practice” Rhône-
Poulenc at 119.  
 
452 C-199/92 P, Hüls AG v. Commission [1999] ECR I-04287, hereinafter “Hüls”.  
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with the “agreement and/or concerted practice” approach453 but in addition 
considerably lowered the burden of proof of the second requirement to show a 
concerted practice: the causal link.454  
The Court began its analysis by providing a general description of the 
requirements of a concerted practice in the order established by Suiker Unie (first 
concertation, then causal link).455 However, instead of assessing whether those 
elements had been met in the case at stake, the Court developed and expanded the 
presumption laid out in Suiker Unie. The exchange of information became – absent 
evidence on the contrary - de facto concertation and the casual link was the mere 
result of continuing to exercise a business activity after receiving the information.456  
Again, this reasoning should be understood within the facts of the case, where 
the Commission’s investigation pointed out clearly towards the existence of a secret 
explicit cartel. There was obviously an obstacle to the Court’s reasoning: could a 
concerted practice amount to an infringement by object?457  
                                            
453 With regard to the application of the “agreement and/or concerted practice” flexible concept one could 
wonder whether its application should be restricted to long and complex cases. This does not seem to be 
the view of the OFT, for example, that considers that it is equally valid in short duration practices. See 
Decision No. CA98/01/2011 (RBS/Barclays) para. 221 “While there is a particular overlap between the 
concepts of agreements and concerted practices in the case of single complex infringements of  long 
duration, the same principle will apply to discrete infringements of short duration.” 
 
454 As explained at the beginning and discussed in further length later on, a concerted practices is 
compromised in principle of two elements: reciprocity (which from concertation has been diminished into 
a mere contact) and a causal link (behavior according in the market influenced by such contact.  
 
455 “It follows, first, that the concept of a concerted practice, as it results from the actual terms of Article 
81(1) EC, implies, besides undertakings’ concerting with each other, subsequent conduct on the market, 
and a relationship of cause and effect between the two”. Hüls at 161.  
 
456 According to the Court: “The undertakings taking part in the concerted action and remaining active 
on the market take account of the information exchanged with their competitors for the purposes of 
determining their conduct on that market. That is all the more true where the undertakings concert 
together on a regular basis over a long period, as was the case here, according to the findings of the 
Court of First Instance”.Hüls at 162. 
 
457 It is important to bear in mind that at the time this was a debated issue. It is interesting to contrast these 
doubts with the judgment in T-Mobile where the Court took this point almost as irrefutable, without 
taking into account that a concerted practice, within a cartel, is very different from a self-standing 
facilitating practice labelled as a concerted practice, given the linguistic limits of Article 101 TFEU.  
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The Court answered in the affirmative by ruling that contrary to Hüls argument, 
a concerted practice is caught by Article 101(1) TFEU, even in the absence of anti-
competitive effects on the market.458 The Court argued in support of this conclusion a 
literal reading of article 101 TFEU.459 
By then, concerted practices had evolved from a legal mechanism to capture 
tacit parallel anticompetitive behavior through indirect or circumstantial evidence to 
become a sort of catch-all concept that decreased the burden of proof of the 
Commission to prove an actual agreement (i.e. the design of an actual plan) 
particularly in long or complex infringements.460  
                                            
458 Hüls at 163. 
 
459 Hüls at 164 “It follows from the actual text of that provision that, as in the case of agreements between 
undertakings and decisions by associations of undertakings, concerted practices are prohibited, 
regardless of their effect, when they have an anti-competitive effect”. According to the Court: “although 
the very concept of a concerted practice presupposes conduct by the participating undertakings on the 
market, it does necessarily mean that the conduct should produce the specific effect of restricting, 
preventing or distorting completion.”Hüls at 165. 
 
460 In our view, the Court was in this way, supporting the judgment of the Court of First Instance rendered 
a few months earlier in the PVC case, T-305/94 where the CFI ruled “In the context of a complex 
infringement which involves many producers seeking over a number of years to regulate the market 
between them the Commission cannot be expected to classify the infringement precisely, for each 
undertaking and for any given moment, as in any event both those forms of infringement are  covered by 
Article 85 of the Treaty.  The Commission is therefore entitled to classify that type of complex 
infringement as an agreement 'and/or' concerted practice, inasmuch as the infringement includes 
elements which are to be classified as an 'agreement' and elements which are to be classified as a 
'concerted practice'. In such a situation, the dual classification must be understood not as requiring 
simultaneous and cumulative proof that every one of those factual elements reveals the factors 
constituting an agreement and a concerted practice, but rather as designating a complex whole that 
includes factual elements of which some have been classified as an agreement and others as a concerted 
practice within the meaning on Article 85(1) of the Treaty, which does not provide for any specific 
classification in respect of that type of complex infringement.”  
 
Some commentators argued for a limited interpretation of the judgment suggesting that the Commission's 
standard for concerted pricing practices (within a cartel) no longer required a showing of a business's 
direct involvement in concerted pricing practices, but instead a showing of a business's membership in a 
cartel in which other members engaged in price-fixing activities. (Ris, 1990) op. cit. Unfortunately, as we 
will see later on there seems to be a tendency of the European Courts to expand rather than interpret 
restrictively previous case law, until the interpretation puts the very same concept at risk. See in this 
regard Cartes Bancaires at note 205 and accompanying text.  
 
The reality is that the burden of proof had been significantly lowered in two ways. On the one hand, 
anticompetitive intention could then be inferred from mere disclosure and, on the other hand, the 
“practice” element of a concerted practice could be presumed, absent evidence on the contrary, from 
merely receiving the information and staying on business. 
 
150 
3. Blurring the meaning of causality: a presumption of 
presumptions: Anic a step forward from Hüls 
The very same day that the Hüls decision was taken, the ECJ also published its 
judgment in the Anic case (also the Propylene cartel).461 The Commission had 
appealed the judgment of the CFI partially annulling the Commission decision. One of 
the interesting aspects of Anic is that the company claimed that the distinction 
between an agreement and a concerted practice had consequences for the level of 
proof required of the Commission and, therefore, for the rights of defence of the 
parties.462  
According to Anic, if a concerted practice could consist in the mental element 
alone, with no need for any physical element, the two concepts would become 
redundant and would differ only as to the degree of manifestation of intention, joint 
intention in the case of an agreement and the manifestation of unilateral intention in 
the case of a concerted practice.463  
The Court ruled, on the one hand, that a concerted practice implies, besides 
undertakings' concerting together, conduct on the market pursuant to those collusive 
practices, and a relationship of cause and effect between the two. And that therefore, 
the Court of First Instance had committed an error of law in holding that the 
undertakings' collusive practices had necessarily had an effect on the conduct of the 
                                                                                                                                
(Ris, 1990) op. cit. “The Commission in PVC expanded the application of the concept of concerted 
practices by incorporating it into the concept of a cartel. While adopting the European Court's definition 
of concerted practices in Imperial Chemical and the Sugar Cases, the Commission, in effect, substantially 
broadened the concept's application.” 
 
461 Case C-49/92 P, Commission v. Anic Partecipazioni SpA [1999] ECR I-04125, hereinafter “Anic”.  
 
462 Anic at 103. 
 
463 Anic at 103. The argument is, in our opinion, very elegant and it illustrates the problems that the 
overexpansive interpretation of the concept of concerted practices was raising. Anic claimed that, if the 
characters of the two concepts are to be kept distinct, a concerted practice must be recognised as having 
an additional physical element, to compensate for the more evanescent nature of the mental element. Anic 
at 103. The Commission countered that Anic’s alleged difference in the burden of proof was wrongly 
based on a literal construction of the term “concerted practice”, according to which 'practice' refers to 
conduct on the market and, consequently, to an objectively observable element. In its view, such a 
construction is contrary to the ratio legis which bolsters the prohibition by widening it to cover concerting 
arrangements that are less elaborate than a real. Anic at 107. 
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undertakings which participated in them.464 In a way, the Court was nuancing the 
previous case law that could be interpreted (as the CFI did) as implying that 
communicating was, in itself, a practice. 
Nonetheless, the Court ruled - the same way as in Hüls - that subject to proof to 
the contrary, which it is for the economic operators concerned to adduce, there must 
be a presumption that the undertakings participating in concerting arrangements and 
remaining active on the market take account of the information exchanged with their 
competitors when determining their conduct on that market, particularly when they 
concert together on a regular basis over a long period, as was the case here, according 
to the findings of the Court of First Instance.465 Therefore, in practice the conclusion 
was almost the same, given the limited scope for rebutting such presumption.  
The Anic presumption - as it has become known - was created in a very 
particular context. That is, in order to capture loose forms of coordination where there 
was evidence of an agreement with varying degrees of intensity over the years. This 
presumption allows the Commission to capture infringements that could otherwise be 
left unpunished and has become with the years an essential tool for defending the 
existence of a single infringement in cartels that lasted for long periods of time.466  
The paradoxical result of this ruling is that the presumption that helps categorize 
the conduct determines the infringement. Any decrease as to the uncertainty of the 
behavior of the competitor becomes de facto a concerted practice and de facto an 
anticompetitive behavior absent an alternative business explanation. This 
presumption coupled with the shift of focus, from the observance of parallel behavior 
in the market (search for the link), to the inference of a concerted practice from 
individual behavior in the market (focus on concertation),467 has resulted in the 
                                            
464 Anic at 119. 
 
465 Anic at 121. 
 
466 In our opinion, this might be a reasonable policy allowance in cartel cases but not so much in self-
standing facilitating practices.  
 
467 See sharing these views (Ghezzi & Maggiolino, 2014) op. cit. “Such an answer [referring to Anic] 
produced two significant consequences. First, it lowered the burden of proof cast upon the Commission 
and other prosecuting authorities who enforce Article 101. From that moment onwards they were 
exempted from showing whether the ascertained collusion was further put into practice, or had actually 
affected market price and output. Second, the Court’s answer shifted the focus of Commission’s 
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intermingling of these two concepts as the recent Bananas and T-Mobile cases show 
(see below).  
However, in order for this final step to take place, it was necessary for the ECJ 
to soften a requirement that it is implied in the terms “concertation” and “exchange”: 
the idea of reciprocity.  
4. Blurring the meaning of reciprocity: from 
exchanges to disclosure, and from concerted practices to “a” 
practice: Cimenteries and British Sugar 
In Cimenteries,468 the ECJ defined the meaning and requirements of the element 
of reciprocity469 expanding the scope of the Anic presumption.  
The Court acknowledged that the requirement of reciprocity had been developed 
by Advocate General Darmon in Woodpulp470 but re-defined the fulfillment of the 
requirement in very broad terms: “that condition is met where one competitor 
discloses its future intentions or conduct on the market to another when the latter 
requests it or, at the very least accepts”.471  
                                                                                                                                
investigative and prosecuting efforts towards the very same episode of collusion – the exchange of 
strategic data – that was presumed to produce parallel practices. In other words, if collusion and 
parallelism were still the two building blocks of concerted practices, the possibility to presume the latter 
drove the spotlight on the former.” 
 
468 Joined Cases T-25/95 and others, Cimenteries CBR, [2000] ECR II-491, hereinafter “Cimenteries”.  
 
469 See supra note 454.  
 
470 WoodPulp op. cit. opinion of AG Darmon delivered on 25 may 1988. Woodpulp is known as the main 
backlash for the Commission in the field of information exchanges. We do not study the case in depth for 
three reasons. First, because the Court found that there had not an information exchange. Secondly, 
because the recent investigation in the Container Liner Shipping Industry (see Commission’s press release 
of November 27, 2013) might shed a new light on the case, as it shares many similarities and, thirdly, 
because we have the impression that if ruled today Woodpulp would have been decided differently as the 
economics on cheap talk were not much developed at the time. For those reasons, we prefer to wait for 
any decision on Container Liner before looking back again to Woodpulp. On the similarities between 
these cases see (Sterling, 2014) 
 
471 Cimenteries at 1849. 
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The definition put forward, therefore, conveys that in order for the meeting of 
the minds to take place unilateral communications suffice, for as long as there is a 
sender of the message and an addressee of said message. 472   
This case again is an example of the concept of concerted practice being used as 
a mechanism to capture a loose form of coordination within a complex cartel.473 
However, the language of the Court was so broad that it allowed for a general 
principle to be construed even absent documentary evidence (to some form or another) 
of a cartel.  
Finally, the path towards incorporating unilateral disclosures into article 101 and 
commingling the concepts of “information exchanges” and “concerted practices” was 
leveled by the EU Courts in British Sugar.474  
In this case the Commission found that British Sugar had infringed competition 
law by unilaterally informing its competitor (Tate & Lyle) of its future prices for 
sugar. The pricing disclosure behavior began after British Sugar had conducted a price 
war and had been sanctioned by the Commission for an abuse of dominant position.475 
The case differed from the cartel cases seen above since the parties did not meet 
to discuss minimum prices or quotas. It was only unilateral pricing disclosure. 
Nonetheless, the difference was on the outset minimal. The parties did not need to 
                                            
472 Cimenteries at 1849. According to the Court, “it may be inferred therefrom that the contacts between 
Lafarge and Buzzi were motivated by the element of reciprocity essential to a finding of a concerted 
practice”. The language of the judgment is somehow confusing and suggests that the Court was 
envisioning the element of reciprocity as a mechanism to show the willingness (the mental state) of the 
parties to reach a tacit concerted practice.  
 
473 In this case, the Commission case relied only on the record of the meeting held on 26 November 1988 
between Lafarge and Buzzi which was drawn up by Lafarge’s representative shortly after the meeting and 
distributed internally. The document contained juicy statements such as “a war is pointless” or 
“agreements must be concluded to avoid conflict”.Cimenteries at 1850. 
  
474 Joined Cases T-202/98 and others, Tate & Lyle v Commission, [2001] ECR II-2035, hereinafter 
“British Sugar”.   
 
475 British Sugar and Napier Brown plead that the fact that information was supplied unilaterally by one 
undertaking to another was insufficient to constitute an infringement of Article 101(1) of the Treaty. In 
their view, for a concerted practice to be established, the Commission would have to prove that an 
exchange of information took place between the undertakings in question, concerning, in this case, their 
future pricing policy. British Sugar at 34. 
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agree on these issues (minimum prices or quantities) since the EU system at the time 
set out production quotas and minimum prices at which the authorities had to buy the 
sugar. 476  
The Court of First Instance ruled that the fact that only one of the participants at 
the meetings in question reveals its intentions is not sufficient to exclude the 
possibility of an agreement or concerted practice. 477   
This is yet another case where the Court even though it might have been correct 
on the outcome, but phrased the rule in such a broad language that allowed for its 
expansion later on.478  
5. The culmination of the distortion: T-Mobile 
The rulings and findings contained in the cases cited above took place mostly in 
the context of complex cartels where the overall assessment of the direct and indirect 
evidence pointed quite clearly towards the existence of tacit collusion.  
Nonetheless, they paved the way for information exchanges to become more and 
more, the only necessary evidence to pursue and sanction allegedly collusive 
scenarios, as the T-Mobile case demonstrates.479 Moreover, they provide Competition 
                                            
476 The Commission argued that an exchange of information (i.e. information moving in both directions) 
is not an indispensable component of an infringement under Article 101 of the Treaty. The Commission 
considered that a trader ceases to determine his policy in an independent manner if he attends regular 
meetings at which he is informed of the prices which his main competitor is seeking to obtain in 
circumstances where he cannot fail to take account of that information. The parties did not challenge the 
existence of those meetings; instead, they argued that they did not have an anticompetitive nature. British 
Sugar at 29.  
 
477 British Sugar at 54.  
 
478 In British Sugar, this company had started a price war, thus informing the other competitors of their 
future prices was a signal pointing toward the end of such war. The problem is that in this case the 
particular circumstances have been left in a second place by subsequent case law to such a point that 
actual reading of British Sugar can be one saying that even (all) unilateral communications can lead to an 
information exchange. 
479 (Bronckers & Vallery, No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of Fundamental Rights on Certain 
Dogmas of EU Competition Law, 2011) op. cit. “In fact, the problems with the causality presumption, 
and the presumption of joint conduct following an exchange of future prices, are exacerbated because 
these exchanges are also characterized as a restriction ‘by object’. In our view, combining these 
presumptions while eliminating the requirement that the Commission must show effects of conduct it 
believes to be anticompetitive reverses the burden of proof to an unacceptable extent”.  
 
155 
Authorities with a flexible and bendable concept almost perfectly suited for any anti-
competitive conduct.  
In T-Mobile, both the European Commission and the Courts have gone as far as 
to argue that depending on the facts of the case, the finding of a concerted practice - 
that infringes competition law by object - cannot be excluded also in a case which 
concerns a single (self-standing) information exchange.480  
This raises an obvious contradiction: if an information exchange - as a self-
standing infringement – refers to a preliminary step before collusion, how is it 
possible that it is punishable as harshly and as promptly as the classic example of 
collusion, a hard core cartel?  
a) The judgment 
In this case, in 2001 the main five Dutch mobile telephone operators held a 
meeting during which they discussed – on top of other legitimate questions that did 
not transcend481 – the reduction of standard dealer remunerations for postpaid 
subscriptions on or about 1 September 2001. The issue was not so much the fact that a 
reduction was going to take place – which seemed to be known in the market482 - but 
the date, extent and the conditions under which the reduction would be implemented.  
On the basis of this single meeting and the fact that the companies did in fact 
reduce their dealer remunerations, the ECJ concluded that: 
                                            
480 Building on the T-Mobile where The Court of Justice was asked, on a preliminary reference, to 
consider the nature and operation of the Anic presumption in. The Court referred to what it had said in 
paragraph 121 of its judgment in Anic and held: “59. Depending on the structure of the market, the 
possibility cannot be ruled out that a meeting on a single occasion between competitors, such as that in 
question in the main proceedings, may, in principle, constitute a sufficient basis for the participating 
undertakings to concert their market conduct and thus successfully substitute practical cooperation 
between them for competition and the risks that that entails.” The Court further held that what matters is 
whether the participating undertakings were afforded: “61. (…) the opportunity to take account of the 
information exchanged with their competitors in order to determine their conduct on the market in 
question and knowingly substitute practical cooperation between them for the risks of competition. Where 
it can be established that such undertakings successfully concerted with one another and remained active 
on the market, they may justifiably be called upon to adduce evidence that that concerted action did not 
have any effect on their conduct on the market in question.”  
 
481 According to paragraph 55 of the judgment the meeting had a “legitimate purpose”.  
 
482 See T-Mobile op. cit. para 68 of the AG’s opinion and para 41 of the judgment.  
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 “an exchange of information which is capable of removing uncertainties 
between participants as regards the timing, extent and details of the 
modifications to be adopted by the undertaking concerned must be regarded as 
pursuing an anti-competitive object, and that extends to situations, such as that 
in the present case, in which the modification relates to the reduction in the 
standard commission paid to dealers.”483  
The Court did not rule whether an infringement had occurred since the ruling 
was answering a preliminary reference requested by the Dutch Courts. Nonetheless, 
the Court’s reasoning in T-Mobile contains two important policy allowances for the 
European Commission.  
First, the consecration of the presumption of anticompetitive nature of all 
information exchanges.484  This interpretation – which follows the AG’s opinion – 
seems, in our view, too broad and dangerous to have been formulated in those terms, 
particularly, when it does not reflect the mainstream economics on information 
                                            
483 See T-Mobile op. cit. It is interesting to compare this case, with previous case law in Sarrió (C-
291/98P, Sarrió v. Commission, [2000] ECR I-09991) paras. 33 to 40 where the Courts had been much 
more cautious arguing that the Commission had shown the connection between the information 
exchanged (which concerned catalogue prices) and the final prices, even though the concertation took 
place only at catalogue prices “According to the appellant, as the Commission imposed a single fine in 
respect of all the alleged infringements, that fine should have been reduced if it had been proved that the 
appellant had been fined in respect of acts which it had not committed. The Court of First Instance, 
however, which merely considered the distinction between direct and indirect concerted action on prices 
charged, did not find it necessary to consider whether there was evidence relating to the transaction 
prices and, accordingly, did not verify whether the scope of the infringement committed by the appellant 
was in fact more restricted than asserted by the Commission (…) following that examination, the Court of 
First Instance concluded that the infringement in question consisted in concerted action on the fixing of 
list prices, but that this concerted action was intended to obtain an increase in invoiced prices 
(paragraph 53 of the contested judgment), the impact of which was acknowledged by the appellant at the 
hearing (paragraph 57 of the contested judgment). As the Court of First Instance correctly stated in 
paragraph 57 of the contested judgment, '[T]he fixing of uniform list prices agreed by the producers 
would have been rendered absolutely irrelevant if those prices had not actually had any effect on 
transaction prices.” 
 
484 “a concerted practice pursues an anti competitive object for the purpose of Article 81(1) EC where, 
according to its content and objectives and having regard to its legal and economic context, it is capable 
in an individual case of resulting in the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
common market. It is not necessary for there to be actual prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition or a direct link between the concerted practice and consumer prices. An exchange of 
information between competitors is tainted with an anti-competitive object if the exchange is capable of 
removing uncertainties concerning the intended conduct of the participating undertakings.” T-Mobile 
para. 43.  
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exchanges, but rather the general policy on hard core catels. The Court should have 
stressed and remembered the cautions made by the ECJ in the UK Tractor case.485  
Secondly, that a mere meeting might suffice to reach a collusive outcome. 486 In 
this regard, even though the Court placed some emphasis on the structure of the 
market, the Court should have been more careful in its wording as it might be 
construed as saying that in tight oligopolistic markets a single meeting suffices. When 
according to economic theory there are many variables, not just structure, which 
should be taken into account to assess the likelihood of one example of indirect 
evidence having collusion as the only valid explanation for their occurrence. 
As some voices have pointed out, this presumption raises empirical and legal 
concerns. Even if one single meeting could at best help reach a focal point, it seems 
difficult to believe that the dynamics of the infringement and the monitoring could be 
sustained on the medium term with just one contact.487 Moreover, this interpretation 
seems too far of a stretch of the term concerted practices. Indeed, even if it can be 
seen a very sensible solution from a policy perspective, it is hardly reconcilable with 
the current understanding of the concept of a ‘concerted’.488  
In this regard, some authors have argued that in T-Mobile, similarly to the 
Bananas case (discussed later on), the Court was dealing, in fact, with a cartel whose 
framing as an information exchange/concerted practice did only obscure the legal 
points at issue.489  
                                            
485 See the quotation of the UK tractor op. cit.  
 
486  “Any other interpretation would be tantamount to a claim that an isolated exchange of information 
between competitors could not in any case lead to concerted action that is in breach of the competition 
rules laid down in the Treaty. Depending on the structure of the market, the possibility cannot be ruled 
out that a meeting on a single occasion between competitors, such as that in question in the main 
proceedings, may, in principle, constitute a sufficient basis for the participating undertakings to concert 
their market conduct and thus successfully substitute practical cooperation between them for competition 
and the risks that that entails.” T-Mobile at 59. 
 
487  (Ossowska, 2010) op. cit. 
 
488  (Wagner-von Papp, 2012) op. cit. 
 
489 (Meyring, 2010) op. cit. 
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The criticism merits some value not only from a theoretical point of view (it 
would then make sense applying the previous case law) but also from a purely 
linguistic aspect; nowhere in the preliminary reference questions the words 
“information exchange” were raised. 490   
In any event, the Court of Justice takes the view that what matters is not so 
much the number of meetings held between the participating undertakings, but 
whether the meeting or meetings which took place afforded them the opportunity to 
take account of the information exchanged with their competitors, in order to 
determine their conduct on the market in question and knowingly substitute 
practical cooperation between them for the risks of competition. Where it can be 
established that such undertakings successfully concerted with one another and 
remained active on the market, they may justifiably be called upon to adduce evidence 
that that concerted action did not have any effect on their conduct on the market in 
question.491  
The exact meaning of these statements, constantly repeated in the case law, is 
something which still escapes our full comprehension.  
b) A critical review of T-Mobile 
T-Mobile clearly shows the theoretical limitations of Article 101 TFEU, given 
the inability of the Courts to differentiate the general clause and the administrative 
offence.  
The Commission and the Courts have reached a dead end, where they see 
themselves incapable of sanctioning or prohibiting purely unilateral behavior (other 
than the decisions of associations which in essence are collective).  
                                            
490 (Meyring, 2010), (Gebrandy, 2010), Loozen, E. "The Application of a More Economic Approach to 
Restrictions by Object: No Revolution After All." 31 E.C.L.R. 4, 2010: 146-150. 
 
491 Bananas at 369.  
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That is the reason why the European Commission and the European Courts have 
developed a case law that, to our mind, stretches the concepts of reciprocity and 
concertation beyond any reasonable interpretation.492  
The Court’s statements in T-Mobile are too broad and should be applied very 
restrictively.493 In fact, in our opinion, the objective infringement of competition law 
is dubious absent a clear theory of harm.  
For example, in economic terms T-Mobile was not very dissimilar from a joint 
purchasing agreement for the services provided by dealers.494 Acting in concert, the 
telephone companies ensured a decrease in costs that ultimately could translate into a 
decrease in the cost of subscriptions for consumers. Why was not this pro-
competitive? The response, as already implied, is because it simply was a cartel case: 
a cartel to determine the price of handsets.495   
The limitations of Article 101 TFEU, as currently interpreted, become even 
clearer when one realizes, following T-Mobile’s reasoning, that unilateral information 
disclosures today either infringe Article 101 TFEU by object or do not harm it all.  
Put it differently, either it was an infringement by object or it was nothing, there 
was no possibility for a middle ground, given the Court’s case law described in the 
preceding pages. 
However, form our review of the economic theory, we know that the line 
between a unilateral disclosure of information that it is merely an invitation to collude, 
a unilateral disclosure that might show that the parallel behavior responds to tacit 
                                            
492 This conclusion is key as it sets the basic advantage of an invitation to collude doctrine: it can 
reestablish the meaning of concertation, as we will demonstrate later on.  
 
493 (Meyring, 2010) op. cit. 
  
494 In 1998, the Commission exempted EUDIM’s information Exchange because its members were 
seeking to strengthen their bargaining power vis-à-vis their supplies to obtain the lowest purchase prices. 
See Commission’s Notice pursuant to Art. 19(3) of Regulation 17 (case Nº. IV/33.815, 33.842 – EUDIM) 
in O.J. 1996, C 111/8. Also (Capobianco, 2004) op. cit. at 1254.  
  
495 Apparently, even though it is not expressly acknowledged in the judgment, the commissions were used 
by dealers to do rebates on the prices of handsets, therefore, operators were acting in concert to alter the 
price of such handsets. (Gebrandy, 2010) op. cit. and (Faull & Nikpay, 2014) op. cit. page 999. 
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collusion, and a unilateral disclosure that brings a cartel into life is a very blurred 
one.496  
In other words, what makes T-Mobile particularly dangerous is that the 
lack of a proper dogmatic of Article 101 TFEU, coupled with an absence of 
properly critical utilization of precedent, makes that these intermediate 
categories – the grey zone of interdependence in oligopolistic industries - fall 
invariably between one extreme or the other.  
In fact, a broad understanding of T-Mobile implies that invitations to collude can 
be sanctioned as infringements by object even if they do not concern prices or 
quantities (just decreasing uncertainty as to the commercial policy of a competitor)497 
since the burden of proof of lack of concertation shifts to the recipients of the 
information.498  
This is yet, another example, of the merits of our theory. There is room for a 
legal exegesis of those conducts that lay on the grey zone of oligopolistic 
interdependence: to distinguish the application of the general principle from the 
application of specific rules.  
This way, Competition Authorities can correct behaviors without being subject 
to the scrutiny that should be applied by a Court of law reviewing a quasi-criminal 
sanction. Moreover, this theory can allow concertation to regain its logical reciprocal 
meaning.  
                                            
496 In this regard, it is very interesting to oppose EU competition law with U.S. antitrust law where 
information exchanges, in principle, can fall under 5 categories: favorable opinions, information sharing 
under Section 5 of the FTC Act, invitations to collude under Section 5 of the FTC Act, information 
exchanges under a rule of reason interpretation of Section 1 of the Sherman, information exchanges as 
ancillary to a (a cartel) per se infringement of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. DOJ & FTC. Statements of 
Antitrust Policy in Health Care. 1996. (DOJ & FTC, 1996) OECD. "Unilateral Disclosure on Information 
with Anticompetitive Effects." Working Party No.3 on Co-operation and Enforcement, 2012, 
Hovenkamp, H. "The Federal Trade Commission and The Sherman Act." Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, 
2010. 
 
497 This is the problem that arises if we confront T-Mobile legalistic approach to information exchanges 
with the more economic or effects based approach of the Horizontal Guidelines.  
 
498 T-Mobile op. cit.  
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c) The dangers arising out of T-Mobile: some national 
examples 
Even though the distinction between information exchanges as concerted 
practices or agreements might seem irrelevant given the ECJ case law,499 it does carry 
relevant consequences: it helps us understand better the frontier between cartels 
(created through an information exchange) and self-standing information exchanges 
and the uncertainty that surrounds information exchanges.  
In our opinion, the national cases explained before in section I.3, illustrative a 
sensitive policy approach to (self-standing) information exchanges where the 
willingness or negligence of the parties (culpability) is difficult to assess given the 
mixed-effects they have on the market.  
Having said that, we must acknowledge that the flip side of the coin is that 
information exchanges agreements might be labelled to promptly as cartels, even 
when they are self-standing behavior. In other words, because the current 
interpretation of Article 101 TFEU neglects the ability to encapsulate the grey 
intermediate zone within the Treaties, cases might fall under the wrong extremes.  
In our opinion, there are two obvious reasons for such behavior by young 
Competition Authorities: first, to ensure that leniency programs gain traction, many 
leniency applicants might inform about behavior which falls even though collusive or 
facilitating falls sort of being labelled a cartel and, secondly, the lower burden of 
proof attached to object infringements.500    
The decision of the Spanish Competition Authority in the Fluid Pumps and the 
counter of the Supreme Court in the Basque Saving Banks cases provide a very good 
example in this regard.  
                                            
499 Given the case law of the European Courts that allows agencies to frame infringement as “an 
agreement and/or a concerted practice” 
 
500 Sharing these views Valdés Burgui, A. "Intercambios de Información entre Competidores y su Posible 
Calificación como Cárteles." In Problemas Prácticos y Actualidad del Derecho de la Competencia, by 
M.A. Recuerda Girela, 368. Pamplona: Civitas, 2014. 
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In the Fluid Pumps case,501 the Spanish Competition Authority fined several 
companies as well as the Spanish Association of Fluid Pump Manufacturers with 18 
million for participating in two distinct anti-competitive practices. 
First, the coordination between competing undertakings in the fluid pumps 
business, with the collaboration of the AEFBF, in order to fix the terms of trading 
with their customers from 2004 until at least the time when the inspections took place. 
The Council took the view that this conduct constituted a breach of article 1.1.a) of the 
Competition Act and article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union and that, given the variables in which it occurred and the structure adopted by 
the agreements, this breach should be treated as a cartel.  
Secondly, the Quality Model for fire-fighting equipment adopted by a series of 
undertakings within the Association, along with the Rating Procedure designed on the 
basis of that Model, contained clauses that restricted competition and were capable of 
hindering competition on the market for fire-fighting equipment, hence they amounted 
to a practice prohibited by article 1.1 of the Competition Act and article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.502 
The particularly interesting part of this decision is that the Competition 
Authority found that the information exchanges amounted to a cartel by quoting T-
                                            
501 Bombas de Fluidos, S/0185/09, Decision of 24 June 2011.  
 
502 The Authority considered that the exchanges of information on future price increases had to be 
analyzed together with the meeting of the minds to determine the main terms and conditions of the 
agreements with clients. “Desde el punto de vista de su calificación jurídica, las conductas descritas 
desarrolladas en el seno de la AEFBF caen en el ámbito de aplicación del artículo 1 de la LDC y del 
artículo 101 del TFUE. Existe un concierto de voluntades plasmado en diferentes acuerdos que tienen 
una naturaleza restrictiva de competencia. En lo que se refiere a los acuerdos de fijación de condiciones 
generales de venta, su objetivo es claramente restrictivo de la competencia. Las empresas acuerdan 
homogeneizar variables que suponen parte del coste efectivo de la transacción, tales como el plazo de 
pago, el plazo de garantía, el coste de los avales durante el periodo de garantía, las condiciones de 
entrega del producto o los conceptos que deben ser facturados de manera autónoma, como la puesta en 
marcha o el almacenamiento.[….] “En lo que se refiere a los intercambios de información acreditados, el 
Consejo concluye que no procede calificarlos de infracción autónoma, sino que forman parte de la 
misma infracción que la fijación de condiciones generales de venta”. A similar argument was provided in 
the Xerez Wines case (S/0091/08) “En un caso de cártel como el que nos ocupa, la conducta no es el 
intercambio de información, éste es solo un instrumento, por tanto no puede aceptarse, como alega 
LUSTAU, que los intercambios de información en el caso presente no cumplen los requisitos establecidos 
por la jurisprudencia comunitaria para que sean considerados aptos para distorsionar la competencia, 
citando el caso de los tractores”. 
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Mobile, without a real analysis of the information exchanged, its quality, its ability to 
have an impact on the competitors’ behavior and without studying the structure of the 
market.503 Surprisingly, the decision was upheld by the Spanish High Court with a 
legalistic interpretation of the case law of the ECJ.504  
In this context, the Basque Savings Banks decision of the Spanish Supreme 
Court is an important admonishment to the Spanish Competition Authority.505 In this 
case the Court upheld the first instance ruling that concluded that the information 
exchange as to the general conditions was an autonomous infringement whose effects 
on the market had to be tested and that the presumption of illegality arising out of the 
infringement “by object” of fixing prices and sharing markets (which had occurred) 
could not be extended to this infringement.506  
                                            
503 Pérez Olmo, G. "Comentario Crítico de la Resolución de la CNC de 24 de Junio de 2011, Bombas de 
Fluidos." In Problemas Prácticos y Actualidad del Derecho de la Competencia, by M.A. Recuerda 
Girela, 368. Pamplona: Civitas, 2014. 
 
504 SAN February 5, 2013 (Id. Cendoj: 28079230062013100060)“Se trata, a juicio de esta Sala, de una 
conducta apta para falsear la libre competencia. El Tribunal de Justicia ha declarado que constituyen 
una conducta contraria al Tratado y condenado por ser contrarios a la libre competencia no solo los 
intercambios de información sino la mera entrega o recepción de información en una reunión, puesto que 
tiene el mismo impacto: eliminar la incertidumbre entre los competidores sobre cual va a ser su futura 
conducta (asunto T-28/99 Sigma Technologie)”. […] “En cuanto a la falta de objeto anticompetitivo, la 
jurisprudencia nacional y comunitaria ha reiterado que lo relevante es la "aptitud" para restringir la 
libre competencia, y en este caso, no cabe duda alguna de que los intercambios de información litigiosos, 
como señala la Administración pueden facilitar el alineamiento de comportamientos que debían ser 
competitivos. […] “La Sala considera que la calificación de las conductas enjuiciadas, las constitutivas 
de la primera infracción litigiosa, en lo que es objeto de enjuiciamiento en este recurso, específicamente 
la consideración como cártel de estos intercambios de información es conforme a derecho, tanto en lo 
que respecta la art. 101 TFUE como al artículo 1 LDC “ 
 
505 (Pérez Olmo, 2014) op. cit. 
 
506 “Estos dos acuerdos, de reparto de mercado y de fijación de precios, tienen por objeto, restringir la 
competencia, y sin necesidad de ninguna acreditación sobre sus efectos, según hemos razonado 
anteriormente, deben considerarse acuerdos anticompetitivos prohibidos por el artículo 1 LDC . [...] Por 
el contrario, en relación con los demás acuerdos que se incluyen en la narración de hechos probados de 
la Resolución impugnada, de coordinación de actuaciones frente a terceros competidores, intercambio de 
información, coordinación y fijación de posturas comunes en sociedades participadas, y coordinación de 
actuaciones en relación con nuevos productos o sectores de actividad (acuerdos 3, 4, 5 y 6 de los 
enumerados en el Fundamento Jurídico 5), no puede presumirse que tengan por objeto, por su 
naturaleza, infringir la competencia, de acuerdo con las criterios jurisprudenciales del TJCE y 
Directrices de la Comisión Directrices de la Comisión sobre la aplicabilidad del artículo 81 del Tratado 
CE a los acuerdos de cooperación horizontal (DOCE 2001/C - 3/02) y las Directrices relativas a la 
aplicación del apartado 3 del artículo 81 del Tratado (DOCE 2004/C - 101/08), previamente citadas, que 
como se ha visto extienden la presunción de ser restrictivos de la competencia por su objeto únicamente a 
los acuerdos de fijación de precios, limitación de la producción y reparto del mercado” 
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Similarly, the ECJ ruling in Cartes Bancaires provides for a reasonable 
application of Article 101 TFEU as a rule in conformity with the harm principle and 
opposed to T-Mobile.507  
K. Information exchanges as infringements by object or effect 
Once we have seen how our theory provides for a reasonable and clearer 
explanation to the agreement and concerted practice divide regarding information 
exchanges, it is time to move to the “effects” of the conduct.  
According to the Courts, the distinction between ‘infringements by object’ and 
‘infringements by effect’ arises from the fact that “certain forms of collusion between 
undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper 
functioning of normal competition”.508   
This distinction – which originates in Société Technique Minière509 and it is also 
presente in Consten510 - carries significant consequences in terms of the burden of 
proof that the Competition authorities need to meet since, in deciding whether an 
“agreement or concerted practice” is prohibited by Article 101(1) TFEU, there is no 
need to take account of its actual effects “once it is apparent that its object is to 
prevent, restrict or distort competition within the common market”.511  
The object category has always been a contentious issue. As it is well known, 
the Commission’s view on the matter is that restrictions of competition by object are 
                                                                                                                                
 
507 See footnote 611 and accompanying text.  
508 Case C‑209/07, Beef Industry Development Society and Barry Brothers [2008] ECR I‑8637, 
paragraph 17 (“BIDS”).  
 
509 See footnote 517.  
 
510 See footnote 167 and accompanying text.  
 
511 See, to that effect, Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 
299, 342; Case C‑105/04 P, Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op 
Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission [2006] ECR I‑8725, paragraph 125. 
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those that experience demonstrates are likely to produce negative effects on the 
market and to jeopardize the objectives pursued by the EU competition rules.512  
According to the Courts, in order to determine whether conduct is ―by its very 
nature injurious to competition or anticompetitive in nature (restrictive by object), 
―regard must be had, inter alia, (a) to the content of its provisions, (b) the objectives 
it seeks to attain and (c) the economic and legal context of which it forms a part.513 
The intent of the parties is, therefore, of secondary importance in this type of 
infringements.514 
The “object”, therefore, is not set by the parties but rather is intrinsic to the 
behavior of the parties. If a bus driver purposely speeds up beyond the speed limit, he 
is committing an infringement, even if there is no accident and even if he was not 
aware of the speed limit. In other words, these infringements are “objective”. 
One of the biggest issues surrounding object infringements is that this 
presumption is based, in principle, on the serious nature of the restriction and on 
experience showing that restrictions of competition by object are likely to produce 
negative effects on the market and - also and very importantly - “to jeopardise the 
objectives pursued by the Community competition rules.”  
                                            
512 (Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 2004) para 21 “Restrictions 
of competition by object are those that by their very nature have the potential of restricting competition. 
These are restrictions which in light of the objectives pursued by the Community competition rules have 
such a high potential of negative effects on competition that it is unnecessary for the purposes of applying 
Article 81(1) to demonstrate any actual effects on the market. This presumption is based on the serious 
nature of the restriction and on experience showing that restrictions of competition by object are likely to 
produce negative effects on the market and to jeopardise the objectives pursued by the Community 
competition rules. Restrictions by object such as price fixing and market sharing reduce output and raise 
prices, leading to a misallocation of resources, because goods and services demanded by customers are 
not produced. They also lead to a reduction in consumer welfare, because consumers have to pay higher 
prices for the goods and services in question.” More recently, Italianer, A. "Competitor Agreements 
under EU Competition Law." 40th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy. New 
York: Fordham Competition Law Institute, 2013. In recent years, the rulings of the ECJ in the preliminary 
references in the BIDS (C-209/07), Expedia (c-226/12), Slovak Banks (C-68/12) and Allianz Hungary (C-
32/11) are very insightful in understanding the ECJ’s approach to this type of infringement.  
 
513 Jones, A. "Left behind modernisation? Restrictions by Object under Article 101(1)." European 
Competition Journal, 2010.  
 
514 Indeed, as explained by the General Court, it should be borne in mind in this respect that “the parties’ 
intention is not a necessary factor in determining whether a concerted practice is restrictive, but that 
there is nothing prohibiting the Commission or the Courts of the European Union from taking that aspect 
into account” Bananas at 413.   
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However, as it is well known whether these types of infringements do actually 
exist and what exact type of infringements fall under this category has been a hotly 
debated issue.515  
As Professor Jones reasons, it appears after T-Mobile the category applies not 
only to specific restraints that experience shows, in the light of the objectives pursued 
by the EU competition rules, are likely to be anticompetitive, but also to other 
arrangements whose anticompetitive nature is apparent from the objective it pursues 
and/or the context in which it operates.516  
As already explained, the root of the problem might be that the object and 
effect boxes were not created by the legislator as different categories of an 
administrative sanction but, rather, as a way to ensure a broad reading of the 
general prohibitive principle which has not been appropriately developed 
through legal rules.  
This problem has been exacerbated by the lack of proper analysis of Société 
Technique Minière, the leading case on the distinction, which was decided on a case 
                                            
515 (Jones, Left behind modernisation? Restrictions by Object under Article 101(1), 2010) op. cit. 
(Gebrandy, 2010) op. cit. distinguishes between hard-core restrictions and infringements by object, 
arguing that hard-core restrictions are a subset within object infringements.  
 
516 (Jones, Left behind modernisation? Restrictions by Object under Article 101(1), 2010) op. cit. The 
new economic approach (effects based approach) has certainly not helped in clarifying the meaning of 
object infringements, on the opposite it has raised issues as to whether the categories of object 
infringements should be revisited and as to the interplay between Articles 101.1 and 101.3 be interpreted. 
It is unclear to what extent Article 101(3) applies in infringements by effect. In Métropole Télevision v. 
Commission, the General Court when considering the type of analysis that needed to be carried out under 
Article 101(1) affirmed: “It is true that in a number of judgments the Court of Justice and the Court of 
First Instance have favoured a more flexible interpretation of the prohibition laid down in Article [101(1)] 
of the Treaty (…). Those judgments cannot, however, be interpreted as establishing the existence of a rule 
of reason in Community competition law. They are, rather, part of a broader trend in the case-law 
according to which it is not necessary to hold, wholly abstractly and without drawing any distinction, that 
any agreement restricting the freedom of action of one or more of the parties is necessarily caught by the 
prohibition laid down in Article [101(1)] of the Treaty. In assessing the applicability of Article [101(1)] to 
an agreement, account should be taken of the actual conditions in which it functions, in particular the 
economic context in which the undertakings operate, the products or services covered by the agreement 
and the actual structure of the market concerned). See T-112/99, Métropole télévision (M6), Suez-
Lyonnaise des eaux, France Télécom and Télévision française 1 SA (TF1) v. Commission of the European 
Communities, [2001] ECR I-2459, para. 74 and seq. 
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concerning just Article 85.2 (voidness) and not an administrative sanction and where 
such distinction made perfect sense.517 
The object and effect categories do not reflect different rules that are forbidden, 
they just clarify that competition can be endangered and harmed, which is something 
very different from explaining how it can be endangered or harmed, or what types of 
dangerous situations should not be allowed at any cost.  
Our theory provides a clear solution to the ambivalent effects or objectives of an 
information exchange: to stop labelling all these conducts as information exchanges 
and instead be more intellectually honest about what they truly are and which specific 
rules they infringe.  
As we hope to have demonstrated, there cannot be self-standing information 
exchanges which are infringements by object if they are not a hard core cartel.  
This, in turn means, that all pure information exchanges (facilitating practices 
which we want to treat as autonomous conducts) should be prohibited and not 
sanctioned because there is not sufficient evidence as to their effects as to develop a 
proper rule of the kind that Article 103 TFEU demands.  
The problem, as we have seen is that the current interpretation of Article 101 
TFEU does not allow developing such clear rules, because it keeps trying to 
encapsulate the entire competition law universe in four words: “agreement and 
concerted practice” and, particularly,” object and effect”.  
                                            
517 C-56/65 - Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm, ECR 235 (1966), at 249 “Finally, for the 
agreement at issue to be caught by the prohibition contained in Article 85 (1) it must have as its 'object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market'. The fact that 
these are not cumulative but alternative requirements, indicated by the conjunction 'or', leads first to the 
need to consider the precise purpose of the agreement, in the economic context in which it is to be 
applied. This interference with competition referred to in Article 85 (1) must result from all or some of 
the clauses of the agreement itself. Where, however, an analysis of the said clauses does not reveal the 
effect on competition to be sufficiently deleterious, the consequences of the agreement should then be 
considered and for it to be caught by the prohibition it is then necessary to find that those factors are 
present which show that competition has in fact been prevented or restricted or distorted to an 
appreciable extent 
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The Authorities have not helped either as there is no single normative definition 
of a cartel in EU competition law, despite being the most clear antitrust infringement. 
We explain this further next.  
1. Information exchanges, cartels and infringements by 
object  
The term “cartel” is not expressly acknowledged in the Treaties. The European 
Commission currently defines a cartel as “a group of similar, independent companies 
which join together to fix prices, to limit production or to share markets or customers 
between them.”518  
Whereas in 1998, the OECD defined a “hard core cartel” as“an anticompetitive 
agreement, anticompetitive concerted practice, or anticompetitive arrangement by 
competitors to fix prices, make rigged bids (collusive tenders), establish output 
restrictions or quotas, or share or divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, 
territories, or lines of commerce”.519  
The Spanish Law on the Defense of Competition in its 4th Additional Clause 
defines it as“all secret agreements between two or more competitors whose object is 
the setting of prices, production or selling quotas, sharing of markets, including bid-
rigging or the restriction of imports or exports”.520 
                                            
518 According to the European Commission’s website, see at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview/  
 
519 Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, 25 March 
1998 - C(98)35/FINAL.   
 
520 “Se entiende por cártel todo acuerdo secreto entre dos o más competidores cuyo objeto sea la fijación 
de precios, de cuotas de producción o de venta, el reparto de mercados, incluidas las pujas fraudulentas, 
o la restricción de las importaciones o las exportaciones.” Spanish Law on the Defense of Competition 
(Ley 15/2007, de 3 de julio, de Defensa de la Competencia).  
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Historically, cartels have been identified as the paradigm of object 
infringements; however, neither the Commission nor the EU Courts has provided a 
clear list of infringements by object.521  
The Commission’s Fining Guidelines of 1998 provided a list of very serious 
infringements which indirectly provide guidance as to what types of Commitments 
could be considered infringements by object, those were “horizontal restrictions such 
as price cartels and market sharing quotas, or other practices which jeopardize the 
proper functioning of the single market, such as the partitioning of national markets 
and clear-cut abuse of a dominant position by undertakings holding a virtual 
monopoly”.522  
A similar concern can be found in the current 2006 Guidelines which point out 
that Horizontal price-fixing, market-sharing and output-limitation agreements, which 
are usually secret, are, by their very nature are among the most harmful restrictions of 
competition and “as a matter of policy, they will be heavily fined.”523 
As we have explained above, in Hüls the EU Courts pointed that concerted 
practices could be in principle infringements by object.524 In T-Mobile, the Court went 
two steps further by (a) indicating that a single information exchange could amount to 
an infringement by object and (b) expanding the concept of horizontal infringements 
                                            
521 Probably the closest are the hard core infringements not subject to the “De Minimis” Notice. 
According to Professor Jones (Jones, Left behind modernisation? Restrictions by Object under Article 
101(1), 2010) op. cit., the case law has identified the following restraints to be restrictive by object: 
• agreements between competitors to fix prices, limit output or share markets; 
• agreements between competitors to reduce capacity; 
• information exchanges designed to remove uncertainties concerning the intended conduct of the 
participating firms and facilitating, directly or indirectly the fixing of purchase or selling prices; 
• vertical restraints conferring an exclusive sales territory and protection from sales by others 
within the territory (absolute territorial protection) or otherwise prohibiting or limiting parallel trade;  and 
• vertical restraints imposing fixed or minimum resale prices on a dealer (resale price maintenance 
or RPM 
 
522 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15 (2) of Regulation No 17 and 
Article 65 (5) of the ECSC Treaty (98/C 9/03) available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1998:009:0003:0005:EN:PDF  
 
523 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation 
No 1/2003 (2006/C 210/02) available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:210:0002:0005:EN:PDF 
 
524 Hüls op. cit.  
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by object beyond price or quota allocations.  In fact, the court ruled, that in order to 
find that a concerted practice has an anti-competitive object, “there does not need to 
be a direct link between that practice and consumer prices”.525 
The Court’s broad statement must be nuanced in light of the facts of the case, 
where the Court seemed to rule that the remuneration paid to dealers was a decisive 
factor in fixing, ultimately, the price to be paid by the end user for their cellphone 
handsets. Nonetheless, such a broad statement opened the door for a looser 
interpretation of the concept infringements by object.   
The ultimate problem with the Court’s ruling in T-Mobile is that it ignores 
economic theory and instead it gives excessive weight to a very obtuse understanding 
of competition - independent business decision making526 - which was originally used 
as a conceptual tool to be able to distinguish tacit collusion from parallel behavior,527 
and has expanded by way of analogy beyond any logical limits.528 Thus, everything 
that hinders this dogma becomes “tainted” with an aura of anti-competitiveness that 
must be rebutted by the undertakings.529  
                                            
525 T-Mobile para. 39.  
 
526 On how this is the wrong approach and it has increased the categories of infringements by object see 
Alfaro, J. "La prohibición de los acuerdos restrictivos de la competencia." Indret, 2004. 
 
527 Similarly, to the ECJ’s reading of competition in 56-58/64, Costen v. Grundig, ECR - 299, where the 
ECJ ruled that in a vertical agreement between a manufacturer and its supplier with a territorial 
exclusivity clause: “It was therefore proper for the contested decision to hold that the agreement 
constitutes an infringement of Article 85 (1). No further considerations, whether of economic data (price 
differences between France and Germany, representative character of the type of appliance considered, 
level of overheads borne by Consten) or of the corrections of the criteria upon which the Commission 
relied in its comparisons between the situations of the French and German markets, and no possible 
favourable effects of the agreement in other respects, can in any way lead, in the face of abovementioned 
restrictions, to a different solution under Article 85 (1). 
  
528 On the dangers of using the analogy in competition law, see (Bork, 1993) page 411.  
 
529 Something almost impossible, unless the parties file a leniency application or publicly reject 
participating. In other words, the test is not a legal one of culpability but rather an economic one of 
whether the party did take an action that could seriously destabilize the cartel. This point is explained in 
(Ghezzi & Maggiolino, 2014) op. cit. and seems evident once one reads the ECJ’s ruling in Solvay, 
C-455/11 P, Solvay v. Commission at para. 44: “In that regard, it must be stated that probative data 
illustrating the competitive nature of the market and, in particular, the decrease of prices during the 
period concerned cannot suffice, of itself, to rebut that presumption. That data does not of itself make it 
possible to prove that that undertaking did not take account of the information exchanged with its 
competitors in determining its conduct on the market. It follows that that data does not of itself preclude 
the presumption that the concerted action enabled that undertaking to eliminate uncertainties regarding 
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The time is ripe now for a critical analysis of Banana’s, were the General Court 
was asked whether there were any differences between information exchanges 
regarding “future prices” and “price fixing” cartels as to their anti-competitive object. 
This was, yet again, a cartel case.  
2. A critical reading of Bananas530: just a cartel case  
This case concerned the telephone communications that took place with 
regularity between the three main bananas producers over a period of two years the 
night before, or early on the morning, on the day that each company would list their 
weekly “reference prices”.531  
The General Court concluded that the bilateral pre-pricing communications that 
took place among three banana producers (in a market not considered oligopolistic) 
where they discussed quotation markets, weather conditions and production quotas 
(within a system of allocated quotas fixed by the EU) decreased uncertainty 
surrounding the future decisions of the undertakings concerned on quotation prices, 
which constitute announced prices, and that concertation on such prices may 
constitute an infringement by object.532  
The General Court, therefore, ruled that the argument that an exchange of 
information can constitute a restriction of competition by object only if it forms part 
                                                                                                                                
its conduct on the market, so that normal competition might as a result have been prevented, restricted or 
distorted.” 
 
530 T-588/08, Dole Food Company v. Commission, judgment of 14 March 2013 (“Bananas”).  
531 The reference prices were the prices the manufacturers would list to their purchasers but not always or 
necessarily the final price given the buyer power of the purchasers. See paragraphs 431 to 585 of the 
judgment.  
 
532 Bananas para. 63. Previously, the Court had explained that “with respect to the infringement referred 
to in the contested decision, it is unequivocally clear from the terms of that decision that the Commission 
alleges that the applicants coordinated quotation prices by means of bilateral pre-pricing 
communications, a situation which characterizes a concerted practice concerning the fixing of prices and 
therefore having as its object the restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 81 EC (see, inter 
alia, recitals 1, 54, 261, 263 and 271 to the contested decision); this is not precluded by the fact that the 
Commission did not find, in the present case, that there had been an agreement or a concerted practice 
designed to fix actual prices, or an agreement relating to quotation prices, or even an agreement or a 
concerted practice designed to fix specific price increases or reductions.” Bananas para. 53. 
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of broader cartel arrangements, such as cartels to fix actual prices or share markets 
lacked “any foundation in law.”533  
The General Court began its analysis by repeating the idea that the principle of 
independent business decision making “strictly precludes” any direct or indirect 
contact between such operators by which an undertaking may influence the conduct 
on the market of its actual or potential competitors or disclose to them its decisions or 
intentions concerning its own conduct on the market where the object or effect of such 
contact is to create conditions of competition which do not correspond to “the normal 
conditions” of the market in question, regard being had to the nature of the products or 
services offered, the size and number of the undertakings involved and the volume of 
that market.  
Even though the reference to “normal conditions of competition” nuances the 
presumption of anti-competitiveness which “taints” all information exchanges, it does 
not seem, in our view, the correct parameter as it does not differentiate between the 
many different competitive and anti-competitive equilibriums that can take place in 
oligopolistic markets.534  
However, despite the language of the General Court suggesting a high degree of 
deference to the Commission, the General Court pointed out that it was in any event 
its role to ascertain whether, in the circumstances of the present case, the Commission 
was entitled to find that the exchanges of information between, on the one hand, Dole 
and Chiquita and, on the other hand, Dole and Weichert constituted a concerted 
practice having as its object the restriction of competition.535  
                                            
533 Bananas para. 59. 
 
534 Similarly, Frazer, T. "Information exchange: don’t slip on the banana skin." The In-House Lawyer, 
2013: “The concept of an infringement constituted by an exchange of information through the medium of 
a concerted practice by object is disconcertingly wide. One crumb of comfort is that the Court’s view that 
an exchange of information of the type in issue would be regarded as anti-competitive by object took 
account of the market context. Infringements are far more likely to arise in a highly concentrated market 
– whether or not the increased transparency actually did distort rivalry on the market and increase the 
probability of collusion. But in a fragmented market, an exchange of such information may be neutral, or 
even pro-competitive. Of course, an exchange that in fact had an anti-competitive effect in a fragmented 
market would be an infringement by effect, even if not by object.”   
 
535 Bananas para. 66. (Frazer, 2013) op. cit.  
 
173 
In fact, the General Court undertook a very thorough and careful analysis of the 
circumstances of the present case. Nothing less can be said of the 500 paragraphs 
(paras. 86 to 585 both included) that the judgment devotes to rule on “the existence of 
a concerted practice having an anti-competitive object” (title of section II.A of the 
judgment).  
During those paragraphs the Court assessed, among other aspects, the ability of 
the information to predict the competitor’s behavior in the market (future rises or 
decreases), the public or private nature of the information, the legal framework, the 
functioning of the offer and demand within that framework, the structure of the 
market, the calendar and frequency of the communications.  
At first sight, it seems contradictory that a per se infringement needs 500 
paragraphs to explain why it is a per se infringement, when in order for a concerted 
practice to be regarded as having an anti‑competitive object “it is sufficient that it has 
the potential to have a negative impact on competition.”.536  
After reading the General Court judgment, one reaches the conclusion that the 
Bananas case is not a case of a concerted practice but an implicit agreement for which 
there was no direct evidence, thus the entire case had to be built on indirect evidence 
which needed to be interpreted as whole (which is precisely what the Court did in 
those 500 paragraphs, particularly given the non-oligopolistic nature of the market).  
However, given the considerably lower standard of proof that the Courts have 
required to put forward these types of cases, the Commission felt more comfortable 
using the information exchange/concerted practice terminology rather than talking 
about a cartel.537  
                                            
536 “In other words, the concerted practice must simply be capable in an individual case, having regard to 
the specific legal and economic context, of resulting in the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the common market. Whether and to what extent, in fact, such anti-competitive effects 
result can only be of relevance for determining the amount of any fine and assessing any claim for 
damages” Bananas para. 70.  
 
537 Referring to this case as cartel case, see Herbert Smith. "Information Exchange Remains a Key 
Competition Law Risk." Competition, Regulation and Trade E-Bulletin, 2013.  
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This comes back to the issue that all cartels contain an information 
exchange however not all information exchanges are cartel. Unfortunately, 
neither the Commission nor the EU Courts have built clear analytical tools to 
differentiate them. The reason might be that a continuum of facilitating practices 
can, with all logic, end up in the existence of an implicit agreement.538  
The recent ECJ judgment of 19 March 2015, upholding the General Court’s 
views, provides additional light on this conclusion.539 In fact, reading the judgment 
one gets the impression that the conduct which is sanctioned is not truly a classic hard 
core cartel but rather the facilitation of the existence of a tacit cartel. We cannot 
obviate that this was a decision arising from a leniency application. 
Instead of agreeing on the final prices, the members of the cartel exchanged the 
elements that help them align their reference prices which in turn would, probably, 
help them align their final prices. The ECJ began by pointing out, in the background 
to the dispute, that the fine had been reduced by 60% given the specific regulatory 
regime of the industry and the fact that the conduct concerned reference prices and not 
final prices.540 This does not seem an irrelevant remark. In fact, to our mind, it 
represents that the ECJ might have acknowledged implicitly that the Commission was 
not sanctioning a fully accomplished conduct but rather the conducts that aided in 
building up a tacit cartel.541  
In our opinion, the ECJ judgment contains both very positive and very negative 
statements which result from the need to comingle Cartes Bancaires and T-Mobile 
into a consistent case law.542 The ultimate outcome – upholding the European 
Commission decision – might be correct. However, the reference to the case law on 
                                            
538 (Ossowska, 2010) op. cit.  
 
539 C-286/13P, Dole Food Company Inc. v. Commission, Judgment of 19 March 2015.  
 
540 Id., para. 25 
 
541 Id., para. 130 “Second, the General Court found, at paragraph 574 of the judgment under appeal, that 
quotation prices were relevant to the market concerned, since, on the one hand, market signals, market 
trends or indications as to the intended development of banana prices could be inferred from those 
quotation prices, which were important for the banana trade and the prices obtained and, on the other, in 
some transactions the actual prices were directly linked to the quotation prices.” 
 
542 It is quite interesting to compare the statements made by the ECJ in paras. 113 and 115 against 119 
and 123.  
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concerted practices and information exchanges and the independent decision making 
doctrine (under T-Mobile) does not aid in providing more legal certainty. Instead, the 
European Courts will be much better off if they extract from this judgment two key 
aspects pointed out in the judgment by reference to Cartes Bancaires: (i) the need for 
sufficient degree of harm to competition as the key benchmark to sanction conducts543 
(principle of harm) and (ii) the idea that this harm can result from direct or indirect 
actions, therefore, in order to sanction it, it is relevant to determine the intention of the 
parties when undertaking those conducts (principle of culpability).544   
3. The need for proper legal rules confirmed 
In our opinion, the previous case law confirms our initial intuition, the absence 
of a proper legal dogmatic exegesis of Article 101 TFEU has resulted in the lack of 
detailed rules setting forth the principles contained in that Article.  
As result, the only rules that actually exist are those contained in subparagraphs 
a) to e) of Article 101 TFEU, when a conduct falls short of those, for example because 
it does not fix prices, but a key of its elements (such as it happened in T-Mobile and 
Banana’s), the authorities prefer to resort to the grey zone of concerted practices and 
information exchanges -even though it might still be clearly cartel (or the preparation 
or facilitation of one) - thanks to a case law that - paradoxically enough - was 
developed, precisely, to fight cartels.  
This would not be a problem if EU Competition law was applied exclusively by 
the European Commission. Nonetheless, once the discretion of what conducts should 
be prosecuted (and under what theories of harm) is also given to the national 
authorities, the need for proper legal rules beyond Article 101 TFEU becomes evident 
                                            
543 Id. at 113 “In that regard, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that certain types of coordination 
between undertakings reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition that it may be found that there is 
no need to examine their effects (judgment in CB v Commission, C‑67/13 P, EU:C:2014:2204, 
paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).” 
 
544 Id. at 130-131 “Second, the General Court found, at paragraph 574 of the judgment under appeal, 
that quotation prices were relevant to the market concerned, since, on the one hand, market signals, 
market trends or indications as to the intended development of banana prices could be inferred from 
those quotation prices, which were important for the banana trade and the prices obtained and, on the 
other, in some transactions the actual prices were directly linked to the quotation prices. Third, at 
paragraph 580 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court found that the Dole employees involved 
in the pre-pricing communications participated in the internal pricing meetings.” 
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to ensure the requisite legal certainty that any system guided by the rule of law 
requires.  
L. Information exchanges under Article 101.3 
Lastly, we shall pay a short visit to Article 101.3 in relation to self-standing 
information exchanges. To our knowledge the European Courts have never examined 
an information exchange case from an Article 101.3 perspective, save for the UK 
Tractor case (that is before the more “effects-based approach”).545 The difficult 
frontier between Article 101.1 and Article 101.3 TFEU drawn after the modernization 
process does not certainly help.546  
The closest approximation to an article 101.3 analysis can be found in the 
Asnef-Equifax, 547 seen before, however, the Court had pointed out that it was not 
necessary to study the applicability of article 101.3 TFEU since the information 
exchange did not have the ability to have an effect on competition given the structure 
of the market, the fact that all competitors could access the register and that the 
system did not allow for outsiders to identify the borrowers.  
                                            
545 The closes practical example to the application and interpretation of Article 101.3 by the Commission 
is the commitment decision in the Star Alliance case. In this case, the Commission had challenged the 
revenue-sharing joint venture between several airlines particularly with regard to the Franfurt – New 
York route.  In this case, in view of the specificity of the airline sector, the Commission for the first time 
accepted the so-called “out-of-market efficiencies”. These are efficiencias which are generated on the 
markets other than the markets where concerns were identified. (Italianer, Competitor Agreements under 
EU Competition Law, 2013). The e-book case, particularly, the Commission’s concern with regards to 
information exchanges through the MFN clauses would have been a very good candidate to se, the 
Commission’s 101.3 application in practice particularly given the efficiency rationale of having an 
additional distributor (Apple) come entering in the e-book market. However, the Commission only 
indicated in the commitments decision that “The Commission’s preliminary view is that Article 101(3) of 
the Treaty and Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement do not apply in this case because the cumulative 
conditions set out in those provisions are not met.” 
 
546Italianer, “A. Fighting cartels in Europe and the US: different systems" Annual Conference of the 
International Bar Association. Boston, 2013. Italianer, A. "Competitor Agreements under EU 
Competition Law." 40th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy. New York: 
Fordham Competition Law Institute, 2013.  
 
547 Asnef-Equifax para. 65. “the applicability of the exemption provided for in Article 81(3) EC is subject 
to the four cumulative conditions laid down in that provision. First, the arrangement concerned must 
contribute to improving the production or distribution of the goods or services in question, or to 
promoting technical or economic progress; secondly, consumers must be allowed a fair share of the 
resulting benefit; thirdly, it must not impose any non-essential restrictions on the participating 
undertakings; and, fourthly, it must not afford them the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of 
a substantial part of the products or services in question” 
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The Court nevertheless pointed that an article 101.3 assessment would have 
been pro-competitive.548  
The Asnef-Equifax precedes T-Mobile and it shows how the analysis is tainted 
ex ante. For example, it surprises that nowhere in the judgment there is any reference 
to Suiker Unie and that the Court avoided swiftly the presumption of anti-
competiveness that “taints” information exchanges by pointing out “while in those 
conditions such systems are capable of reducing uncertainty as to the risk that 
applicants for credit will default, they are not, however, liable to reduce uncertainty 
as to the risks of competition.”549  
However, this argument seems to be biased given that one could legitimately 
argue that the exchange eliminated an element for competition differentiation among 
financial institutions. Those with the best systems to assess the default risks of their 
clients would have the best clients and therefore lower default rates.  
In this regard, the standard set in John Deere precluding any “direct or indirect 
contact between competitors, the object or effect is to create conditions of competition 
which do not correspond to the normal competitive conditions of the market” could 
have been meet since normal competitive conditions would require competition on the 
assessment of the default risk of borrower.550  
We do not pretend to argue that Asnef-Equifax should have been decided 
differently, quite on the contrary. However, this case shows the flexibility and 
imprecision that the standards set by the ECJ grant to Competition Authorities.551  
                                            
548 Given that “under Article 81(3) EC, it is the beneficial nature of the effect on all consumers in the 
relevant markets that must be taken into consideration, not the effect on each member of that category of 
consumers. Moreover, as follows from paragraphs 55 and 67 of this judgment, registers such as the one 
at issue in the main proceedings are, under favourable conditions, capable of leading to a greater overall 
availability of credit, including for applicants for whom interest rates might be excessive if lenders did 
not have appropriate knowledge of their personal situation.”Asnef-Equifax paras. 69 and 70. 
  
549 Asnef-Equifax para. 62. 
 
550 Asnef-Equifax para. 60. 
 
551 Here, again, legal dogmatic provides a nice answer to the controversy regarding the application of 
Article 101.3. Article 101.3 is balancing test to measure the collusion of principles. Once principles have 
been developed into rules, they are not balanced what rather excluded by specific clauses. There is no 
sense if having an exception a prohibitive rule, because that would be a positive rule. 
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In this regard, it should not be ignored that Asnef-Equifax concerns a private 
suit by a Spanish consumer association. The Spanish Competition Authority had 
blessed the agreement provided that personal data was protected and access to the 
registered was not discriminatory. 
PART THREE - OUR PROPOSAL  
VI. A DOGMATIC FRAMEWORK FOR A COHERENT 
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 101 TFEU AS AN 
ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTION 
So far, we have seen how, historically and conceptually, there has been much 
confusion about the scope of application of Article 101 TFEU, particularly, with 
regards to one infringement (information exchanges) that moves within a fine line 
between what it is permissible and what is not.   
Overtime, particularly after Regulation 1/2003 and the Commission’s focus in 
prohibiting and punishing cartel behavior, monetary fines for competition law 
infringements have increased considerably.552 Today, as it is well known, there is 
heated discussion about the possible criminal nature of competition law fines.553  
The aim of this section is not to conclude whether the application of Article 101 
TFEU by Competition Authorities is criminal or administrative in nature. In our 
opinion, this is not a very productive debate. After all, in Menarini,554 the ECHR 
acknowledged their quasi-criminal nature and so have the ECJ judgments in recent 
                                                                                                                                
 
552Connor, J. "Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, and Anticartel Enforcement." Purdue 
Agricultural Economics Working Paper No. 03-12 , 2012. 
 
553 Schweitzer, H. "The European Competition Law Enforcement System and the Evolution of Judiicial 
Review." In European Competition Law Annual 2009, by C-D. Ehlermann, & M. Marquis. Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2010. 
 
554 European Court of Human Rights, A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. c. Italie (Requête no. 43509/08), 
judgment of 27 September 2011. See also Bronckers, M. , and A. Vallery. "Business as usual after 
Menarini?" MLex Ab Extra, 2012: 44-46.  
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cases.555 Moreover, continental administrative law scholars have long ago agreed that 
their sanctioning systems should resemble in, as much as possible, the procedures and 
guarantees of criminal law.556 
On the contrary, this chapter is devoted to laying out the basic concepts and 
principles that should guide from lege lata the application of Article 101 TFEU, as an 
administrative sanction, by the EU Courts.557  
Our objective here is to incorporate the (continental) criminal law categories 
into the universe of Article 101 TFEU. In a way, one could say that we will look at 
competition law with the googles of a criminal law scholar. This will allow us to use 
the most sophisticated intellectual tools in the analysis of sanctions,558 obtaining a new 
angle of analysis of Article 101 TFEU and most importantly, providing a theory on 
how to distinguish between the application of the general clause and the application of 
the administrative rules and sanctions.   
This approach to competition law is not novel; in fact, it is inspired by the 
analogy drawn by AG Kokott, between (criminal) risk offences and competition 
infringements in T-Mobile. 559  
                                            
555 See, among others, the opinion of AG Kokott, delivered on 12 January 2012, in Joined Cases C‑
628/10 P and C‑14/11 P Alliance One International Inc. and Others v. European Commission and 
Others, para. 111 “Accordingly, although the Commission may, in the proceeding before the General 
Court, explain in more detail in its defence the reasons for the decision at issue, (65) the Commission may 
not introduce completely new grounds for the decision at issue in those proceedings. For the original lack 
of reasons cannot be cured by enabling the person concerned to learn of those reasons during 
proceedings before the European Union judicature. This prohibition of adding grounds ‘after the event’ 
before a court is particularly strict in criminal proceedings and in quasi-criminal proceedings such as 
cartel proceedings.” 
 
556 For a very good summary of the German, French, Italian and Spanish convergence on this aspect, see 
(Huergo Lora, 2007) op. cit.  
 
557 Similarly, (Schwarze & Bechtold, 2008) op. cit. “When examined from a substantive law perspective, 
fining decisions in competition law are presently at least quasi-criminal in nature. To be valid, they must 
therefore comply with the principles of criminal law and criminal procedure – regardless of whether or 
not they exceed the boundary drawn in Art. 23 (5) of Reg. 1/2003.” 
 
558 A mere look at any criminal law manual shows that many of the issues that trouble competition 
lawyers today have long been discussed in criminal law, particularly in German criminal law, see Roxin, 
C. Derecho Penal. Parte General. Tomo I. Civitas, 2008. 
 
559 T-Mobile: “the prohibition on ‘infringements of competition by object’ resulting from Article 81(1) EC 
is comparable to the risk offences (Gefährdungsdelikte) known in criminal law: in most legal systems, a 
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 To that end, we will provide a brief explanation of some key criminal law 
concepts in the next pages; we apologize in advance if some concepts might seem too 
obvious for those trained in continental law.   
A. Competition as a legally protected value or 
“Rechtsgutsbegriff”, understanding supra-individual values deserving 
legal protection and their mechanisms of protection 
One of the greatest contributions of the German criminal law scholarship in the 
study of criminal law has been to identify the link between criminal norms and the 
values and principles they seek to protect (Recthsgütter in German, bienes jurídicos in 
Spanish).560  
The classic understanding of criminal law has been, for many years, that behind 
each crime there should be, at least, a legal (and legitimate) value or principle 
protected. This theoretical tool has been a key aspect in order to decriminalize certain 
behaviors and to tailor sanctions in accordance to the values protected.561  However, 
as society has evolved and become more institutionalized, so have criminal codes.562  
                                                                                                                                
person who drives a vehicle when significantly under the influence of alcohol or drugs is liable to a 
criminal or administrative penalty, wholly irrespective of whether, in fact, he endangered another road 
user or was even responsible for an accident. In the same vein, undertakings infringe European 
competition law and may be subject to a fine if they engage in concerted practices with an anti-
competitive object; whether in an individual case, in fact, particular market participants or the general 
public suffer harm is irrelevant.” 
 
The car example has also been used by Director General of DG Comp when explaining infringements by 
object “In a way, it’s a bit like speed limits. It is presumed – based on experience – that driving too fast is 
dangerous, and it is therefore prohibited. That prohibition applies irrespective of whether someone drove 
safely above the speed limit, whether the offence actually resulted in an accident or whether someone had 
other, perhaps even laudable motives for driving too fast. It is the mere risk of the presumed danger 
which triggers the offence”. (Italianer, Competitor Agreements under EU Competition Law, 2013) op. cit.  
 
560 Roxin, C. "El concepto de bien jurídico como instrumento de crítica legislativa sometido a examen." 
Revista electrónica de ciencia penal y criminología, 2013, Hefendehl, R. "¿Debe ocuparse el derecho 
Penal de riesgos futuros?: Bienes jurídicos colectivos y delitos de peligro abstracto." Revista Electrónica 
de Ciencia Penal y Criminología, 2002.  
 
561 Among others Ferrajoli, L. "El Principio de Lesividad como Garantía Penal." Conferencia 
pronunciada en la Real Academia de Jurisprudencia y Legislación. Madrid, 2008, (Roxin, Derecho 
Penal. Parte General. Tomo I, 2008), op. cit. The Spanish Constitutional Court expressed the problem in 
terms of proportionality. See STC 55/1996 of 28 March 1996 “Establecida esta premisa, debemos 
precisar en primer lugar cuál es el bien jurídico protegido por la norma cuestionada o, mejor, cuales son 
los fines inmediatos y mediatos de protección de la misma. Esta precisión constituye el prius lógico para 
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Life, physical integrity, honor, property are examples of values or principles of 
legal nature which are protected by specific criminal statutes. Homicide, assault, 
defamation, robbery are, indeed, the crimes created to protect these values.563  
Traditionally, criminal law theorists had to deal only with crimes which were 
individual in nature or, in common law terms, “victim crimes”.564 There was always a 
victim, i.e., a person whose property was robbed, whose life was taken away, whose 
body was injured.  
However, as society matured, legislators moved from pure punishment to 
protection, and started sanctioning as criminal infringements behaviors which did not 
protect an individual or its property but, rather, more ethereal, “victimless” or 
“collective” values such as: the environment, public health or an efficient and 
trustworthy traffic system.565   
The concept of collective values is somehow elusive, criminal law academics 
have acknowledged that in principle it can encompass, at least, two different 
meanings: on the one hand, those collective rights that just result from the 
accumulation of individual rights (public health) and, on the other hand, purely supra-
individual rights, that is, rights which are beyond individual interests (administration 
of justice) and which, according to some authors, cannot be understood by reference 
to an individual right.566 
                                                                                                                                
la determinación de si el legislador ha incurrido en un exceso manifiesto en el rigor de las penas, 
vulnerador del art. 17.1 C.E., al introducir un sacrificio patentemente inidóneo, innecesario o 
desproprocionado del derecho a la libertad; a la par que permite descartar toda posibilidad de sujeción 
mínima al principio de proporcionalidad si el sacrificio de la libertad que impone la norma persigue la 
preservación de bienes o intereses, no sólo, por supuesto, constitucionalmente proscritos, sino ya, 
también, socialmente irrelevantes (STC 111/1993, fundamento jurídico 9º)”.  
 
562 We appreciate professor Lascurain’s observations in this regard.  
 
563Among others (Roxin, Derecho Penal. Parte General. Tomo I, 2008) op. cit., Mir Puig, S. Derecho 
Penal (Parte General). Barcelona: Reppertor, 2011.  
 
564 This is a made-up term, being the truly Anglo-American concept that of “victimless” crimes, which is 
the closest concept we were able to find. 
 
565 (Hefendehl, 2002) op. cit. (Ferrajoli, El Principio de Lesividad como Garantía Penal, 2008) op. cit. 
 
566 (Hefendehl, 2002) op. cit. The exact definition is still discussed in criminal law, see Feijoo Sánchez, B. 
"Sobre la Crisis de la Teoría del Bien Jurídico." Indret, 2008: 1-16, criticizing the idea of accumulation as 
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We believe that “competition” is a collective value which is protected by the 
TFEU. No doubt, that the ultimate concept protected by competition law is a subject 
of much discussion. In fact, if we were to provide a definition we would say that there 
is not a clear-cut one in the case law of the ECJ but rather a polyhedron with many 
different interrogates.567  Is about the competitive process or about welfare?568 Is it 
about consumers or about competitors? And if so, what welfare, total welfare or 
consumer’s welfare?569   
However, by looking at this case law and the surrounding literature, one soon 
realizes that the interests that seem to be protected by competition law are normally 
                                                                                                                                
relevant.  Other authors propose a different distinction, both collective and supraindividual rights 
anticipate the barrier of protection to values that ensure a proper functioning of the system. However, 
ones have a more direct relationship with individual rights (public health), whereas others are further 
away from them (administration of justice). See Gil Gil, A., J. M. Lacruz López, M. Melendo Pardos, and 
J. Núñez Fernández. Curso de Derecho Penal. Parte General. Madrid: Dykinson, 2011, pages 8 to 13.  
 
567 Zimmer, D. The Goals of Competition Law, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012. 
 
568 The approach in the EU seems to shift between two definitions depending on the case, rivalry between 
firms or consumer welfare. Director General Alexander Italianer joined both of them nicely in a recent 
speech when he claimed that “in its quest to protect rivalry among firms and so the competitive process 
to promote consumer welfare, the Court takes a broad approach when it comes to concerted restraints 
on the competitive autonomy of firms that are liable to impede the competitive outcome” (Italianer, 
Competitor Agreements under EU Competition Law, 2013). See also Slovak Banks (C-226/12) para. 18 
“Article 101 TFEU is intended to protect not only the interests of competitors or consumers but also the 
structure of the market and thus competition as such” as opposed to Allianz Hungary (C-32/11) “In the 
light of all of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question submitted is that Article 101(1) 
TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that agreements whereby car insurance companies come to 
bilateral arrangements, either with car dealers acting as car repair shops or with an association 
representing those dealers, concerning the hourly charge to be paid by the insurance company for repairs 
to vehicles insured by it, stipulating that that charge depends, inter alia, on the number and percentage of 
insurance contracts that the dealer has sold as intermediary for that company, can be considered a 
restriction of competition ‘by object’ within the meaning of that provision, where, following a concrete 
and individual examination of the wording and aim of those agreements and of the economic and legal 
context of which they form a part, it is apparent that they are, by their very nature, injurious to the proper 
functioning of normal competition on one of the two markets concerned.”  
 
569 See (Motta, 2004) op. cit. pages 17 to 30. On this topic see also Zimmer, D. "Consumer welfare, 
economic freedom and the moral quality of competition law - comments on Gregory Werden and Vicotr 
Vanberg." In Competition Policy and the Economic Approach, by J. Drexl. Edward Elgar, 2011, ICN. 
Competition Enforcement and Consumer Welfare. Conference The Hague, 2011, . (ICN, 2011). (Zimmer, 
Consumer welfare, economic freedom and the moral quality of competition law - comments on Gregory 
Werden and Vicotr Vanberg, 2011). Werden, G. "Consumer Welfare and Competition Policy." In 
Competition Policy and the Economic Approach, by J. Drexl. Edward Elgar, 2011, Orbach, B. "The 
Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox" 7 J. Competition L. & Econ. 133, 2010, Kaplow, L. "On the 
Choice of Welfare Standards in Competition Law." Harvard Law School Discusssion Paper 693, 2011.  
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collective and organizational, they relate to the adequate functioning of the market or 
even to consumers as whole, as a group.570  
As we will explain next there is a connection between supra-individual or 
collective values and risk offences. Moreover, the case law of the ECJ has favored 
such a construction of competition law infringement by consecrating the “potential 
effects” standard of proof.571  
As AG Kokott intuitively acknowledged in T-Mobile, competition law 
infringements are quite similar to protecting road traffic or the environment. If we 
translate this into offences, we could say that one drunk driver does not threaten the 
traffic even though it might cause an accident. Letting everybody driving drunk might 
put at risk the functioning of the traffic system. One small information exchange 
might not threaten the EU economy; all industries exchanging information among 
competitors could bring European integration to a halt.572  
B. Competition law infringements as a continuum of 
“endangering” behaviors, the usefulness of the distinction between 
harm and risk 
In general terms, we could say that collective values are generally endangered, 
whereas individual values are normally harmed. This is obviously a generalization but 
it helps extract one key conclusion: different values might require different 
mechanisms of protection, because they are threatened in different ways.   
                                            
570 Otherwise, why are there safe harbors for market participants beyond certain thresholds or de minimis 
rules? Even though it is not the purpose of his paper, reading (Reindl, 2011) op. cit. under a criminal lens, 
one becomes certain that this structural/organizational/collective aspect is one of the most relevant of 
competition law. Look at the AG opinion in T-Mobile “Article 81 EC forms part of a system designed to 
protect competition within the internal market from distortions (Article 3(1)(g) EC). Accordingly, Article 
81 EC, like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is not designed only or primarily to protect the 
immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers, but to protect the structure of the market and 
thus competition as such (as an institution). In this way, consumers are also indirectly protected. Because 
where competition as such is damaged, disadvantages for consumers are also to be feared” 
 
571 In other words, the protected values are useful as a methodology tool to analyze Article 101 TFEU. 
Explaining that this is a useful use of the concept but not the only one, see (Roxin, Derecho Penal. Parte 
General. Tomo I, 2008) op. cit. page 55.  
 
572 (Hefendehl, 2002) op. cit.  
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Criminal law theory has long pointed out that there is a distinction between 
traditional crimes of harm (i.e. killing) and risk offences (i.e. drunk driving). The first 
ones could be described as harmful offences (verletzungsdelikte in German), while the 
second ones could be described as danger or risk offences (gefährdungsdelikte in 
German).573 
In the last decade, criminal law academics have been particularly interested in 
these types of risk offences, to such extent, that some authors have labeled this new 
area in criminal law as the criminal law of the risk (“Derecho Penal del Riesgo”).574   
To provide a definition of risk offences is an extremely difficult task, 
particularly, when one realizes: (a) that it is a purely theoretical construction,575 and 
(b) that even with this category, scholars have singled out also different sub-
categories.576  
In this regard, criminal law theory tells us that there is a consensus 
distinguishing, at least, three main types of risk offences: abstract risk offences, 
concrete risk offences and abstract-concrete risk offences.577 This last category 
reflects a somehow mixed option between the two extremes. Not surprisingly, there is 
a connection between collective (criminal law) protected values and risk offences.578  
                                            
573 (Roxin, Derecho Penal. Parte General. Tomo I, 2008) op. cit. We use the term danger and risk (and 
crimes of danger and risk offences) as synonyms as there is not an exact translation of the concept in 
Anglo-American criminal law. The theoretical constructions and discussions that we will see next are 
much less frequent in Anglo-American law. A crime is a crime from the moment the legislator has chosen 
to do so and the theoretical discussion has been for long time limited to the issue of what is the purpose of 
the sanction.  
 
574 Mendoza Buergo, B. Límites dogmáticos y político-criminales de los delitos de peligro abstracto. 
Granada: Comares, 2001, pages 335 and seq.  
 
575 There is no such express distinction in the Penal codes since all that matters is whether the action has 
been embedded into a particular provision. 
 
576 (Mendoza Buergo, 2001) op. cit., Cerezo Mir, J. "Los delitos de peligro abstracto en el ámbito del 
Derecho penal del riesgo." Revista de derecho penal y criminología, 2002: 47 - 72. Feijoo Sánchez, B. 
"Seguridad colectiva y peligro abstracto. Sobre la normativización del peligro." In Homenaje al profesor 
Dr. Gonzalo Rodríguez Mourullo, by AA.VV., 3007-342. Civitas, 2005.  
 
577 (Mendoza Buergo, 2001), op. cit. 
 
578 In fact, and this is an important reflection to keep in mind, depending on the definition of the Recths-
gütter, the behavior that harms or endangers it significantly varies.  
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Let’s illustrate this point with an example. Killing someone in a car accident 
because of reckless driving or by poisoning the water he drinks is a homicide 
punishable by the Criminal code. This is clearly a case of a crime of harm.579 
However, instead of just preventing this type of crimes and to ensure a safe and 
reliable transport system or clean waters, the legislator might prefer to widen the 
breath of the protection of criminal law to crimes which could likely end up in such a 
fatal result. For example: 
 Drunk driving is a case of an abstract risk (abstraktes 
gefährdungsdelikte), the prosecutor will only be required to show that 
(a) the driver was actually driving and (b) his level of alcohol exceed 
certain parameters fixed ex ante, or that the driver was actually 
influenced by the alcohol.580 
 
 Reckless driving, on the contrary, is a case of crime of concrete 
risk (konkretes gefährdungsdelikte), the prosecutor will need to show 
that the actions of the defendant posed a concrete danger to the protect 
value given, for example: the high speed of the car, the disregard to 
traffic regulations (changing lanes frequently, using the opposite lane 
when not permitted, talking on the cellphone or lighting a cigarette just 
before passing the traffic light on rush hour), jointly with the 
assessment of danger expressed by other drivers present at the moment 
in their testimonies, etc.581  
 
                                                                                                                                
 
579 We borrow this translation into English from Binavince, E. "Crimes of Danger." 15 Wayne L. Rev. 683 
, 1968-1969. 
 
580 Obviously that will be the case if the criminal code sets specific parameters, for example based on the 
level of alcohol in the blood, as the current Spanish criminal code does or if the police can describe 
certain behavior which shows the influence of alcohol.  
 
581 In a way, if we look at risk offences as varying scale of actions that get closer to harm an individual or 
a collective value. Concrete risk offences are at one end of the chain, and it seems almost invariably that 
they will harm the protected value, even though, exceptional circumstances might make it not happen.  
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 A hazardous spill could be an intermediate figure (abstraktes-
konkrete gefährdungsdelikte),582 while there is an abstract element, that 
the person spills the product, there is also a concrete element, that the 
substance is hazardous enough to endanger the environment or the 
people surrounding it.583  
Once the legislators began to prohibit risk offences, criminal law scholars 
started to justify them under the “tentative theory”. This means that they envisioned 
risk offences as a mechanism to avoid even attempting to commit another crime. The 
risk was identified by reference to a crime of harm and the willingness to prevent such 
a crime pushed the legislator to prevent the attempt (adequate or inadequate) to 
commit a crime of such harm that it became on itself a crime (a crime of danger). 584  
However this approach was soon replaced by the “probability theory”. 
According to this interpretation, the “attempt” stage explanation inadequate because it 
created a iuris et de iure presumption of harm (one the attempt is shown, the harm is 
presumed, that is why there is crime) which would be incompatible with the 
presumption of innocence.585 Instead, they argued that the rationale for these 
infringements is that the danger is precisely the reason why the legislator has 
prohibited the conduct. The danger is the ratio legis of the provision. The legislator 
                                            
582 (Mendoza Buergo, 2001) op. cit.  
 
583 For example, article 325 of the Spanish Criminal Code that reads “Será castigado con las penas de 
prisión de dos a cinco años, multa de ocho a veinticuatro meses e inhabilitación especial para profesión 
u oficio por tiempo de uno a tres años el que, contraviniendo las leyes u otras disposiciones de carácter 
general protectoras del medio ambiente, provoque o realice directa o indirectamente emisiones, vertidos, 
radiaciones, extracciones o excavaciones, aterramientos, ruidos, vibraciones, inyecciones o depósitos, en 
la atmósfera, el suelo, el subsuelo o las aguas terrestres, subterráneas o marítimas, incluido el alta mar, 
con incidencia incluso en los espacios transfronterizos, así como las captaciones de aguas que puedan 
perjudicar gravemente el equilibrio de los sistemas naturales. Si el riesgo de grave perjuicio fuese para 
la salud de las personas, la pena de prisión se impondrá en su mitad superior.” 
 
584 (Feijoo Sánchez, Seguridad colectiva y peligro abstracto. Sobre la normativización del peligro, 2005) 
op. cit. he calls it the “italian” school of thought. Even though there were German authors also defending 
this approach see (Mendoza Buergo, 2001) op. cit. pages 67 and seq. Following Carrara’s concept of the 
“danger undertaken” “pericolo corso”, (Ferrajoli, El Principio de Lesividad como Garantía Penal, 2008) 
op. cit.  
 
585 (Bronckers & Vallery, Business as usual after Menarini?, 2012) op. cit. and (Bronckers & Vallery, No 
Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of Fundamental Rights on Certain Dogmas of EU Competition 
Law, 2011) op. cit. 
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has already foreseen that those conducts are ex ante statistically likely to cause harm 
and, thus, should be prevented. 586   
The discussion on the rationales for punishing abstractly dangerous offences is 
very useful to our study, as it helps us understand the link between the complexity of 
competition (as a value that deserves legal protection) 587 and the categorization of the 
infringements (rules) incorporated into the black letter law to protect such value.    
In general, criminal law scholars are more comfortable when crimes are worded 
or interpreted as abstract-concrete infringements or concrete risk infringements, rather 
than as pure abstract risk offences.588  
In their view, the former demand a suitability test (was the conduct suitable to 
put the value protected at risk?) before concluding whether a crime has been 
committed, which fits better within the classic principles of culpability, harm and 
presumption of innocence.589 Moreover, this option allows for a more targeted 
application of criminal law since it would take into account the abilities of driver, 
his/her weight and height, the exact amount of alcohol drunk, etc.590 
                                            
586 However, in our view, even this construction those not seem to meet the principles of presumption of 
innocence and culpability since it merely places the presumption at an earlier stage.  Other authors have 
suggested that these behaviors are sanctioned because the wrongdoer has subjectively chosen to disregard 
a conduct that sets out a minimum degree of care. In our opinion, this comes back again to the idea of 
experience, since such a rule of care should have been imposed based, precisely, on that common 
experience of the likely effects of not doing as instructed.   
 
587 Its prevention, restriction or distortion according to Article 101 TFEU. 
 
588 (Cerezo Mir, 2002) op. cit. (Kiss, 2015) op. cit.   
 
589 (Bronckers & Vallery, No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of Fundamental Rights on Certain 
Dogmas of EU Competition Law, 2011) op. cit. “First, the presumption of innocence would seem to 
discipline the characterization of restriction ‘by object’ as well. That characterization really presumes 
anticompetitive effects, without this presumption being rebuttable. According to the ECtHR, presumptions 
should not go further than is reasonably necessary to achieve a public policy goal. Given the lack of 
certainty surrounding the effects of information exchanges, even on future prices, it seems 
disproportionate to automatically infer an anticompetitive object, with the procedural consequences this 
entails for the companies concerned.” 
 
590 (Mir Puig, 2011) op. cit., (Muñoz Conde, 2002) op. cit. (Kiss, 2015) op. cit.  
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1. Article 101 TFEU under the criminal law lens: a typology 
of offences  
As we know, Article 101 TFEU (as interpreted by the ECJ) distinguishes two 
types of infringements: infringements by object and infringements by effect.  
Infringements by object are, for the European Courts, activities which are per se 
illegal absent evidence, on the contrary, of countervailing effects. Thus, according to 
the categories provided above infringements by object are infringements of abstract 
danger, since the mere conduct suffices to punish the undertaking without the need of 
showing any (potential) final specific harm.591 
The categorization of the infringements by effect is more difficult. According to 
the rule of reason analysis, these infringements are neither beneficial nor harmful on 
an ex-ante analysis. Rather, it is necessary to undertake a case by case analysis of the 
circumstances surrounding the case to assess it potential consequences.  
This rules out purely abstract infringements of danger, but it does not tell us if 
we can move away from the risk to the harm area. The European Courts provide a 
partial response through their case law understanding that the term “effects” 
encompasses both “actual” effects and “potential” effects.592  
Potential effects cases involve circumstances where no specific harm has 
actually taken place (or been shown) but - taking into account the particular 
                                            
591 (Italianer, The Object of Effects, 2014) op. cit. “Every time we pursue an investigation we have to 
decide: is this an infringement of competition law by its very nature, or should we examine possible anti-
competitive effects? In the first case we look at inherently harmful infringements. We do this by primarily 
focusing on the content and the objectives of the agreements or the conduct in question in order to see 
whether they reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition. But we don't consider whether in fact they 
produce negative effects. Such infringements by their very nature are always serious, although not 
necessarily obvious.” 
 
592 (Italianer, The Object of Effects, 2014), op. cit. “The Cartes Bancaires judgment has only told us what 
to do and what not to do when analysing infringements by object. The Court did not tell us much what to 
do when it comes to infringements by effect. But this is pretty clear from previous case law, for instance 
the case John Deere, which tells us that for finding an infringement by effect under Article 101 there is no 
requirement to demonstrate whether and to what extent concrete effects actually occurred: we legally 
only have to show, on the basis of a realistic counterfactual, the likely effects of the conduct in question. 
In some cases the quantitative economic evidence can be very important. But there are certainly are also 
cases in which qualitative analysis can be sufficient to provide the required proof of the likely effects, just 
as it can be in merger cases.” 
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circumstances and facts of the case - there are reasons (rule of reason analysis) to 
forbid the conduct and to believe that they could (have) happen(ed).  
On the one hand an actual harm is not necessary to sanction the company, 
however, on the other hand, a sanction can only be imposed after taking into account 
the particular circumstances of the market - which make it suitable to harm our legally 
protected value “competition” at least potentially – these cases could be labelled as 
abstract-concrete risk offences. 
Finally, we are left with infringements by effect with an actual effect. At first 
sight, it seems plausible to argue that these are infringements of harm since the 
Competition authorities need to prove an actual result on competition. However, in 
reality, we believe that these cases probably lay on the frontier between the concrete 
risk offences and crimes of harm.  
Given that the analysis is always based on a counterfactual, (what would 
competition have looked like, if the allegedly anticompetitive agreement under 
investigation had never existed?);593 it is quite difficult to determine whether these are 
cases of concrete risk offences or crimes of harm.  
Something which, to our mind, seems quite logical as these infringements move 
in a continuum of different conducts that move from their unlikely harm (or even 
procompetitive effect) [some types of information exchanges] to an almost absolute 
certainty of harm (and, therefore, of dangerousness) to competition [secret hard core 
cartels].  
                                            
593 (Italianer, The Object of Effects, 2014) op. cit. 
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Our conclusions are summarized in the following table: 
Competition law Criminal law 
 
Infringements by object 
 
Abstract risk offences 
 
Infringements by effect 
(potential effects) 
 
Concrete-abstract risk 
offences 
 
Infringements by effect (real 
effects) 
 
Concrete risk offences or 
harm offences 
 
2. The problem of enforcing principles rather than rules 
One evident conclusion that can be extracted from the above, when confronted 
with our review of the case law, is that in competition law there is a continuum of 
behaviors that can endanger the system and that frontiers between what is punishable 
and not are irremediably arbitrary. So far, this does not make it any different from any 
sanctioning system.  
However, the lack in competition law of detailed rules - either contained in 
“black letter” provisions or in a consistent (and effectively monitored) administrative 
practice - has created a very interesting phenomenon of evolution, which is precisely 
the opposite of criminal law.  
Instead of having conducts which are clearly forbidden through detailed rules 
and which are later analyzed by Courts and scholars, to determine its limits by reason 
of the values protected, the mechanisms of protection, and the general principles, all 
that the Courts and Agencies have is a general prohibitive principle which basically 
says that competition law can be attacked either abstractly, concretely or through 
intermediate mechanisms.  
In other words, when the ECJ differentiates infringements by object and by 
effect, the Court is technically categorizing conducts, while in practice it is trying to 
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compensate the lack of such “rules”. That is why the case law is sometimes so 
confusing.594  
As we explained at the beginning of this dissertation, Article 101 TFEU was 
drafted in open and broad terms because it was conceived as a general prohibition. 
Article 101 TFEU tells us that everything that harms or endangers competition should 
be prohibited, but it does not tell us when it should be sanctioned.  
Regulation 1/2003, quite wrongly in our opinion, tells us that everything that 
harms or endangers competition can be sanctioned but it does not tell us how to relate 
the harm or danger to the quantity of the fine or actually to the necessity of such a 
fine. It does not provide us any rules. 
Our review of the basic tenets of any (criminal) sanctioning system tells us that 
only those actions that can really threaten the system (again, the organization as a 
whole) should be punished, even in the absence of this general concrete effects and, in 
very particular cases, even in the absence of accumulation, provided that there is a 
sufficient threat to the protected value or to the social conception of the adequate level 
of protection that such value deserves.  
Translating these ideas into competition law means, first, that reality will always 
be more complex than just a few sentences, and secondly, that we should move away 
from a literal, word by word interpretation of the Treaty, and begin realizing that only 
those conducts whose illegality clearly emanates from it, such as hard core horizontal 
cartels, should be clearly sanctioned.595  
In fact, from our review of the economic literature, this is the only clear rule in 
collusion: hard core cartels should be punished. Only clear rules can meet the 
demands of the principles of culpability, harm and legal certainty.  
                                            
594 In other words, drunk driving is one type of crime, an abstract type of risk of offence, whereas 
information exchanges on the contrary, can be anything an abstract risk offence, concrete risk offence, 
abstract-concrete risk offence or even a crime of harm. 
595 See pointing, in our opinion, in this direction the Opinion of the AG Wahl in C-172/14, ING Pensii v. 
Consiliul Concurentei, opinion of 23 April 2015, paras. 39 and 40. See also his opinion in Cartes 
Bancaires.  
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C. The limits to the protection of competition: culpability, harm 
and legality, three key safeguards.  
The possibility to prohibit and punish risk offences under criminal law has raised 
many concerns among criminal law scholars, particularly with regards of the ability of 
these offences to meet three basic general principles of any sanctioning system:596 the 
principles of culpability, harm and legality.597  These principles fit very nicely within 
our theory.  
1. The culpability principle  
The principle of culpability is built under the basic premise that anyone that is 
punished under criminal law must have committed said criminal infringement.598As a 
corollary of said principle one must be personally responsible of the behavior that 
violates the penal code.599  
Traditionally, culpability has been understood either subjectively or 
normatively.600 According to a subjective interpretation, the relevant part of the analysis 
is whether the defendant was subjectively (consciously) aware of his behavior and its 
legal consequences. The normative analysis, on the contrary, looks at whether the 
wrongdoer could have acted in a different manner and chose not to do so.601  
                                            
596 As Professor Huergo has pointed out the guarantees of criminal law have translated into administrative 
sanctioning law generally as principles thus allowing for a more flexible approach in their application. 
See (Huergo Lora, 2007) op. cit. page 43 and seq.  
 
597 Our goal in the following paragraphs is to briefly sketch these principles, for more in depth analysis 
see (Roxin, Derecho Penal. Parte General. Tomo I, 2008) op. cit. 
 
598 (Mir Puig, 2011) op. cit.  page 123, explaining that the first corollary is the principle of personal 
liability or “personnalité des peines”.  
 
599 (Roxin, Derecho Penal. Parte General. Tomo I, 2008) op. cit.. Some authors assign the principle of 
culpability three different roles: first a requirement in order for a punishment to be imposed, secondly, an 
element in order to determine the exact gravity (length) of the punishment, and thirdly, a limit/safeguard 
to avoid the imposition of punishments based solely on the result of the conduct. (Muñoz Conde, 2002) 
op. cit. pages 92 and 93. This author focuses in the third function in particular.   
 
600 Jescheck, H. "Evolución del concepto jurídico penal de culpabilidad en Alemania y Austria." Revista 
Electrónica de Ciencia Penal y Criminología, 2003. 
 
601 (Muñoz Conde, 2002) op. cit. page 359.  
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After much debate, the general view nowadays is that this principle must be 
interpreted as a mix of both alternatives. Thus, in order for a citizen to be imprisoned for 
infringing a criminal provision, the legal system requires a degree of maturity and 
consciousness of its behavior, as well as the understanding of the legal consequences of 
his acts, which is not based on pure individualistic assessment of the wrongdoer but 
incorporates social conventions as well.602  
This mixed approach allows Courts to punish both willing behavior and negligent 
behavior. For example, a terrorist might highjack a bus to purposely get on an accident 
and kill several people (i.e. he was aware of his behavior and the illegality of such and 
he committed it anyways or). However, a bus driver might prefer to sleep in 10 minutes 
more rather than checking the pressure of the tires before departing at 5:00 in the 
morning, with the dreadful result that one tire blows up and there is an accident where 
several passengers die (he neglected his duties with appalling consequences and he was 
probably aware that by not checking the tires the risks increased).  
The principle of culpability as applied to crimes of harm is quite straightforward, 
we can look at whether the wrongdoer was subjectively and objectively conscious of the 
possible consequences of his acts, regardless whether or not he desired, expected or 
foresaw them.  
On the other hand, its application to risk offences raises particular problems since 
we are not dealing with specific and tangible consequences. In other words, there is a 
general degree of uncertainty that always surrounds risk offences and that to a certain 
extent is unavoidable, that is precisely why, criminal scholars tend to prefer 
“concretized” versions of these offences. For instance, two obvious problems that come 
up are: how do we quantify danger? and, moreover, how do set a standard of danger? 
After all, we know that people are either risk averse or risk takers but rarely risk neutral 
and, furthermore, it is highly unlikely that two persons will measure risk in the same 
                                            
602 (Muñoz Conde, 2002) op. cit. page 366. Another way to understand culpability is by looking at the flip 
side of the coin: liability. Only those citizens that understand their acts and their consequences might be 
liable. This does not mean that a drug addict does not infringe the law when he steals someone under the 
abstinence syndrome, however, he might not be as liable for his acts as someone perfectly healthy.  The 
same way that a minor, in principle, is not as aware of the consequences of his acts as an adult.  
 
Nonetheless, we should keep in mind that there are two understandings of culpability, as a general 
principle guiding criminal law enforcement, as a concrete requirement in order to find an infringement.  
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manner.  For instance, in any drunk driver case where there were no casualties, the 
defendant’s lawyer might ask the Court, or the jury, to consider: how much danger did 
the driver created (when he did not kill anyone) and how aware was he of his acts if he 
was considerably intoxicated?603  
As it happens with the application of general principles, there is no definite 
answer to these questions. Nonetheless, the principle of culpability provides a very 
useful rule of thumb for criminal law enforcers. There must be some degree of 
knowledge (subjective and objective – based on common experience) as to the 
dangerousness of the behavior before we can punish a particular conduct. 
Moreover, there must be a sufficient degree of knowledge of the illegality of the 
behavior.604 In fact, under a protective approach to criminal law, one could say the 
opposite is true, unless the prosecutor can prove willingness (mens rea), one should be 
deemed not guilty.605 Obviously, as with many of the concepts developed so far, we 
cannot talk about knowledge in yes or no terms, this is rather a continuum.606  
                                            
603 Notice that drunkenness is normally a mitigating factor in most crimes but it is the triggering factor in 
drunk driving, shouldn’t the courts have to address whether the defendant was aware that he was driving 
and that he was drunk, before addressing any other elements of the crime?  
 
604 This brings the concept of the “mistake of the law”, known as “Rechtsirrtum” in German which 
acknowledges that even though ignorance of the law is no excuse, there might be circumstances where the 
wrongdoer might be mistaken about: (a) either one of the elements of the conduct, someone marries 
another person believing that he or she is single, (b) the illegality of the conduct, a foreigner travels to 
Singapore and brings chewing gum without knowing that is forbidden in the country, or (c) the existence 
of cause of exculpation, for example a U.S. citizen from Texas living abroad in Europe might believe that 
the use of deadly force in the event of trespass (“castle doctrine”) might be allowed in all cases and not 
only in those of imminent peril of death. This mistake or error might, under certain circumstances, allow 
the wrongdoer to be exculpated or have his liability considerably decreased. Among others see Bajo, M. 
"El Error de Prohibición en el Derecho Penal Económico." Bajo - Trallero Publicaciones, n.d., (Muñoz 
Conde, 2002) op. cit. pages 396 to 402, and extensively, the thesis dissertation Felip i Saborit, D. La 
Delimitación del Conocimiento de la Antijuridicidad. 1997. 
 
605 We thank professor Lascurain for this observation.  
 
606 It is not the same the knowledge of the consequences, that the knowledge of the potential 
consequences or knowledge of the potential to behave in such a way that has potential consequences. In 
other words, it is not the same knowledge that it is required to show a willing intent, than a willing 
disregard or mere negligence.  
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2. The harm principle 
The principle of harm, in its original English meaning, summarizes a basic 
common sense principle: everyone is entitled to do as long as it does not harm another 
one.607 The principle, particularly in Continental law, has expanded nowadays to mean 
that only those conducts that harm the legally protected values (Rechtsgütter) should be 
punished.608  
The concept of harm encompasses two different notions. On the one hand, formal 
harm (antijuridicidad formal), the affront to the system as a whole that is caused by 
anyone who infringes a prohibitive norm. On other hand, the material or substantive 
harm (antijuridicidad material), that is the harm or danger posed on a specific legally 
protected value.609  
Again, its application to crimes of harm is quite simple. If you kill someone you 
harm that person and his right to live. If you try to kill someone and you fail, you 
attempted to harm him and, therefore, you endangered that value (life) that society seeks 
to protect, therefore, depending on the degree of danger (whether the attempt was 
suitable or unsuitable to meet its goal) you should be punished.   
In other words, in the crimes of harm, the danger can be measured by reference to 
the ultimate physical act that harms the values protected by the criminal code, and 
                                            
607 According to John Stuart Mill “That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others”, see Harcourt, B. 
"The Collapse of the Harm Principle Redux." Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper, 
2013.  
 
608 According to Ferrajoli the harm can be articulated in abstract (nobody can be punished for an act that 
does not offend legal values of constitutional relevance), or in particular terms, (nobody can be punished 
for act, that even falling within the wording of a criminal provision, does not in the particular 
circumstances endanger or harm the protected value). (Ferrajoli, El Principio de Lesividad como Garantía 
Penal, 2008) op. cit. “es posible articular el principio de ofensividad en dos subprincipios: el de 
ofensividad en abstracto, que podría anclarse a la Constitución mediante una formulación del tipo 
“nadie puede ser castigado por un hecho que no ofenda bienes jurídicos de relevancia constitucional”; y 
el de ofensividad en concreto, con el cual se podría establecer que “nadie puede ser castigado por un 
hecho que, aún correspondiendo a un tipo normativo de delito, no produzca en concreto, al bien por éste 
protegido, ningún daño o peligro”. El primer principio, al consistir en una norma dirigida al legislador, 
debería formularse en la Constitución. El segundo, al ser una norma dirigida a los jueces, podría 
perfectamente ser previsto por una ley común. En ambos casos, este principio tiene la forma, que es 
propia de todas las garantías, de límite o condicio sine qua non de la intervención penal.” 
 
609 (Muñoz Conde, 2002) op. cit. pages 304 and 305.  
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therefore, there is a benchmark to measure the danger. This reference does not exist in 
crimes of danger which makes it harder to assess the degree of harm that it is necessary 
in order to infringe the provision.610  
Again, this test does not provide easy answers but it does deliver another useful 
analytical tool. Danger is not an abstract concept but rather is related to a value which is 
protected. For example, drunk driving in order to be a criminal infringement might 
require a considerably high level of alcohol in blood or reckless driving might require 
some degree of actual or potential adjoining traffic. The same way that the ECJ 
overruled the GC judgment in Cartes Bancaires611 arguing, that the essential legal 
criterion for ascertaining whether coordination between undertakings involves such a 
                                            
610 (Muñoz Conde, 2002) op. cit. page 307 “La distinción entre delito de lesión y delito de peligro tiene 
razón de ser en relación con bienes jurídicos de carácter individual con un soporte físico material u 
objeto de la acción (vida, integridad física, propiedad). En este caso, tanto la lesión como la puesta en 
peligro concreto del bien jurídico son realidades tangibles que deben ser objeto de prueba en el 
correspondiente proceso penal. Sin embargo, hay supuestos en los que el peligro a que se refiere el delito 
en cuestión es meramente abstracto y no va referido directamente a bienes jurídicos individuales, sino a 
bienes jurídicos colectivos inmateriales tales como la seguridad del tráfico automovilístico (cfr. Art 382), 
la salud pública (cfr.art.364,24º), o el equilibrio de los sistemas naturales (cfr. Art. 325). En estos casos 
se trata de prevenir un peligro general que afecta a la seguridad colectiva y sólo indirectamente a bienes 
jurídicos individuales, cuya puesta en peligro concreto queda fuera de la configuración típica, aunque en 
algunos casos se aluda también a la puesta en peligro de estos bienes jurídicos sin especificar si es una 
puesta peligro concreta o abstracta (…) Esta doble naturaleza plantea complejos y difíciles problemas 
interpretativos a la hora de solucionar el nivel de peligrosidad requerido, la conciencia y aceptación que 
requiere el dolo de peligro y su diferencia con el dolo del lesión (…) Todo ello ha producido una enorme 
expansión del Derecho penal que se utiliza como un instrumento de intervención en sectores 
tradicionalmente alejados del derecho penal, pero que cada vez son más importantes en las sociedades 
modernas, como el medio ambiente, la salud pública o la economía”.  
 
611 In T-Mobile, the ECJ ruled that in order for a concerted practice to be regarded as having an anti-
competitive object, it is sufficient that it has the potential to have a negative impact on competition. In 
other words, it must simply be capable in an individual case, having regard to the specific legal and 
economic context, of resulting in the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
common market.  A few years later, the ECJ took a very different stand on the meaning of infringement 
by object and its burden of proof. The CB case was not a preliminary reference, but the result of an appeal 
of a General Court judgment upholding a Commission decision sanctioning the Cartes Bancaires 
Grouping.   
 
According to the ECJ, the General Court failed to take into account that the essential legal criterion for 
ascertaining whether coordination between undertakings involves a restriction of competition ‘by object’ 
is the finding that such coordination reveals in itself a sufficient degree of harm to competition.  
Moreover, the General Court had erred in law in holding that the concept of restriction by object did not 
need to be interpreted restrictively. The ECJ held that the General Court did not set clearly set out the 
reasons why the measures at issue, in view of their formulas, were capable of restricting competition and 
did not in any way explained in what respect that restriction of competition revealed a sufficient degree of 
harm to be characterized as a restriction ‘by object’. 
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restriction of competition ‘by object’ is the finding that such coordination reveals in 
itself a sufficient degree of harm to competition.612 
3. Legality and legal certainty 
The principles legality and legal certainty are well known in criminal law and 
basically stipulate that no punishment shall be imposed without a previous provision 
stating so (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) and that no punishment can be 
imposed if the provision was not clear and understandable (nullum poena sine certa 
lege).  
These principles are part of the European Union acquis613 and are, to a large 
extent, incorporated into article 49 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
The debate on the compatibility of Article 101 TFEU, as applied, through 
Regulation 1/2003 with said principles has been raised many times and dismissed by 
the ECJ.614  
In our opinion, the interesting aspect of the debate is neither whether Article 101 
TFEU meets the test of legality (which it actually does), after all it is a binding 
provision which tells us that everything that harms or endangers competition shall be 
prohibited, except when allowed under Article 101.3, nor whether Article 23 of 
Regulation 1/2003 fulfils it, which it clearly does not.615  
                                            
612 In fact, some crimes even demand that the danger is severe. For example, the case of hazardous spills I 
of Article 325 of the Spanish Criminal Code explained above.  
 
613 “In that respect it must be emphasized that a penalty, even of a non-criminal nature, cannot be 
imposed unless it rests on a clear and unambiguous legal basis” Case 117/8, Könecke v Balm, ECR 1984, 
3291, para. 11. In the Degussa judgment, the CFI held that “the principle that penalties must have a 
proper legal basis is a corollary of the principle of legal certainty, which constitutes a general principle 
of Community law and requires, inter alia, that any Community legislation, in particular when it imposes 
or permits the imposition of sanctions, must be clear and precise so that the persons concerned may know 
without ambiguity what rights and obligations flow from it and may take steps accordingly” T-279/02 , 
Degussa v Commission, ECR 2006, II-897, para. 66. 
 
614 For a very critical perspective on the compatibility of the current system with said principles see 
(Schwarze & Bechtold, 2008), op. cit. 
 
615 Following (Schwarze & Bechtold, 2008) op. cit. “contrary to the current decision practice of the CFI, 
Art. 23 (2) of Reg. 1/2003 infringes the principle of a clear and unambiguous legal basis”. According to 
these authors, the infringement of the principle of a clear and unambiguous legal basis can only be 
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Instead, the relevant question is whether the rules that are extracted from this 
principle (and its corresponding sanctions) through the Commission’s practice, meet 
the requirements of legal certainty that any sanctioning system requires.  
After all, even if classic continental lawyers are surprised by the lack of “black 
letter rules”, this method of law construction based on a general principle, from which 
more detailed rules are extracted through administrative practice is not that foreign not 
the Anglo-Saxon systems, where EU law applies equally.  
In order to meet such principle of legal certainty, the EU Courts need to apply a 
more careful approach to the system of precedent and a much more in-depth review of 
the consistency of the Commission’s decisions before acknowledging the existence of 
rules that can derived from the above. This is in fact, the normal method of 
interpretation in administrative law when rules are framed as open provisions 
(cláusulas abiertas).616  
What is completely against the principle of legal certainty is the fact that only 
infringing the norm, a party might understand what rules are derived from such 
general provision, which unfortunately seems to be the current system.617 
                                                                                                                                
remedied by limiting the scope of discretion of the Commission regarding the determination of the 
amount of fines. 
 
616 See for example, the description provided by the Spanish Supreme Court, Administrative Section, on 
the obligations that this principle imposes which include a prohibition against clauses too “open” or too 
broad or which are subject to interpretation by another norm which is also unclear, STS 2326/2013: “El 
Tribunal Constitucional exige taxatividad y certeza de los tipos infractores, requiriendo una descripción 
precisa de las conductas infractoras, suficiente certeza, taxatividad o claridad en la exposición de la 
conducta prohibida; comportando la taxatividad un mandato al legislador para realizar el máximo 
esfuerzo posible que garantice la seguridad jurídica, de manera que los ciudadanos puedan conocer de 
antemano lo que está prohibido y prever las consecuencias de sus acciones ( STC 151/1997 ), pudiendo 
vulnerar el principio de tipicidad los tipos infractores con cláusulas abiertas o excesivamente genéricas 
si configura tipos desorbitados, o la integración de una norma sancionadora en blanco mediante la 
remisión a otra disposición legal que no exprese con la determinación exigible en lo que consista la 
infracción ( STC 181/2008 y 283/2006).” 
 
617 (Schwarze & Bechtold, 2008) op. cit. “Furthermore, the objection may be raised that the fining 
proceedings in European Community competition law have been conducted for almost fifty years now 
basically without objection, and that the broad legal rules have attained a sufficient rule-of-law character 
in the course of decades of practice, so that doubts about the required certainty and unambiguity of the 
sanctioning system are not (or no longer) reasonable. Firstly, this argument can definitely be reversed. 
The greater the changes in practical application allowed over the decades by that normative system – 
which applies in principle unchanged –, the more the required legal clarity and certainty of the penalty 
system can be questioned. It is probably not an exaggeration to state that at the time Art. 15 of Reg. 17 
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 That is why an administrative practice of prohibitive decisions might be 
necessary before a proper rule is developed.  
4. “Concertation” under these principles 
As we have seen today, once concertation has been shown, the conduct 
requirement comes almost invariably. The UK Competition Appeal Tribunal affirmed, 
for example, in the milk and cheese case618 that, once concertation has been proven, it 
is clear from the judgments of the Court of Justice in Anic and T-Mobile that the 
evidential burden is on the participating undertakings to adduce evidence to rebut the 
presumption and establish that their concerted action did not have any effect on their 
conduct on the market.619 A burden of proof is considerably high.620  
Courts have developed, therefore, a iuris tantum presumption of causation that 
shifts the burden of proof to the defendant.621 From a legal point of view, this doctrine 
seems at odds with the principle of culpability and the quasi-criminal nature of 
                                                                                                                                
was adopted, it was by no means conceivable that the fines would reach such (exorbitant) levels under 
one and the same regime.” 
 
See also, the incorrect approach, in our opinion, of AG Kokkot in C-286/13 P, Dole Food Company Inc. 
v. Comission, opinion of 11 December 2014, para 113.  
 
618 Tesco Stores Ltd v Office of Fair Trading [2012] CAT 31. 
 
619 A similar reading of the case law can be found, among others, in (Ghezzi & Maggiolino, 2014) op. cit. 
“A concerted practice to fix prices exists even independently from the specific market practices that firms 
undertake after having taken part to strategic inter-firms contacts.” 
 
620 Case T-235/07, Bavaria NV v. Commission, [2012] ECR 226 at 180 “It is certainly true that both the 
statements by the managers from InBev and the fact that Heineken did not increase its prices until 
February 2000 demonstrate that, during the period in question, each brewer pursued its own policy on 
the market. Nevertheless, even though this finding may show the absence of formal commitments or 
actual coordination between the brewers, it is not sufficient to prove that the brewers never took into 
account the information exchanged at the meetings in question in order to determine their conduct on 
the market as they wished.” 
 
621As put forward by the General Court in the Bananas case:  “subject to proof to the contrary, which the 
economic operators concerned must adduce, it must be presumed that the undertakings taking part in the 
concerted action and remaining active on the market take account of the information exchanged with 
their competitors in determining their conduct on that market. That is all the more the case where the 
undertakings concert together on a regular basis over a long period” Bananas at para. 57. Equally, 
(Bailey, 2008) op. cit.   Later confirmed by the ECJ in C-286/13P, Dole Food Company Inc. v. 
Commission, Judgment of 19 march 2015.  
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competition law.622 By forcing the defendant to prove that he has not taken the 
information into account, the Courts are asking the defendants to meet the standard of 
a probatio diabolica623 to show that they did something that did not happen.624  
Moreover, the individual is presumed to have committed an action that is likely 
to constitute an infringement, a conjecture that seems to contradict the presumption of 
innocence that underpins any criminal or quasi criminal proceeding.625   
                                            
622Some commentators have argued that the presumption is based more in economic theory as to the 
factors that can destabilize a cartel, than in legal presumptions. (Ghezzi & Maggiolino, 2014) op. cit.   
“Put differently, a firm that makes its rivals believe that it has subscribed the results of their 
anticompetitive meeting and that it would act in conformity with them encourages them to act in a way 
that is harmful to competition, in case in order to deviate from the collusive equilibrium that the rivals 
will realize”. Nonetheless, they caution that “This argument should not be pushed too far. As a matter of 
practice, the rule of public distance has been elaborated and enforced in cases of blatant cartels, that is 
to say, in cases of leniency applications, prolonged parallel practices and complex forms of coordination 
against those firms that, though clearly benefitting from the collusive equilibrium, argued that they 
walked on-part in only one or a few of the scheduled conspirational opportunities.”.  
 
In fact, notice how far, the concept of concerted practices has gone. In 1957, the French 
Secretary of State of Economic Activities appeared before the French Assembly to provide explanations 
on the functioning of Article 59 bis later mirrored by article 85 TEC: 
 
 “L’entente peut résulter d’un contrat écrit mais, par-delà les apparences, il est loisible de 
rechercher si les pratiques effectivement suivies para les entreprises constituent la manifestation d’une 
action concerté ou d’une entente au sens de l’article 59 bis de l’ordonnance. Cette recherche s’appuie 
sur l’examen de la situation de fait du marché du produit considéré. Cette analyse est toutefois poussée 
assez loin pour ne pas retenir de simples présomptions permettant de conclure à l’existence d’une 
pratique concertée. C’est ainsi que l’existence d’un tarif commun de vente ne suffit pas à établir une 
pratique d’entente, si ce tarif n’est pas appliqué en fait et si les conditions de vent de chacune des 
sociétés productrices ont évolué dans le sens d’une nette différenciation des prix (…) Les pratiques 
précédentes sont susceptibles d’être condamnées en application de l’article 59 bis, dès lors qu’elles 
peuvent exercer sur les Prix les effets prévus par le texte”.  
Available at http://4e.republique.jo-an.fr/page2/1957_p4569.pdf?q=28+fevrier+1950  
 
623 An interesting aspect of the debate that has not been discussed into much detail is whether the 
presumption is substantive or procedural. In our opinion, the ECJ has made clear that this is a substantive 
presumption in the sense that it is embedded in the concept itself of concerted practices. The issue is 
relevant for National Competition Authorities as procedural law is national law whereas substantive law 
is guided by EU law. Dealing with this issue see (Bronckers & Vallery, No Longer Presumed Guilty? The 
Impact of Fundamental Rights on Certain Dogmas of EU Competition Law, 2011) op. cit.  and 
(Gebrandy, 2010) op. cit. AG Kokott draw a distinction between the standard of proof and the burden of 
proof in its conclusions, see para 80 of the AG Opinion and footnote 60.  
 
624 Arguing the difficulty in meeting such a high standard, (Bailey, 2008) op. cit.  and (Faull & Nikpay, 
2014) op. cit.    
 
625 (Bronckers & Vallery, No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of Fundamental Rights on Certain 
Dogmas of EU Competition Law, 2011) op. cit.  (Loozen, 2010) op. cit.    
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In this regard, it is very interesting to point out the final outcome of T-Mobile. 
When the national court received the preliminary judgment: it found that the Dutch 
Competition Authority had infringed the presumption of innocence, having dealt all 
too summarily with the defendants’ rebuttals to the causality presumption (which the 
Dutch Court was instructed to apply by the Court of Justice).626 
This was certainly a brave decision. On the contrary, the UK Competition 
Appeal Tribunal in the milk and cheese case considered that this approach is justified 
by the commercial and economic reality that competing undertakings are likely to take 
into account how their competitors are planning to behave on the market when 
determining their own strategy and conduct.627  
Moreover, there is an additional question, if the conduct is presumed to take 
place and to be anticompetitive, when do you determine its degree of 
“(anti)competitiveness”?  
In other words, if concertation is sufficient to build a presumption of 
anticompetitive conduct, how can you determine if the conduct is anticompetitive by 
object or by effect? 628 At what stage do the authorities need to show the (real or 
potential) effects of the conduct? 
The only answer is that the whole analysis of the legality of the conduct is 
biased ex ante. It is at the very beginning of this chain of presumptions that surrounds 
information exchanges where the Authority decides whether the infringements is by 
object or by effect.  
                                            
626 (Bronckers & Vallery, No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of Fundamental Rights on Certain 
Dogmas of EU Competition Law, 2011) op. cit.    
 
627 Tesco Stores Ltd v Office of Fair Trading [2012] CAT 31. The disclosure of future pricing intentions 
significantly reduces, and may indeed eliminate, uncertainty as to competitors’ future conduct on the 
market allowing an undertaking to alter its behavior accordingly. As a result of the disclosure or exchange 
of information, the participating undertakings are likely to behave differently on the market than if they 
were required to rely only on their own perceptions, predictions and experience of the market. 
Accordingly, the likely outcome of such an exchange is that the market will not be as competitive as it 
might otherwise have been 
 
628 Some commentators have argued as to the expansion of the concept by object as a result of T-Mobile 
and the consequent return to a more restrictive understanding in Cartes Bancaires see (Latham & 
Waltkins Client Alert, 2014) op. cit.  and infra note 205. This alert deserves particular attention as it 
belongs to the same law firm that defended Cartes Bancaires before the ECJ.  
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This is where the whole logic of Article 101 TFEU, as currently interpreted, 
falls into pieces and where the lack of proper legal rules developed by the 
Commission (and demanded by the ECJ) becomes evident.  
The Commission’s practice up to date629 only shows that the closer the 
information exchange is to a cartel case (information ultimately affecting price or 
quotas), the more likely it seems that the Commission will look at it as an 
infringement by object, on the contrary the closer the information exchange is to pure 
information exchange (decreasing uncertainty on itself) the more possible that the 
Commission will look at it as an infringement by effect.630  
In other words, there seems to be a tendency to sanction as infringements by 
object and use the net of presumptions explained above when information exchanges 
which are closer to a cartel, whereas if the infringement tends to be one of effect, there 
might be a tendency to use those presumptions as a threat to reach a commitment 
decision with the parties.  
However, some cases, particularly of young national competition authorities 
seem not to understand or miss this logic, precisely, again, given the lack of certain 
and determinate legal rules. 
D. The degrees of protection: attempting to endanger  
Since we have learnt that information exchanges as self-standing infringements 
convert a facilitating practice into an autonomous crime, an obvious question arises: 
how much can we anticipate the barrier of protection in competition law to sanction 
without infringing the above principles? In other words: is it compatible with criminal 
law to punish preparatory or attempted stages of behaviors which might be already 
risk offences?  
To answer this question, first, we have to bear in mind the distinction between 
crimes which just require an activity to be committed and those that required a result.  
                                            
629 Some authors consider it an “economic approach” (Loozen, 2010) op. cit.    
 
630 This is in - our opinion - the general impression that underlays in the Guidelines on Horizontal 
Cooperation Agreements.   
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A crime of action is one that just needs the offender to undertake certain 
physical actions. Drunk driving is the perfect example. No specific result is needed. It 
is just necessary that a person drives a car while drunk.  
A crime of result requires that the action ends up in specific consequence. 
Homicide is a good example. If I shoot someone and I kill him there is a result. The 
crime is not shooting someone but killing him. Just shooting will be either an attempt 
to kill someone or a different crime depending on the circumstances.  
Intuitively, one could see a parallel between (abstract) risk offences and crimes 
of action. In order to create a risk, it is not necessary to cause a harm (a result) or it is 
sufficient to pose a danger to a precise value deserving (criminal law) protection. 
However, we should not be guided by first impressions.  
There might be cases where the categories are not exactly parallel. For example, 
reckless driving can be understood as a crime of result. If a car drives at 200km/h on 
an empty road which is closed to all other traffic for recording an advertisement, he 
will not be putting at risk the functioning of road system or anyone’s life save for that 
of the driver. There will be no crime. If a car drives at 200km/h on two sided road 
when passing a cyclist, there is a specific risk posed to the cyclist by a concrete action 
- passing him and creating a wind force which might be sufficient to make him fall. A 
similar thing happens with competition law as we will see next.631  In a way, one 
could say that such a concrete placing of risk is on itself a result.632 
Therefore, the theoretical answer is that it is possible. So the ultimate reply to 
the question asked is that it depends. It depends on the risk offence and the moral and 
social repulsion attached to it.  
In the case of terrorist attacks, most criminal law systems in Europe punish not 
only the attack but also belonging to a terrorist band or even attempting to create such 
an organization. In order to do so, it will be extremely useful to be able to identify the 
                                            
631 (Muñoz Conde, 2002) op. cit. (Mir Puig, 2011) op. cit.  
 
632 Obviously, one caution should be made: these are not clear cut categories, the closer we get to a 
concrete risk offence, the closer we are getting as well to a specific result, and in a way, to a crime of 
harm. On these issues see (Kiss, 2015).  
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chain of events that need to be taken in order to reach the stage of highest danger or 
actual harm.  
In our opinion, this type of certainty and repulsion only exists in the case of hard 
core cartels. Only, in those cases it seems reasonable to punish the attempted 
categories. However, this extension of the frontier of protection is subject to certain 
requirements.  
First, the punishment needs to be necessarily lower than the accomplished 
behavior. There needs to a graduation, that takes into account the distance from the 
legally protected value. 
Secondly, the requirement of culpability will be higher, because the Competition 
Authority will need to show that the undertaking was aware (or should have been 
aware) of the likely consequences of its behavior, as we are anticipating the 
intervention at an earlier step in the chain of events leading to a cartel, the culpability 
needs to go a step further as well.  
As can see, these principles provide already a useful rule of thumb for trying to 
determine which information exchanges should amount to a sanctionable 
administrative law infringement and which not.  
Only those information exchanges that might undoubtedly lead to the formation 
of a cartel shall be punished.  
VII. CONCLUSIONS  
As we have seen throughout our review of the jurisprudence, information 
exchanges cannot be interpreted without recourse to the ECJ’s case law on concerted 
practices, to such an extent that both terms have ultimately become almost synonyms.   
The principle of individual decision making in competitive markets - 
consecrated in Suiker Unie as a parameter to spot concerted practices – is not only a 
different test from the one that the economic literature applies – collusion – but it has 
been expanded into a presumption of anticompetitive behavior even absent any 
205 
evidence of concertation. Thus, “tainting” all information exchanges with an ex ante 
presumption of objective illegality.   
The increase in competition enforcement awareness and the resulting decrease 
of direct evidence of cartels has pushed the European Commission to increase the 
relevance of indirect evidence - particularly information exchanges - in showing the 
existence of cartel, decreasing the burden of proof for the Commission to establish the 
existence of these hard core infringements.  
However, we should be aware that competition infringements are infringements 
of danger and, therefore, a category of infringements prone to interfere with the basic 
principles of harm and culpability.  
The risks that this entails might be small in the case of sophisticated agencies, 
such as the European Commission, which might assess the facts under an economic 
lens and use a slightly incorrect language purposely in order to further its goals (see 
Bananas and T-Mobile). However, it is considerably larger when these concepts are 
used by less developed Agencies or by regular Courts.  
Thus, the EU Courts and, particularly, the national Courts should be extremely 
careful when assessing the actions that might be deemed as infringements by object – 
i.e. abstract risk offences. In our opinion, this category if it was to continue to exist (a 
distinction that we believe should we surpassed) should be left for the classic hard 
core cartels or slight variations of a classic cartel type offence. 
Economic theory is consistent in defending that only naked price fixing and 
quota allocation  are unlawful per se (unless ancillary to an agreement with another 
objective), the EU Courts should not separate from this approach in their case law.  
Although it is true that competition law has been used as a mechanism to further 
integration within the single market, and that there might arguments in favor of a 
broader application of object infringements than in the US (i.e. territorial exclusivity, 
etc.), those arguments do not support a broader interpretation of the concept of object 
infringements as applied to information exchanges. 
An interpretation of Article 101 as a general clause encompassing a prohibition 
against invitations to collude could be already a step forward. This doctrine could help 
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bringing the concept of concerted practices within its logical conceptual borders (as it 
would restore the traditional meaning of concertation) and, at the same time, would 
allow competition agencies to regulate oligopolistic markets to enhance competition 
without the risk of Type I errors.  
How far should we extend this interpretation of Article 101 TFEU is something 
that will be settled ultimately by the European Commission and the European Court of 
Justice.  
Moreover, we see no problem in prohibiting what – under criminal terms – 
could be labelled as the attempt to commit a crime of risk. As we have seen, criminal 
law theory supports that in order to punish attempted behaviors the relevant issue is 
not whether the crime is one of risk or harm but, actually, whether the infringements 
are of mere activity or result. If there are a chain of actions that can lead to 
commission of the crime, then attempt can be punished.    
This does not mean, however, that attempt should be valid in all cases. Since the 
attempt brings the criminal law punishment to an earlier stage of the infringement 
there is an agreement among criminal law scholars that it should be left only for the 
most dangerous crimes; in our case: hard core cartels. Moreover, only willing attempts 
can be sanctioned.   
To sum up, we believe that this invitation to collude doctrine could be 
incorporated in the EU legal system without modifying Regulation 1/2003. In these 
cases we would not be interpreting an administrative infringement (there would be no 
administrative fine) but a general principle of the legal system (Article 101 TFEU).  
That is precisely the beauty of general principles, that they allow a wider and 
flexible application. Obviously, again, one caveat applies: provided that the 
Competition Authority can sufficiently prove the risk of ending up in cartel and that 
the legal consequence is just prohibition decision. 
Our study on information exchanges has clearly shown how the case law of the 
ECJ sanctions equally collusion and invitations to collude, without distinguishing 
among the different actions that are necessary in order to alter competition in the 
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market. In other words, the ECJ sanctions both competition infringements and 
attempts to infringe competition law.  
That is why the concept of concerted practices has become such a difficult 
instrument to grasp. There is not a theoretical distinction in the case law of the ECJ 
between actual collusion, indirect evidence of collusion, attempted collusion, 
invitations to collude or other preparatory acts, and facilitating practices, with regards 
to their degree of completion and proximity to the competition as legally protected 
value.  
As we said, the application of the harm principle demands that only horizontal 
cartels should be prohibited as infringements by object. That is, only in horizontal 
cartel cases the Commission should not have to show the actual or potential effects of 
the behavior of the companies. According to economic theory, only in these cases that 
danger is so evident as to punish a purely abstract risk offence.633  
Information exchanges, as competition law infringements, fall at least within 
three different categories that the ECJ has not been able to clearly spell out yet.634  
1) Information exchanges can be indirect evidence of the existence of a 
cartel. In those cases they should be fined as a cartel (i.e. infringement by object). In 
criminal law terms, if collusion is the crime, an information exchange might be 
indirect evidence of the commission of the crime.635  
                                            
633 We cannot develop this point further as it would require a whole thesis on itself. Nonetheless, our 
conclusion is that given the mix economic results as to vertical collusion, there should a progressive shift 
towards an effects based approach to all cases of vertical collusion, something which is already happening 
as some commentators have pointed out (Lianos, Collusion in Vertical Relations Under Article 81 EC, 
2008) op. cit., (Reindl, 2011) op. cit.  and the analysis of the GlaxoSmithKline case in (Faull & Nikpay, 
2014) op. cit. Only those vertical infringements that sustain a horizontal cartel should be treated under the 
object category, for example, RPM in oligopolistic industries where upstream firms hold significant 
market power. In other words, RPM could be considered an object infringement if it is clear that it is a 
practice within cartel. Arguing that RPM could be assessed with the same logic than information 
exchanges see (Reindl, 2011) op. cit.    
 
634 As we have seen this is partially due to the conceptual limitation of having to frame any infringement 
as an object or effect infringements instead of clearly setting out anticompetitive behaviors in Regulation 
1/2003.  
635 This is, in fact, acknowledged in the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines. 
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2) Information exchanges or information disclosure can be the preliminary 
step in order to bring a cartel into life. In that case, and provided that the competitors 
do not act in the market on the basis of the information exchanged, this behavior 
should be fined as an invitation to collude which, necessarily, requires a lower fine 
than actually colluding. In criminal law terms, sometimes the information exchange 
will not prove the existence of a cartel but rather the attempt of one (or several 
parties) to collude. In those cases, we should differentiate between suitable and 
unsuitable attempts, as well as between willing attempts and negligent attempts.636  
3) Information exchanges as self-standing infringements, outside the 
classic cartel fact pattern, are not collusive by themselves but rather might facilitate 
collusion. They should only be fined as infringements by effect provided that a 
sufficient risk (at least potential) to competition can be proven. In criminal law terms, 
sometimes competitors develop information exchange systems that increase the 
possibilities to behave coordinately. In criminal law terms, they could be labelled as 
the preparatory acts in order to commit an offence, or in some cases, those preparatory 
acts can even be codified, as for example in the case of the illicit association for the 
purposes of committing a terrorist attack. This is precisely what happened in UK 
Tractors.637   
There is a need to develop clear rules to ensure that sanctions are proportionate 
to the danger. In this regard, it is not paradoxical that the more abstract category is the 
one more severely fined if it is limited to cartel conduct: the only clearly defined rule. 
                                            
636 This term is used to show an obvious contradiction, a negligent attempt will never be sanctioned under 
criminal since the attempted category requires the willingness of the final act that does not take place. 
(Muñoz Conde, 2002) op. cit., (Mir Puig, 2011) op. cit.. In a way, some authors argue that this precisely 
why risk offences have been created and codified: to cover such gray area. In other words, to compensate 
the loophole derived require an element of mens rea even in the attempted category.  
 
However, given that we are still within the boundaries of administrative law, particularly, if the behavior 
is prohibited and not sanctioned, we see no major problem in issuing a decision forbidding certain 
conduct, even if the parties did not attempt to create a cartel but it could have likely been created as a 
result of the disclosure.  
 
637 Depending on the circumstances they should be fined or just prohibited/dismantled. One thing should 
be obvious, drunk driving cannot be punished with the same punishment than killing someone while 
driving drunk, the same way that committing a terrorist attack is a different infringement from associating 
to commit a terrorist attack. Therefore, facilitating the external circumstances for collusion, should not be 
sanctioned with the same degree of severity as collusion itself.  
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The more concrete the conduct, the higher burden of proof for the Commission and 
the more prone it will be to reach a commitment decision.  
The application of the principle of culpability, jointly with those of legality and 
legal certainty, requires that companies are sanctioned only for those conducts that are 
clearly unlawful and prohibited ex ante.  
To such end, it is necessary to develop a theoretical and normative distinction 
between the rules and the general principles contained within Article 101 TFEU.  
As professors Ghezzi and Maggiolino have pointed out antitrust enforcers need a 
notion of arrangement flexible enough to catch any behavior that could harm 
competition, even the most malicious one.638 We cannot fail to acknowledge, 
therefore, that if only very narrow categories could be sanctioned, Competition 
Authorities would be bound to legalistic concepts and could not adjust in due time to 
the developments of economic theory and market behavior. Moreover, it would be 
ingenuous to ignore that once a specific conduct is described as punishable, 
undertakings will try to find a mechanism to reach the same result (for example, a 
collusive outcome) through a different conduct.  
Even though it is true that codifying each infringement to the highest degree 
would be almost impossible and would petrify competition law, there are still many 
degrees of detail. Moreover, one must realize that is highly doubtful whether 
Regulation 1/2003, particularly Article 23 meets the most basic requirements set by the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, particularly when one looks at the presumptions 
developed by the EU Courts.639  
It is true that soft law has worked considerably well and that it allows Agencies 
to swift policies more easily. Nevertheless, one thing is to provide the Agencies with 
discretion when regulating oligopolistic industries and a very different one to allow 
the same discretion when setting increasingly high monetary fines. We firmly believe 
                                            
638 (Ghezzi & Maggiolino, 2014) op. cit.    
 
639 (Bronckers & Vallery, No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of Fundamental Rights on Certain 
Dogmas of EU Competition Law, 2011) op. cit.    
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that there must be a direct relationship between the severity of the fine and the 
discretion of the Administration and our thesis provides it.640  
In any event, any limits on the scope of the rules, could be compensated by the 
expansion of the general clause. In this way, new infringements could be prohibited first 
and, after a consistent practice, sanctioned. In fact, the application of the general clause 
would allow for positive decisions, such as those originally envisioned in the reform 
process that lead to Regulation 1/2003.  
That is why we believe our proposal is a pragmatic approach to the different 
problems involved and analyzed so far. In a way, the negative effects associated with 
both developments counter act each other, while providing more legal certainty within a 
more coherent system.  
VII. CONCLUSIONES  
Tal y como hemos visto, los intercambios de información no pueden ser 
interpretados si no es por referencia a la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia sobre 
prácticas concertadas, hasta tal punto que ambos términos han terminado en 
convertirse prácticamente en sinónimos.   
El principio de autonomía en la toma de decisiones – consagrado en Suiker Unie 
como parámetro para identificar prácticas concertadas – no solo es un test distinto del 
que aplica la literatura económica – colusión – sino que se ha convertido en una 
presunción de comportamiento anticompetitivo incluso en ausencia de una evidencia 
clara de concertación. Ello impregna todos los intercambios de información con una 
presunción ex ante de antijuridicidad objetiva.   
                                            
640 Our thesis, at the very least, allows reducing the discretion on the legal consequences by proving some 
certainty as to the final outcome depending on whether we are within a general application of Article 101 
TFEU or within an identified competition law offence.   Distinguishing the different levels at which the 
Administrative discretion can take place see (Bacigalupo, 1997). As Professor Hovenkamp has 
brilliantly explained a significant problem of pursuing collusive behavior in ambiguous situations is 
false positives. “The least costly way to pursue facilitating practices or collusion-like behavior in the 
absence of explicit evidence of agreement is for the Agencies to identify anticompetitive practices and 
then condemn them with cease and desist orders”. (Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and 
The Sherman Act, 2010), op. cit.    
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El incremento de la concienciación sobre la importancia del Derecho de la 
competencia y el consecuente decremento de la evidencia directa de la existencia de 
cárteles ha empujado a la Comisión Europea a dar mayor importancia a las pruebas 
indirectas – particularmente los intercambios de información – a los efectos de 
demostrar la existencia de un cartel, rebajando el estándar de prueba que se exige a la 
Comisión para probar la existencia de tales infracciones palmarias del Derecho de la 
competencia.  
Pese a ello, deberíamos recordar que la mayoría de infracciones del Derecho de 
la competencia son delitos de peligro y, por tanto, una tipología de infracciones muy 
propensa a interferir con los principios básicos de lesividad y culpabilidad.  
El riesgo que ello conlleva puede resultar pequeño en el caso de Autoridades 
sofisticadas, como la Comisión Europea, las cuales analizan los hechos desde una 
perspectiva económica y que pueden preferir utilizar un lenguaje parcialmente 
incorrecto para poder lograr sus objetivos (léase Bananas y T-Mobile). Sin embargo, 
dicho riesgo es considerablemente más alto cuando es utilizado por Autoridades 
menos desarrolladas o por Tribunales no especialistas.  
Por ello, los Tribunales de la Unión y, en particular, los Tribunales nacionales 
deberían ser especialmente cautos a la hora de analizar acciones que podrían ser 
catalogas como infracciones por objeto - i.e. delitos de peligro abstracto. En nuestra 
opinión, si esta categoría continuase existiendo (una distinción, la de objeto y efecto, 
que debería quedar obsoleta) debería restringirse a los carteles secretos o a las 
variaciones conocidas de dicha infracción.  
La teoría económica es pacífica a la hora de concluir que únicamente los cárteles 
sobre precios o cantidades son ilícitos per se (salvo que sean accesorios a otro objetivo 
legítimo), los Tribunales no deberían separarse de dicho enfoque en su jurisprudencia.  
Si bien es cierto que el Derecho de la competencia ha sido utilizado como un 
mecanismo para avanzar en la integración del mercado interior, y pueden existir 
argumentos que aboguen por una aplicación más amplia que en Estados Unidos de 
esta categoría de infracciones por objeto (i.e. evitar la fragmentación), dichos 
argumentos carecen de relevancia a la hora de defender una aplicación más amplia de 
las infracciones por objeto respecto de los intercambios de información.  
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Una interpretación del artículo 101 TFUE como una cláusula general en el que 
se entenderían englobadas las invitaciones a coludir sería un avance teórico 
considerable. Esta doctrina ayudaría a reducir la brecha existente entre el concepto 
actual de práctica concertada y el significado racional de coordinación (unión de 
voluntades), mientras que, al mismo tiempo, permitiría a las Autoridades de 
competencia la regulación de los mercados oligopolísticos sin el riesgo de imponer 
sanciones injustas (errores de Tipo I en la terminología económica).  
Hasta donde deberá extenderse la aplicación general del Articulo 101 TFEU 
mediante órdenes de cesación, es algo que debe ser resuelto en última instancia por la 
Comisión Europea y el Tribunal de Justicia.  
Asimismo, no vemos que exista ningún problema en prohibir lo que en términos 
de derecho penal podría considerarse como la tentativa de cometer un delito de 
peligro. Como hemos visto, la dogmática penal apoya la tesis de que a la hora de 
sancionar comportamientos intentados lo relevante no es tanto si la infracción es una 
de peligro o de lesión, sino si las infracciones son de mera actividad o puede deducirse 
un “resultado de peligro”. En otras palabras, en la medida en que exista una cadena de 
eventos (un iter criminis) que lleve a la comisión de la infracción, la tentativa podrá 
ser sancionada.  
Ahora bien, ello no conlleva que la tentativa pueda ser aceptada en todos los 
supuestos. Dado que la tentativa adelanta la barrera de protección a un momento 
previo de la comisión de la infracción, existe un consenso en la dogmática penal 
exigiendo que la punición de dichas conductas quede reservada a los delitos más 
peligrosos, lo que en nuestro caso sería el supuesto de los cárteles secretos. Por otra 
parte, aunque obvie decirlo, únicamente las tentativas dolosas podrán ser sancionadas.   
En resumen, creemos que una teoría sobre la invitación a coludir podría ser 
introducida en el Derecho de la Unión sin modificar el Reglamento 1/2003. En estos 
casos, la aplicación del 101 TFUE no sería la de la infracción administrativa típica (no 
se impondría una sanción monetaria) del Reglamento 1/2003, sino la de las cláusula 
general (artículo 101 TFEU).  
Aquí yace la belleza de las cláusulas generales que desarrollan principios 
generales, su capacidad de aplicación amplia y flexible. Evidentemente un requisito 
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inexorable resulta de aplicación: la necesidad de que la Autoridad de Competencia 
demuestre el riesgo cierto de que la conducta podría resultar en un cartel y que la 
consecuencia jurídica se limite a la cesación de la conducta.  
Nuestro estudio sobre intercambios de información ha demostrado que, al menos 
aparentemente, el Tribunal de Justicia sanciona por igual la colusión y las invitaciones 
a coludir, sin distinguir el cúmulo de actuaciones que resultan necesarias para alterar 
la competencia en el mercado. En otras palabras, en principio, la jurisprudencia 
comunitaria permite sancionar de igual manera las infracciones del Derecho de la 
competencia y las tentativas de realizar tal infracción.  
Este es uno de los grandes motivos por el que el concepto de prácticas 
concertadas se ha convertido en un instrumento jurídico tan difícil de aprehender. No 
existe actualmente en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal, una distinción teórica entre la 
colusión expresa, la prueba indirecta de la existencia de colusión, las invitaciones a 
coludir, y el resto de actuaciones preparatorias para lograr llegar a la misma, respecto 
de su nivel de desarrollo y proximidad al bien jurídico protegido, “la competencia”.  
Tal y como se ha razonado, la aplicación del principio de lesividad exige que 
solo los cárteles secretos horizontales sean prohibidos y sancionados como 
infracciones por objeto (esto es como delitos de peligro abstracto). En efecto, 
únicamente en este caso la Comisión no deberá probar los efectos actuales o 
potenciales del comportamiento de los competidores. De acuerdo, con la teoría 
económica únicamente en estos casos el peligro es tan evidente como para sancionar 
una infracción puramente de peligro abstracto.641  
                                            
641 Este punto no puede ser desarrollado más en extenso aquí pues requeriría una investigación propia en 
si misma. No obstante, de manera sumaria, nuestra intuición es que dada la incertidumbre en la literatura 
económica respecto de los resultados de la colusión vertical, debería producirse una tendencia hacia su 
estudio como delitos de peligro concreto, algo que en cierta medida ya está sucediendo. (Lianos, 
Collusion in Vertical Relations Under Article 81 EC, 2008) op. cit., (Reindl, 2011) op. cit.  y el análisis 
de GlaxoSmithKline en (Faull & Nikpay, 2014) op. cit. Sólo aquellas infracciones verticales que puedan 
soportar una cartel horizontal deberían ser sancionadas como infracciones por objeto, por ejemplo, la 
fijación de precios de reventa en mercados altamente concentrados donde las empresas aguas arriba 
disponen de un alto poder de mercado. Sugiriendo que los acuerdos de fijación de precios de reventa 
podría ser analizado bajo una lógica similar a los intercambios de información, véase (Reindl, 2011) op. 
cit.    
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Los intercambios de información, como una infracción del Derecho de la 
competencia, pueden subsumirse en, al menos, tres categorías distintas que no han 
sido claramente delineadas por el Tribunal de Justicia todavía.642  
1) Los intercambios de información pueden ser la prueba indirecta de la 
existencia de un cartel. En estos casos deben ser sancionados como un cartel 
(infracción por objeto). En términos penales, si la colusión es el crimen el intercambio 
puede ser la prueba indirecta clave de la comisión del mismo.643  
2) Los intercambios de información o la divulgación de información puede 
ser un paso preliminar en la formación de un cartel. En dicho caso y siempre y cuando 
los competidores no utilicen dicha información en el mercado, este comportamiento 
deberá ser sancionado como una invitación a coludir que, necesariamente, requiere 
una sanción menor que la colusión propiamente dicha. En términos penales, en 
algunas ocasiones el intercambio no demostrará la existencia de un cartel sino la 
intención de uno o más partes de llevarlo a cabo. En estos casos, las Autoridades 
deberán distinguir las tentativas idóneas de las inidóneas, y las tentativas dolosas de 
las negligentes.644  
3) Los intercambios de información como comportamientos autónomos, 
fuera del funcionamiento de un cartel, no son colusorios en si mismo sino que pueden 
facilitarlo. Por ello, únicamente podrán ser sancionados como infracciones por efecto 
siempre y cuando el riesgo (aunque potencial) pueda ser suficientemente probado. En 
términos de derecho penal, en ocasiones los competidores desarrollan sistemas de 
                                            
642 Ello se debe en parte a la necesidad de introducir las conductas infractores en el lenguaje del 101 
TFUE dada la falta de clarificación normativa del Reglamento 1/2003.  
 
643 Algo que de hecho reconocen las Directrices de Cooperación Horizontal.  
 
644 Este término se utiliza para demostrar una contradicción evidente, una tentativa negligente nunca 
podrá sancionarse pues la tentativa, por su propio nombre, requiere la voluntad de que el acto ultimo 
tenga lugar (Muñoz Conde, 2002) op. cit., (Mir Puig, 2011) op. cit.. En cierta manera, algunos autores 
sostiene que precisamente por ello las infracciones de peligro se han codificado: para cubrir esta zona 
gris.  
 
No obstante, dado que nos encontramos todavía en los reinos del Derecho administrativo, si el 
comportamiento se prohíbe pero no se sanciona, en principio, no plantearía mayores problemas prohibir 
este tipo de conductas en que la voluntad de las partes no era lograr un cartel pero su divulgación de 
información podría generarlo posteriormente.  
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intercambio de información que incrementan las posibilidades de comportamiento 
coordinado. Bajo la dogmática penal, esto podría concebir como los actos 
preparatorios de un delito, lo que en algunos casos incluso se codifica por los códigos 
penales como un delito autónomo, por ejemplo piénsese en la asociación ilícita para 
cometer actos terroristas. Esto es en nuestra opinión precisamente lo que ocurrió en 
UK Tractors.645   
Existe una necesidad acuciante de desarrollar reglas jurídicas que aseguren que 
la sanción es proporcionada con respecto al peligro causado. A este respecto, no 
resulta paradójico que la categoría más abstracta sea la sancionada más severamente si 
nos limitamos a las conductas de cartel: que es la única regla-tipo de la que 
disponemos. Cuanto más concreta sea la necesidad de probar el daño (delitos de 
peligro concreto o de resultado), mayor carga probatoria se exigirá a la Comisión y 
más probable sea que la investigación termine en una terminación convencional con 
compromisos.  
La aplicación conjunta de los principios de lesividad, culpabilidad y seguridad 
jurídica exige que las empresas sean sancionadas monetariamente únicamente por 
aquellas conductas claramente ilícitas y prohibidas “ex ante”.  
A tal efecto, es fundamental trazar la distinción teórica entre las reglas tipo y los 
principios generales contenidos en el artículo 101 TFEU explicada anteriormente.  
Como han subrayado los profesores Ghezzi y Maggiolino las Autoridades de 
competencia necesitan conceptos flexibles que les permiten capturar todo tipos de 
comportamientos dañinos.646 No podemos por tanto obviar que la fijación de reglas 
cuidadosamente tasadas podría atar las manos de las Autoridades a tipologías que les 
impidiesen adaptarse rápidamente a la evolución de la teoría económica y de los 
comportamientos de los mercados. Asimismo, resultaría ingenuo ignorar que una vez 
                                            
645 Dependiendo de las circunstancias, éstas deberían ser prohibidas o sancionadas. Una cosa resulta 
evidente, conducir borracho no puede sancionarse con la misma severidad que un homicidio conduciendo 
bajo los efectos del alcohol, del mismo modo que la comisión de un acto terrorista no debería sancionarse 
del mismo modo que la asociación para cometerlo. En otras palabras, facilitar las circunstancias externas 
que pueden llevar a un comportamiento coordinado, no puede sancionarse del mismo modo que coludir 
directamente.  
 
646 (Ghezzi & Maggiolino, 2014) op. cit.    
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que una conducta se tipifica, las empresas trataran de lograr los mismos objetivos a 
través de conductas que no queden expresamente recogidas bajo el tenor de la norma.   
No obstante, si bien es cierto que una codificación excesiva podría llevar a la 
petrificación del Derecho de la competencia, no debe obviarse que existen muchos 
niveles de detalle. Más aún, cuando es altamente dudoso que el Reglamento, 
particularmente el artículo 23.2., cumpla con los requisitos mínimos de la Carta 
Europea de Derechos Fundamentales, particularmente cuando uno observa las 
presunciones desarrolladas por los Tribunales de la Unión.647  
Es cierto que el llamado derecho blando “soft law” ha funcionado 
considerablemente bien y faculta a las Autoridades a corregir el rumbo de sus políticas 
de manera relativamente sencilla. No obstante, una cosa es proporcionar a las 
Autoridades con la discreción para regular mercados oligopolísticos y otra muy 
distinta permitir el mismo margen de discreción en la imposición de sanciones cada 
día más elevadas. Creemos firmemente que debe existir una relación inversa entre la 
severidad de la sanción y la discreción concedida a la Administración y nuestra tesis 
proporciona un modo de lograrlo.648  
En cualquier caso, cualesquiera límites que pudiesen derivarse del desarrollo de 
reglas tasadas se verían compensados por la interpretación amplia de la cláusula 
general.  
De este modo, las “nuevas” conductas infractoras podrían prohibirse en primer 
lugar y tras una práctica decisoria reiterada ser sancionadas. De hecho, la aplicación de 
la cláusula general debería incluso permitir la emisión de decisiones favorables como 
aquellas inicialmente previstas en el proceso de reforma que desembocó en el 
Reglamento 1/2003.  
                                            
647 (Bronckers & Vallery, No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of Fundamental Rights on Certain 
Dogmas of EU Competition Law, 2011) op. cit.    
 
648 Nuestra tesis permite, al menos, reducer la discreción respecto de las consecuencias jurídicas al 
proporcionar cierta certeza sobre las consecuencias dependiendo de si se trata de una infracción de la 
cláusula general o de un tipo/infracción concreta.  Distinguiendo los distintos niveles en que puede tener 
lugar la discreción de la Administración, véase (Bacigalupo, 1997). Tal y como ha explicado el profesor 
Hovenkamp brillantemente, un problema relevante de perseguir el comportamiento colusorio son los 
falsos positivos. La manera menos costosa de evitarlos es mediante las acciones de cesación.  
(Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and The Sherman Act, 2010), op. cit.    
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Es por ello por lo que creemos que nuestra propuesta proporciona un enfoque 
pragmático para los problemas analizados. En cierto modo, podría decirse que los 
efectos negativos contrarrestan a los positivos, mientras que se incrementa la seguridad 
jurídica de los operadores bajo un sistema mucho más congruente.  
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